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9Introduction
I can’t remember when Alex Cobham, now of the Tax Justice 
Network, joked that I should write a book called The Joy of 
Tax. I have to thank him for the title, and much else. 
For several years the book remained a title without con-
tent: occasional drafts came and went but what I’ve written 
took a decade of thinking, more than 11,000 blog posts, and 
vast numbers of discussions to bring to life over the relatively 
short period in which it was eventually written.
Who else to thank then? Two colleagues stand out. The 
first is John Christensen, the director of the Tax Justice 
Network. We have been on an amazing journey together over 
the last twelve or so years. And then there is Colin Hines who 
is the convener of the Green New Deal Group, without whom 
many of the ideas I have promoted on the broader economic 
agenda would not have been cajoled into life. Both have been 
true friends during my campaigning career who have enriched 
my life far beyond the matters referred to in this book.
Academic colleagues Ronen Palan, Prem Sikka, Anastasia 
Nesvetailova and Sol Picciotto (professors all) demanded I 
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improve my thinking over the years and each challenged me 
to go further than I had ever considered I might. I am grateful. 
As with all others mentioned in this introduction, none have 
any responsibility for the ideas and errors in this book, which, 
for better or worse, are all mine.
Howard Reed has been a friend and inspiration on many 
an occasion: it would be great to do more together. The mem-
bers of the Green New Deal Group are all also due thanks: 
they know who they are, with Andrew Simms and Ann 
Pettifor standing out for special mention. 
Some persistent commentators on the Tax Research UK 
blog, and most especially Ivan Horrocks and Andrew Dickie, 
encouraged me in my moderating of thousands of comments 
when that has, on occasion, been a thankless task. I am 
grateful for their moments of enlightenment.
My friends in Jersey may be surprised that I offer a note of 
thanks to the politicians of that island who started teaching 
me about obstinacy in the face of the inevitable from 2005 
onwards. I’m not sure they will appreciate my thanks. Nor 
will the many internet trolls who have over the years taught 
me about the reality of politics in the social media era, even if 
they never once offered a moment of enlightenment.
I owe an enormous debt to those who have funded my 
work. The trustees of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust 
showed confidence in me for five years, as did Stephen Pittam 
and Nick Perks, successive secretaries to that trust. That we 
shared our Quaker beliefs may have helped. Chapter 6 reflects 
that fact, unashamedly.
The TUC, PCS and Unite all offered support, work and 
friendship when needed. I am proud to be a chartered accoun-
tant and a trade unionist.
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Many NGOs also chipped in on the way: occasionally with 
work, often with support. Christian Aid, Oxfam and Action 
Aid jump out from the crowd.
My colleagues at the Fair Tax Mark have put up with my 
variable input whilst the book has been in progress. My spe-
cial thanks go to Meesha Nehru.
I suspect my agent, Carrie Karnia, and editor at Transworld, 
Doug Young, shared the doubts of many that this book would 
ever materialize. But they stuck with it, and the rush with 
which it has come into being. I look forward to repeating the 
process with the next idea.
No one deserves more thanks than my wife, Jacqueline, 
and my sons, James and Thomas. Jacqueline suffered con-
siderable ill health during the gestation period for this book: 
that it was written as her recovery has progressed is the 
clearest indication of the way she has been integral to my 
work. 
James and Thomas motivate me. Every morning I wake up 
thinking that if I have one thing to do it is to make the world 
a better place for them, their friends and all of their genera-
tion. Ultimately they will have to judge whether anything I 
have said or done has helped achieve that goal. Whatever 
their eventual view might be this book is for them, with my 
thanks for becoming the friends to me that both now are, 
from a father who can never really complain about how much 
time they spend on their computers because I have always 
been there just a bit longer. 
Richard Murphy
Downham Market
September 2015
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1
Tax and society
It has been said that the only two things in life that are inevi-
table are death and taxes. I hate to disappoint from the outset, 
but this is, very obviously, not true.
Death has indeed been inevitable from the moment that 
life was first known on earth. Life has, apparently, existed for 
about 3.5 billion years.1 However, since as far as we know 
taxation is a relatively recent human invention, for approxi-
mately 3,493,000,000 years death might have been inevitable 
but taxation was not, because humans have been around for 
at most 7 million years.2 
However, even that is too generous, because written records 
have existed for a mere 4,500 years and it is only from those 
records that we know about tax. Thus taxation may have 
existed for a lot less time than humans have been around. After 
all, there’s a fair chance that tax was not the first idea we humans 
hit upon. So Benjamin Franklin’s famous comment about tax is 
incorrect: for most of human existence taxation has not been 
inevitable. In truth most things that are said about taxation are 
just wrong. This will be a recurring theme of this book. 
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It is, however, worth noting that we do have written records 
from about 2,500 bc and that some of the earliest, from 
Mesopotamia, record that tax was a part of life back then, 
just as it is now.3 From this it would seem that, while taxes 
may not be inevitable, they have been a fixture on the agenda 
of humankind ever since we tried to live in any form of com-
plex society. If that’s what Benjamin Franklin meant then we 
can let him off with his error for the remaining 3,499,995,500 
years of living history.
The history of taxation is, in fact, important. If we are to 
understand what we want from taxation now – and that will 
be another recurring theme of this book – then we have to be 
sure that we’re not just reinventing that history and what it 
has to tell us. That’s why I am concentrating on this issue in 
this first chapter. 
Most histories of tax start in the modern era, but it was actu-
ally the Babylonians who are the first known to be in on the 
act despite having some problems to overcome in achieving 
their aims. In particular they had the slight difficulty that 
there was no money available to settle tax debt. The relation-
ship between money and tax is of enormous significance, as 
Chapter 3 will explain, but back then paying tax involved 
payment in kind. That could be in goods. So, payment in 
sheep and cows was possible. But so too was payment with 
your own labour; that was the first form of income tax. It is 
also apparent that other levies such as tariffs on imports and 
exports existed, paid with a part of the cargo, whilst in 1900 
bc there is a record of a person being imprisoned for smug-
gling. Tax evasion has evidently been on the scene for a very 
long time.
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Babylon might be the first place that we know had taxes, 
but the idea definitely spread. The Bible, and most especially 
the Old Testament, provides some very clear references to 
taxation, even if it does not always mention the word as 
such.4 It talks of personal levies (or a poll tax)5 and taxes on 
land.6 It also suggests that they were to be paid in grain,7 or 
in provisions.8 And there was, of course, the whole process of 
tithing, which looks remarkably like an income tax.9 
In other cases the whole issue of proportionality and the 
ability to pay is considered. So, for example, in 2 Kings10 it is 
said that tax was only to be taken from ‘the men of sub-
stance’, while elsewhere in the same book11 it is said that 
Jehoiakim ‘exacted the silver and gold from the people of the 
land, from each proportionately’, though frustratingly we are 
not told what, precisely, that might mean. Read together, 
however, the suggestion that capacity to pay and progressive 
taxation might have been on the tax agenda thousands of 
years ago is intriguing.
The Romans had many bases for charging taxes. The first 
preferred taxes were land-based, but these were abolished in 
Rome itself in 167 bc because the proceeds of expansion of 
the empire rendered them unnecessary.12 This was not true 
elsewhere, especially later in the life of the empire, by which 
times fortunes had changed considerably.13 Poll taxes based 
on land ownership remained popular with Roman adminis-
trators throughout the provinces. There were also customs 
duties and tolls, and special taxes on trading slaves. 
Extraordinarily, inheritance taxes at the rate of 5 per cent 
were charged at one time on those who did not leave property 
to their families. 
In the later history of the Roman Empire sales taxes were 
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more common and so too was resistance. It is thought that 
the revolt of Boudicca may have been related to tax demands,14 
and it is widely suggested that the refusal of Rome’s wealthy 
elites to pay the tax that they owed helped bring the empire 
to an end. 
The tale of the disliked tax collector appears to have its 
origins in the Roman Empire. The tax collectors in the prov-
inces, much referred to in the New Testament (maybe as a 
result of one, St Matthew, becoming a disciple of Jesus), were 
widely despised. Jesus also made comment on tax itself, 
including the obligation to pay it,15 as did St Paul.16 
The essential point to be made from this very brief tour 
through history before the Dark Ages is that so many features 
of modern tax debate resonate in what was happening then. 
There were discussions on the ethics of tax, whilst attempts 
to find different tax bases were obviously commonplace: 
land, income, wealth, sales, imports and exports, and simply 
being alive and having been counted (poll taxes) were all tried 
out at various times. There were also more methods of settle-
ment than today, where payment in kind is rarely an option. 
And, lest we think they are modern inventions, there were 
also allowances, exemptions for special economic circum-
stances, and wealthy people who got out of or simply refused 
to pay the taxes they owed. 
In the background to all this there is also a theme of resent-
ment. The resentment of having to pay tax to an authority 
imposed upon them that led to the rebellion of the Iceni tribe 
in Britain was no doubt little different to that of the first- 
century Jews as reported in the New Testament. Innovation 
in ways of collecting tax resulting in conflict and dispute 
appears to be a part of the history of the period. Through it 
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all, though, there is a recurring theme, which is that govern-
ments (or, at least, the autocratic and often foreign rulers who 
represented government in this era) needed cash to fund their 
military and territorial ambitions, and tax was a way of get-
ting it.
It is a theme that survived the Dark Ages. William I of 
England may have wanted an inventory of the wealth of the 
land he’d conquered in 1066, but there is no doubt that the 
resulting Domesday book was not just a record of curiosity; 
it was also a basis for tax assessment of the people now sub-
ject to his rule. Issues relating to taxation, and its imposition, 
have constantly been a significant factor in the history of 
many countries, of which England is simply an example. 
There is good reason for this. The ability to tax is an exer-
cise in economic power over others. This fact is inescapable. 
At the heart of much, if not most, conflict over the last thou-
sand years has been dispute over who should have that power 
over which other people. It is a primal dispute that is still at 
the core of politics today. All that has changed over time is, it 
could be argued, who has been disputing this issue, over what 
territory with which intended outcome. 
For example, the major constitutional disputes in the UK’s 
history have always revolved around this issue. Within 34 
years of William I conquering England his son, Henry I, had 
to sign a Charter of Liberties17 to win acceptance for his reign. 
It is suggested one of the grievances that the English barons 
had with the Crown concerned taxation, although the charter 
itself simply pledged to uphold the rule of law. 
Henry did not keep his word to the barons, but he had set 
a precedent that, in a sense, began a change in the direction 
of travel with regard to tax. His father William the Conqueror 
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was a straightforward, old-fashioned autocratic ruler, in- 
vading a territory and imposing his right to tax by might. 
Henry, his son, had to grant favours, even if he had little 
intention of honouring them, to achieve the same objective. 
The dark ages of taxation could almost be said to have died 
just after the conquest of England.
If there was still doubt about that new process of taxation 
by (albeit somewhat limited) consent then Magna Carta made 
it clear that the era of tax by royal decree was definitely meant 
to have come to an end. The demand for reform that gave rise 
to Magna Carta was, at least in part, tax driven. Taxes had 
been heavy as a result of the wars of both Kings Richard and 
John, from which the barons had gained little. Their willing-
ness to continue paying taxes for wars from which they did 
not gain was limited. Their threat of rebellion brought the era 
of tax without representation to an official end. 
Signed in 1215, the Magna Carta contained two signifi-
cant clauses relating to tax. Clause 12 required that the king 
accept the ‘common counsel of our kingdom’ when levying 
and assessing an aid or a scutage, which would now be called 
a tax.18 Clause 14 tried to specify what that process of 
common counsel meant and required that the archbishops, 
bishops, abbots, earls and greater barons should be consulted 
on any tax matter.19 It is curious that the clause 13 that 
divided these two said:
And the city of London is to have all its ancient 
liberties and free customs, both on land and water. 
It is extraordinary that even in the thirteenth century the City 
had to have its rights stated right in the middle of a 
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consideration on how tax might be lawfully imposed. Some 
may say little has changed since then.
With or without the City, it is fair to say that clauses 12 
and 14 of the Magna Carta were, firstly, a revolution in the 
legal basis for the right to tax and, secondly, were probably 
much more ignored than they were ever complied with. 
Nevertheless the precedent that they set was what mattered. 
There was in these clauses a specific constraint on the right 
of the king – the executive government of the day – to tax 
without consultation with representatives of the country at 
large. Those representatives may not have been very repre-
sentative, but the change was definite. The right to tax 
without representation had been eroded for the first time. In 
many ways the history of the following 800 years in the UK 
is just a footnote to the principle established in Magna Carta: 
the whole argument on constitutional reform since 1215 
might be said to be about who was to be represented in dis-
cussion on the right to tax, in what area, and when.
What is clear is that there was a feeling that Magna Carta 
gave too few the right to be heard. De Montfort’s parliament 
of 1265 extended the right of representation on some issues 
– but not it appears on tax – to some who were not peers. 
Another precedent had been set, but it took until 1362 for a 
statute to be passed that required the consent of the people of 
the realm before the king could tax their lands and goods.20 
Taxation and representation had become inextricably 
linked in England but that did not, of course, satisfy everyone. 
England might have had a parliament but it represented the 
interests of a tiny minority in society, being made up of peers, 
senior clergy, and commoners who were mainly knights and 
members of the landed class. This did not go unnoticed by 
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those left out of the equation. Wat Tyler’s Peasants’ Revolt of 
1381 was triggered by the attempts made by a royal official, 
John Bampton, to collect unpaid poll taxes in the town 
of Brentwood in Essex. The rebellion may not have lasted 
long, and 1,500 of those who were involved were executed 
for expressing their opinion on tax in such fashion, but it 
clearly demonstrated that tax was an emotive topic, and that 
the grant of representation to some gave rise to similar expec-
tation amongst others. The genie was out of the bottle.
It was a subject that was, eventually, to come to a head in 
the reign of King Charles I of England, Scotland and Ireland. 
There is little doubt that Charles was not a very wise man. He 
inflamed passion on many issues and as a result did his very 
best not to consult the English parliament. Having fallen into 
dispute with Parliament, and having then dissolved it three 
times between 1625 and 1629, he resolved to rule without it, 
whatever the statute of 1362 had to say regarding his obliga-
tion to consult Parliament on matters relating to taxation. 
And tax was at the heart of the differences of opinion. 
Parliament did not trust a monarch married to a Catholic. 
They reflected this mistrust in a refusal to grant Charles the 
right to collect tonnage and poundage (two forms of customs 
duty) for more than a year at a time. Tax was thus being used 
as a weapon in a power conflict. A parliament seeking one 
form of society sought to deny revenue to a king who they 
thought wanted another type of society altogether. The idea 
was emerging that tax might influence and reflect the society 
a country both was and wanted to be. 
Charles would have none of this. In his opinion it was 
his opinion that mattered; that was his God-given right. His 
problem was, however, that there was by the seventeenth 
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century no obvious divine right to raise tax without parlia-
mentary approval. Despite this he ruled for eleven years 
without a parliament. During that period he could, legally, 
resort only to his customary rights and prerogatives to raise 
tax. So he did, for example, force those earning more than 
£40 a year to be knighted and to pay for the privilege. But, 
most of all, he relied on ‘ship money’, a privilege tax suppos-
edly to pay for the navy but which Charles used to supplement 
the tonnage and poundage that he was collecting illegally. 
Land taxes – enforced by extension of the royal forests in 
England and by revocation of gifts of land in Scotland and 
replacing them with rents – were further attempts to raise 
revenue without parliamentary consent.
It cannot be said the outcome of all this was inevitable. 
There had never before been a revolution of the type that 
England had undergone by 1649. What can be said with cer-
tainty is that tax was a central, if not the sole cause of this 
enormous constitutional upset in English history. What is 
also clear is that the aftermath of Charles’s death and the 
creation of a Commonwealth under Cromwell did not solve 
all the problems. Indeed, Cromwell’s relationship with 
Parliament was on occasion little better than Charles’s had 
been, and by 1660 the monarchy had been re-established. 
Things were not, however, ever the same again. The rela-
tionship of trust between King and Parliament had been 
fatally undermined. In the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9, 
when Charles’s son, James II, was effectively overthrown to 
be replaced by William and Mary, who accepted the throne at 
the invitation of Parliament, the balance of power irrevocably 
shifted. William and Mary had to consent to a Declaration of 
Rights before accepting the throne. Among other things this 
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prohibited taxation without parliamentary consent. By 1694 
a demand for regular parliaments was backed up by the 
Triennial Act. 
The road from Babylon to London in 1694 is a long one: 
maybe 4,000 years of taxation history leading to this funda-
mental shift in the balance of power, in England at least. No 
longer could the English monarch tax at will; an effective 
limit on taxation by prerogative had been created by a parlia-
ment that, albeit very incompletely, represented the people of 
the country. Magna Carta established a precedent that the 
Charter of Liberties had failed to achieve; now the Glorious 
Revolution established another ground rule that the more 
violent revolution of the Civil Wars had failed to deliver. 
Never again, in England, would there be taxation without 
some form of representation. The gauntlet had in effect been 
thrown down by England’s Parliament and an example had 
been created for all societies. A threat had been established 
for all monarchs. Since 1689 tax has been at the core of social 
revolution.
Thus it was that in Britain’s American colonies the cry 
went up of ‘no taxation without representation’ at the time of 
the Boston Tea Party in 1773. This was a straightforward 
rejection of the Tea Act passed by what was, by then, the 
British Parliament, which was meant to enforce the obliga-
tion on Americans to buy tea on which duty had been paid. 
The attempt to impose a tax from afar on tea was a trigger 
point. The developing American colonies were no longer 
willing to accept taxation imposed without their consent. The 
Declaration of Independence followed in 1776. In the list of 
complaints that, in the eyes of those signing the Declaration, 
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justified their actions, was one statement of grievance about 
the King which was as short as it was unambiguous: they said 
that he had consented to ‘Acts of pretended Legislation . . . 
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent’.21 
It is possible that no one grievance has been more important 
in the demands that people have made when seeking their 
independence. Roll forward 240 years and the Scots’ bid in 
2014 to seek independence from the rest of the United 
Kingdom. On page 2 of the Scottish government’s case for 
independence it argued that ‘we have generated more tax 
receipts per person than the UK for every one of the last 30 
years. We are in a fiscally stronger position than the rest of 
the UK.’22 The point being made was clear: the Scots had 
raised more money themselves than the rest of the UK, and 
they wanted control of it. National pride, long-term differ-
ences of view that have meant Scotland and England have 
never truly integrated, and different cultures might all have 
impacted on Scotland’s claim to become the newest country 
in the world, but when it came down to it debate was really 
about one thing, and that was, to use the phrase coined by 
Bill Clinton’s election adviser in 1992, ‘the economy, stupid’. 
What is more, ‘the economy stupid’ very clearly meant con-
trol of tax and spending.
The Bostonians of 1773 and the Scottish government of 
2014 were not alone in realizing this. The Americans were 
just ahead of the French in understanding that to wrest con-
trol of taxation and spending from an authority out of 
sympathy with the will of a nation was the prerequisite 
of change, and, in the case of France, the precursor of revolu-
tion. At the core of the French uprising in 1789 was a demand 
for the overthrow of feudalism and the privileges and taxes 
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that maintained it. Even if ‘Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité’ was 
not, in fact, the cry of that revolution, in the Age of 
Enlightenment it was held self-evident that taxation not only 
had to reflect society, but had the capacity to change society. 
It may not have been coincidence that Adam Smith published 
his theory of taxation in his book The Wealth of Nations in 
1776, the year the United States of America declared inde-
pendence from Britain. 
Another paradigm in taxation had shifted. It was becoming 
clear that nation states were defined by their ability to tax 
and that the credibility of those states was, albeit rather hesi-
tantly at first, being determined by their willingness to tax in 
accordance with the views of those who were governed. As 
the Scots proved in 2014, arguments about the limits of the 
state, and its right to tax, still go on today. But what may not 
have been anticipated in the USA in 1776 or in France in 
1789 is just what representation might come to mean.
Some contemporaries of the French revolution, like 
Thomas Paine, were arguing for universal male suffrage, but 
they were way ahead of their time, and those who argued for 
women’s suffrage were even more so. The Enlightenment was 
not that enlightened as yet, but matters were to change. 
Although the linkage between tax and the creation of uni-
versal suffrage is too complex to explore in detail, it is clear 
that the relationship exists. It comes down, quite simply, to 
the old adage of ‘no taxation without representation’, and as 
the demands on modern states grew so too did suffrage, 
including, over time, that for women. Despite that it is 
curious, and embarrassing to note, that in the UK it was only 
in 1988 that the income of married women ceased to be 
declared on their husband’s tax returns as if it were his 
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property.23 Taxation has sometimes changed to influence 
social mores. At other times it has been dragged into reflecting 
them.
This brief review of the history of taxation shows, I suggest, 
a number of things. 
The first is that like it or not tax is a part of any society. 
Let’s not fight it then; let’s embrace it instead.
Secondly, many of the questions relating to tax that we 
struggle with now have been around ever since tax was first 
charged in ancient times. Questions such as who to charge it 
on, based on what economic activity, at what rate and whether 
that rate might vary depending on the circumstances of the 
taxpayer have existed for as long as people have recorded 
their history. So too have issues relating to allowances and 
reliefs; while tax evasion has been around from the start as if 
(as seems likely) it is inseparable from tax itself.
Thirdly, tax may be accepted (which clearly it usually was; 
after all, the states and empires that imposed it did seem to 
enjoy remarkable durability), but can also give rise to sub-
stantial tensions, and on occasion to outright revolt. There is, 
however, what appears to be a common theme to these 
ancient revolts that seems to have extended right through to 
the modern era, and even the present day. Tax is accepted if 
the authority imposing it appears to reflect the society that is 
paying it. Of course that process of reflection has changed 
over time, as has the number of people brought within the 
scope of the tax net, but this issue has been constant. Tax and 
society appear to be inextricably linked.
As a consequence tax has been integral to the process of 
the development of the modern state, which is in very many 
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respects defined by its ability to tax in a way acceptable to 
those living within its domain – failing which it is forcibly 
broken up, as the American colonies once proved to Britain 
and as the Scots tried, only slightly less convincingly, to do 
recently. 
Tax has also been integral to the development of the pro-
cess of democracy. Without the demand for representation on 
the issue of taxation it is very unlikely that the currently pre-
ferred method of government in a great many states in the 
world would exist.
The result is broader than the history implies, though. The 
implication of these conclusions is that the history of tax 
is little less than the history of the state itself.24 After all, it is 
taxes that define in no small part what a state thinks it can 
do. And it is the consent of the people to that process of tax-
ation that does in turn limit or empower the capacity of a 
state to act. Without that consent a state is restricted in how 
it can protect and provide for those within its borders. The 
fortunes of a people are, therefore, intimately linked to this 
process of consensual taxation.
It is only one step on from that realization to appreciate 
that tax both provides the basis for the power of a state and 
at the same time binds the people and the state in which they 
live together. That, though, can only happen with representa-
tion. And because representation appears to be related to the 
demand to pay, tax is in fact central to the creation of good 
government. We cannot, quite literally, do without it if we are 
to prosper, as the fate of so many states that can rely on oil 
revenues alone, without demands for other taxes being neces-
sary, appears to prove.
This idea does, of course, build on Rousseau’s idea of the 
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social contract. I think there is such a contract between the 
people of a nation and their government. And the consider-
ation in that contract is the tax that is paid. That tax must 
reflect the values and priorities of those people. If it does 
people will willingly pay it and return the government that 
charges it to power. If it does not reflect those values they can, 
in a democracy, change that government, and will. This pro-
cess of choice is then enabled by tax and democracy working 
hand in hand. We can get good government and we can make 
that government reflect our will and needs precisely because 
they want the tax that we pay, whether or not they could 
raise funds by other means (which is an issue to which I will 
return later). It is this vibrant and symbiotic relationship, 
developed over a long time and reflecting the struggle of 
many people to deliver it, that is, in my opinion, the first Joy 
of Tax. 
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What is tax?
For most people tax means income tax. If you were to listen 
solely to the media and politicians when they talk about tax 
that is what they are really referring to. So, for example, there 
was a headline in the UK’s Daily Telegraph in February 2013 
that said ‘Top 14 per cent of taxpayers pay 60 per cent of all 
tax’.1 Except they don’t, of course. The tax referred to was 
income tax, and that’s a long way from being all the tax paid 
in this country, or any other country come to that.
For the record, in the 2013/14 tax year it is thought that 
the total tax take in the UK was as shown in Figure 1.
I hope that this straight away shatters the myth that there 
is only one sort of tax. That is very obviously untrue.
I also hope it shatters the myth that the only tax that really 
matters is income tax. It isn’t. Income tax represents only just 
over a quarter of all taxes paid in the UK. That’s a lot, but it’s 
not all taxes.
Lastly I hope it shatters the myth that the most affluent pay 
most of the tax raised in the UK. Of course they pay a lot of tax. 
That is because they have a much higher income and/or much 
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Figure 1: UK taxes in the 2013–14 tax year
HM Revenue & Customs £’billion % of total tax
Income tax (gross of tax credits) 155.0 27.3%
Tax credits (negative tax) –2.7 –0.5%
National insurance contributions 106.9 18.8%
Value added tax 105.1 18.5%
Corporation tax 40.1 7.1%
Corporation tax credits –1.0 –0.2%
Petroleum revenue tax 1.1 0.2%
Fuel duties 26.8 4.7%
Capital gains tax 3.9 0.7%
Inheritance tax 3.5 0.6%
Stamp duty land tax 9.5 1.7%
Stamp taxes on shares 3.1 0.5%
Tobacco duties 9.6 1.7%
Spirits duties 3.0 0.5%
Wine duties 3.7 0.7%
Beer and cider duties 3.6 0.6%
Air passenger duty 3.0 0.5%
Insurance premium tax 3.1 0.5%
Climate change levy 1.0 0.2%
Landfill tax 1.2 0.2%
Aggregates levy 0.3 0.1%
Betting and gaming duties 2.1 0.4%
Customs duties 2.9 0.5%
Bank levy 2.2 0.4%
Swiss capital tax 0.6 0.1%
Total HMRC 487.7 85.8%
Vehicle excise duties 6.1 1.1%
Business rates 26.8 4.7%
Council tax 26.8 4.7%
VAT refunds 13.9 2.4%
EU ETS Auction Receipts 0.3 0.1%
Other taxes and royalties 6.9 1.2%
Total net taxes and NICs 568.6 100.0%
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Budget reports March 20142
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greater accumulated wealth than most people, which inevitably 
means they pay more than most people do in, for instance, 
income tax; but it is not the case, as the Daily Telegraph 
claimed, that they pay 60 per cent of all taxes. For example, 
they probably pay little more in fuel duty than most other 
people with a car do. And in proportion to their income they 
pay less council tax than most in the UK because the maximum 
that anyone can pay is capped for the purposes of that tax. 
This is a theme I will return to, but there are two important 
points to make here.
The first is that we have lots of taxes.
The second is that people don’t always tell the truth about 
tax.
Part of my aim in writing this book is to cut away some of 
that untruth. And I will also try to make clear when what I 
am offering is opinion, based on my interpretation of facts, 
which is more than the Daily Telegraph’s headline did.
So, what then is tax, which is the question I am meant to 
be addressing? According to the online Oxford dictionary it is:
A compulsory contribution to state revenue, levied 
by the government on workers’ income and business 
profits, or added to the cost of some goods, services, 
and transactions.3
This is, I am afraid to say, despite the authority of the 
source, about as misleading as the Daily Telegraph’s headline 
quoted above. For a start we do not now only charge tax on 
‘workers’’ incomes (a phrase itself suggestive of a deeply 
class-based system) and profits; we also charge tax on income 
from invested savings, pensions and rents. We can and do 
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also charge tax on wealth, as we do in the case of inheritance 
tax, or on gains, as is the case with capital gains tax, or on 
occupation of property, as council taxes do, and in exchange 
for services, as landfill tax does. The collective term for all 
this is ‘the tax base’. The tax base is made up of the things on 
which we want to charge tax. Any definition of tax can, and 
should, make reference to the tax base, but that still does not 
define what tax is because the tax base can exist without 
being taxed (as a lot of land does in the UK right now). So 
they’re not the same.
Next, the Oxford Dictionary definition states baldly that 
tax is ‘a compulsory contribution to state revenue’. There are, 
however, major problems with this view. As I have sought to 
show in Chapter 1, the whole history of tax, government and 
democracy is entangled precisely because those who have 
been taxed have demanded that their consent to taxation be 
sought before any such charge was imposed. In that case is it 
true to say that there is ‘compulsion’? Even if it is undoubt-
edly true that a great many people in modern democracies are 
disenchanted with modern politics they do have the right to 
vote in elections that result in the formation of the govern-
ments that set the taxes in the countries in which they reside. 
Compulsion is hard to suggest in that case.
What is more, those same people also have a right to try to 
influence the democratic process. They can either do that 
directly by actually standing for election or by supporting 
those who do, or they can do it indirectly, by seeking to influ-
ence ideas, as I am in writing this book. So, the suggestion 
conveyed by ‘compulsory contribution’, that people are 
excluded from the tax-making process which is then imposed 
upon them, has to be challenged. 
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Finally, and for the sake of the record, many people in 
the UK and many other countries do have a right to leave the 
country if they really do feel they are being compelled to do 
something they do not want. That’s not true of everyone, but 
the evidence that people actually move for tax reasons is very 
limited indeed.4 Again, the idea of compulsion is hard to 
sustain.
Instead, and implicit in this notion of compulsion, what 
the Oxford definition actually embraces is the idea that gov-
ernment is itself imposed upon us and if only we could we 
would opt out of it. I do not accept that view. There are 
remarkably few examples of states without governments. It is 
true that Belgium survived without a government for nine-
teen months in 2010–11,5 but the machinery of state continued 
despite that because it was always assumed a government 
would return. There are also places that do not have effective 
government. However, few would choose to live in parts 
of Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and the like. In fact, the absence of 
government is usually the precursor to or consequence 
of profoundly unattractive situations deeply prejudicial to 
human well-being. Government is therefore, I suggest, not 
imposed but willingly accepted by the vast majority as a 
matter of choice. That is because most of us instinctively 
think it a ‘good thing’. The idea that government is ‘imposed’ 
on us is simply not true in a functioning democracy. We 
actively consent to its operation and if we do not get the gov-
ernment we want then it is, at least potentially, our fault for 
not doing something about it.6 
What of tax then? Is tax accepted as a matter of choice 
by those making payment of it? There is evidence to suggest 
that it is. 
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First of all, when taxes are considered deeply unacceptable 
then this sentiment is very loudly and clearly conveyed. One 
of the best examples in recent history occurred in the UK. In 
1989 the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher 
introduced what it described as a Community Charge but 
which was almost universally described by everyone else as a 
poll tax. This poll tax was designed to replace the local taxa-
tion system that had been linked to capacity to pay inasmuch 
as it was based on the value of a property a person owned, 
and thus a form of wealth tax. The Community Charge 
instead required payment of a single flat-rate per-capita tax 
by every adult living in a local authority area, with only lim-
ited credit for those with very low incomes. So strong was 
opposition to this poll tax that rioting actually preceded its 
introduction in England and Wales (it had first been intro-
duced into Scotland) including a major outbreak in London 
in March 1990.7 So clear was feeling on this issue, and so 
damaged was the government by it, that by November 1990 
Margaret Thatcher had been ousted from office by her own 
political party. 
The message of this incident is very plain: however much 
we may grumble, the reality is that tax is actually imposed by 
consent, and is also paid by consent. Indeed, one reason why 
the poll tax headed for extinction so quickly was that in some 
areas there was simply insufficient court capacity to enforce 
recovery of the tax or to penalize those refusing to comply 
with demands for payment. That was unprecedented. If it 
occurred on a regular basis with other taxes the UK’s system 
of justice would collapse remarkably quickly. 
According to HM Revenue & Customs 90 per cent of all 
tax is paid without ‘HMRC doing anything’.8 Whilst I do not 
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entirely agree (since they do have to send out reminders to 
pay in the first instance and administer the system), I think 
there is a strong element of truth to that suggestion if they 
mean that most tax is paid with little or no further interven-
tion on their part. It follows that, in contrast with the reaction 
to the poll tax, the vast majority of tax is paid by consent in 
this country, and I suspect that is also true around much of 
the world. 
There may be good reason for that consent. The graph in 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between nominal GDP per 
head of population in 175 countries according to the CIA 
Factbook (a reliable source)9 and aggregate taxation as a 
Figure 2: Aggregate tax rate compared with nominal 
GDP per capita in 175 countries in 2013
Source: author’s calculations based on data from the CIA Factbook and 
the Heritage Foundation (see notes 9 and 10)
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proportion of that GDP (source: the Heritage Foundation, 
which seems reliable on this occasion).10 I added the linear 
trend line. 
The graph shows that as GDP per capita rises so does the 
aggregate tax rate. Or vice versa, of course. The relationship 
holds if countries with a per capita GDP below $5,000 a year, 
$10,000 and $20,000 a year are excluded, although the trend 
line begins to flatten a little as the rate of exclusion increases, 
perhaps unsurprisingly. 
I also tested the relationship excluding states with very low 
tax rates (often tax havens or places heavily dependent upon 
oil revenues) from the sample. If countries with aggregate tax 
rates of less than 10 per cent are excluded, the relationship is 
very strong: as tax rates rise so does GDP per capita markedly 
increase on average. Even when considering countries with 
aggregate tax rates of over 39 per cent (the UK’s rate) (but 
with Zimbabwe excluded as an aberration in the data) the 
relationship is positive, i.e. income still rises with the aggre-
gate tax rate.
Now that does not of itself prove anything – correlation is 
not proof of causation – but it does seem to suggest that higher- 
taxed states are better off, and it’s my suspicion that most 
people know this. They realize that there is in fact a relation-
ship between tax and well-being and that it is strongly positive 
for a country and so, in turn, for them. And that is why, as 
HM Revenue & Customs have put it, the vast majority of tax 
is paid without them having to do (almost) anything.
If that is true, and if it is also true that tax charges are cre-
ated by consent in a modern democracy with a universal 
franchise, then the view of tax that the Oxford Dictionary 
presents, and which would be widely recognized by a great 
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many people, is not just wrong, it is actually a complete mis-
representation of the truth in the situation described. In fact, 
the Oxford Dictionary is in pretty much the same place as 
the Daily Telegraph was when talking about the proportion 
of tax paid by the rich: spinning a line that is deeply 
misleading. 
That is not to say there is no element of compulsion to tax. 
It would be impossible to deny that there is, but when saying 
that we have a duty to ask why that compulsion exists and 
not just treat it as if it is an essential feature of the system, 
when it isn’t. In truth, the compulsion is there because com-
pulsion is a usual sanction that society imposes on behaviour 
that society thinks aberrant. In other words, society actually 
treats compliance (voluntary payment of tax) as normal and 
only requires compulsion to deal with those who break that 
convention. Let’s think about other areas where sanctions for 
aberrant behaviour exist. We do, for example, have laws to 
penalize burglary but not because most of us want to steal. 
That, I am pretty sure, is just not the case. The law sanc-
tioning theft as unacceptable behaviour is there because a few 
people within society do commit burglary despite the very 
obvious fact that the vast majority of us think that it is wrong 
to steal from someone else. 
The same logic should be applied to the sanctions the law 
imposes with regard to tax. Just as most of us voluntarily 
refrain from burglary without the requirement of any law to 
tell us not to do so, so do most of us in a modern democracy 
voluntarily pay our tax. It is for those who break the norm of 
society, by refusing to comply with what most of us think is 
the right thing to do, that we have law that penalizes anyone 
who persists in doing the wrong thing. The fact that we have 
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these laws and use them relatively rarely (as the poll tax expe-
rience proves) is not evidence of compulsion but the exact 
opposite, which is that compliance is the norm that needs to 
be enforced only exceptionally. 
If that is true, then to put compulsion at the start of the 
definition of tax – as the Oxford Dictionary has, and as many 
people do – is absurd in the current political context. I stress 
‘current’ for good reason, since of course this has not always 
been true. It made sense in the fourteenth century for the 
peasants to revolt: they did not set the taxes that it was 
demanded they pay. Indeed, the same grievance had earlier 
motivated the barons to demand Magna Carta. And it may 
equally have made sense for people to object to the Community 
Charge, a tax imposed by a government clearly out of touch 
with the sentiment of the people it was governing and which 
acted contrary to the principles of economic fairness many 
think inherent in democracy, which is a logic that flows from 
its deep associations with taxation and the sense that a tax is 
only fair if it reflects the capacity of a person to pay it. By that 
reasoning, the poll tax protests were against something seen 
as anti-democratic, and not the tax as such. This same logic 
also, no doubt, explains the Scottish nationalists’ demand for 
the Scottish parliament to have the right to determine taxes 
and spending, to reflect their society which appears to them 
to be clearly different from that of the UK as a whole. 
All that being noted, however, in most times and in most 
cases it has to be said that this need to resort to violent pro-
test about tax is unnecessary. We have the mechanisms to put 
forward our views and to change and reform taxation to suit 
the society we want and respect: that is the democratic 
process at work. And, as I have argued in Chapter 1, that 
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democratic process owes its existence to tax. The notion that 
tax is compulsorily imposed is anachronistic and should be a 
remnant of another age, when one class imposed their will on 
others who were not represented in the decision-making 
process. Now that we are, or at least can be (although some 
shamefully absent themselves from it), a part of that decision- 
making process, tax is not imposed but is consensual. 
What follows on quite logically from that realization is the 
understanding that tax paid does not become the property of 
some alien body. It is the property of a government in which 
we have a stake, and in which we participate. 
The consequences of this understanding are radical. 
Government is not now some ‘other being’ over which we 
have no control. It is something that we want to exist and in 
whose operation we consent. That’s not to say that at the 
same time we do not also understand that government is dif-
ferent from us: the democratic process clearly creates the 
possibility that there will be governments and taxes that we 
personally would never have supported with our vote. We do, 
however, consent none the less to comply with them because 
within the democratic process we accept the consequence of 
a will greater than our own. We are in one sense a part 
of government because we vote for it and so hope to have 
influence and even some control over its actions. And yet at 
the same time we also consent when it does not do what we 
want. And when that happens we realize that government has 
an existence apart from us and that we also consent to this. 
These two positions are, of course, in ever-present tension 
with each other, but that is the basis of the political process 
in a democracy. Both opinions most definitely exist, and 
simultaneously. 
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This realization has enormous significance for the debate 
on what tax is. If we consent to the existence of government 
and willingly consent to its right to tax, then another phrase 
in popular use is also profoundly incorrect: every time a pol-
itician says they are spending taxpayers’ money (and they do, 
often, even dedicating whole speeches to it11) they are making 
another statement that is simply untrue. Tax is not taxpayers’ 
money. It is the government’s money and it is the govern-
ment’s rightful property. It is absurd to claim otherwise.
First of all this is because if tax really were taxpayers’ 
money then the government would have no right to spend it; 
yet it very obviously has that right, not least because we gave 
it that right. And then there is the fact that tax is, of course, 
legally defined as the property of government, which is why 
when consent fails it can enforce its claim to ownership of it. 
What is more, this property right of the government, which 
results in its claim that it owns tax, has been created in exactly 
the same way as all other property in a modern democracy, 
which is by statute law. It is also enforced in the same way, 
through the courts. In that case for politicians to then pretend 
that this property right of the government to own funds paid 
in tax does not exist because the cash involved is still in some 
way ‘taxpayers’ money’ is not just wrong, it is profoundly 
misleading. It is also, and at least as importantly, a denial of 
their responsibility for that money. That’s not encouraging. 
Second, if the funds really were the property of taxpayers, 
as this statement suggests, then the government would merely 
act as agent for the people of a jurisdiction and not have an 
existence in its own right. There is a libertarian view that 
holds this to be true, just as that view also claims (when it is 
convenient to those making the argument) that companies 
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registered by law are nothing more than a bundle of contracts 
and that they have no real existence. Both arguments, how-
ever, stretch credibility beyond any reasonable limit. 
That’s partly because governments and companies can and 
do own property, and can and do decide how and where 
resources will be used, and in ways that cannot be attribut-
able to the acts of any one individual. That is a sure sign of 
decidedly separate existence from any one person, let alone 
any one taxpayer. This point then suggests the second reason 
why the argument that government is just an agent for tax-
payers is wrong: it is a matter of fact that any government (or 
company, come to that) is more than the sum of its parts and 
to suggest they are mere contractual arrangements or agents 
for the people they supposedly represent is, therefore, wrong. 
They have existence over, above and beyond that. It takes an 
extraordinary leap of imagination to think otherwise; the 
same sort of leap that permits a person to believe in the tooth 
fairy when an adult. 
At which point, and having made all these observations as 
to what is wrong with current perceptions of tax, the time has 
come to put something in their place. Based on these observa-
tions that government exists with our consent, and because it 
is clear that it has a legal right to the ownership of property 
to which we have also consented, and because we might 
sometimes have possession of part of that property which 
rightfully belongs to the government (which as a matter of 
fact many of us do because we receive some or all of our 
income without tax being deducted), then the action that we 
call paying tax is actually the process by which we transfer to 
the government that part of the funds that we hold which 
rightfully are not ours but are in fact the property of the state.
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Or, to put it another way, the idea that tax is our money 
that the government holds on our behalf is completely wrong. 
Tax is actually the government’s money that we sometimes 
hold on its behalf. That’s the exact opposite of what most 
politicians currently claim but in a modern democracy it is 
hard to see how any other conclusion is possible. To put it 
more formally:
In a democracy with a universal franchise that 
provides every adult with a right to seek election, tax 
is that property held in trust by an individual or 
company that is due to the state whose rightful and 
legal property it is.
I stress that this is not in any way a definition that chal-
lenges the right to own private property. In fact the exact 
opposite is the case. Because the government’s right to claim 
the tax that it owns is a property right, just like any other, 
defining tax in this way reinforces the property right of 
everyone in a society and says everyone has the right to own 
what is really theirs. What is more, given that a democracy 
can only exist when property rights are upheld (because 
anarchy breaks out pretty quickly if they aren’t), recognition 
of the government’s property right is absolutely fundamental 
to the maintenance of a democracy and the suggestion, made 
by all too many politicians in recent years, that tax is not 
really a government’s property to spend as it sees fit is, I sug-
gest, language designed by those who do not respect either 
government or democracy and who want to undermine the 
role of both, in order to reduce the confidence we have in 
the state in which we live. 
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It’s a sad fact that this rhetoric undermining the state seems 
to have worked. Confidence in democracy has fallen as the use 
of language like this has grown in recent years. The alienation 
it has created between us and the state of which we are a part 
has increased over recent decades as indicated by declining 
voting rates and disenchantment with the political process.
This just leaves some final comments to be made before we 
move on to look at more particular aspects of tax. The first is 
a really important and obvious conclusion to draw from the 
discussion I have just offered. This is that whilst we have an 
absolute right to own private property, that is only true if we 
have settled the tax that we might owe as a result of acquiring, 
using, selling, gifting or otherwise disposing of that property. 
So we do not own our gross income if the government says 
that tax is due as a result of acquiring it. We only own our net 
income. This obvious conclusion follows from the definition 
of tax that I have offered, but it’s important to make it clear 
for two reasons.
The first is that this rule applies to anyone who can acquire, 
own, use or dispose of property. So the often suggested argu-
ment of libertarians that companies do not exist, being a mere 
bundle of contracts, and that therefore they cannot actually 
pay tax (because only real, live, warm-blooded individuals 
can do so) is wrong. Tax is a property right and companies 
quite emphatically have property rights and that means that 
they can and do as a result have to pay tax in their own right. 
The same is true of trusts (which exist independently of their 
trustees), charities and partnerships. The idea that tax is 
something that is simply of concern to individuals is just 
wrong. It’s appropriately charged on any body with the nec-
essary property rights.
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The second significant idea that this introduces is that any 
attempt by an individual to reduce the property right of a 
state to claim the tax that is rightfully its property is an action 
like all others that are motivated by the desire to take from 
somebody something that is rightfully theirs. Such acts are at 
best a con trick, which is how they might be described when 
they fall within the law but leave the other party aggrieved 
and full of righteous indignation, or they are outright theft. 
Conventionally we have called the first of these two activities 
tax avoidance and the second tax evasion. But either way 
they’re an abuse of someone else’s property; in this case the 
government’s. No wonder then that they have given rise to 
widespread condemnation, although precisely why that has 
been the case has very often been hard for people to explain. 
That difficulty is now resolved using the understanding of tax 
that I have offered here. 
When tax is defined as something we owe by compulsion. 
to a government that is alien to us, out of property all of 
which is rightfully our own, then the claim can be made that 
tax avoidance and tax evasion are actions to prevent our own 
property being taken from us by duress. This affords cover to 
the tax abuser and those who assist them in their activities. 
No wonder they are so keen on the type of definition of tax 
found in the Oxford Dictionary. Such a definition even lets 
them claim they’re doing a socially just act by preventing 
their property being taken from them – except for just one 
little problem, which is that such claims have very obviously 
been an affront to millions and millions of people in recent 
years, including, apparently, those very same politicians who 
have told us that all they do is spend taxpayers’ money. 
And that affront does, in itself, very strongly suggest that 
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what I have argued in this chapter is right. We are offended 
by those who claim they have a right to avoid tax. That is 
because most of us know that we are not alienated from gov-
ernment: the vast majority of us feel that to at least some 
degree our interests and its are closely aligned and that. 
because of our power to participate in the democratic pro-
cess, action to abuse the government is also action to abuse 
us. This is why we are so passionate on this issue: we think 
that to take what is rightfully the property of government is 
an act that abuses us all, which of course it is. 
That’s why there has been public outcry on tax, but it only 
makes sense if tax is defined in the way I suggest it should be 
here. And because the outcry suggests most people do feel 
sentiment that can only be explained in this way then I sug-
gest the majority will also share this view of tax.
That’s not to say some won’t disagree. But to go back to an 
example noted earlier: to ask burglars to both define the law 
of theft and at the same time to shape public opinion on the 
issue because they are the self-proclaimed experts on the sub-
ject would, I think, by common consent be considered unwise. 
We should take the same view of the supposed tax specialists 
whose expertise is largely based on their prowess in denying 
the state access to its rightful property. In a democracy a con-
sensus should be defined by the majority. On tax we have got 
that wrong and have instead accepted a minority view and it 
is time to correct that now. 
The reality is that in a democracy tax can be seen to be one 
of the cleverest of human inventions, and one from which we 
all benefit as a result of the massive contribution it makes to 
our well-being. No wonder I think there’s a Joy to Tax. 
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Why we tax
Why does a government tax? The answer may seem blin-
dingly obvious: to raise money to meet its planned expenditure. 
However, it’s a simple fact that, completely contrary to pop-
ular perception, no government has to charge tax to be able 
to spend on what it wants to do. Most governments usually 
choose to raise taxes, but other mechanisms are open to them 
to achieve their spending goals. These need to be understood 
before considering why they use tax when there are alterna-
tives available. 
The most obvious practicable alternative to tax is for a 
government to print money to pay for its expenditure. As a 
matter of fact, although many like to deny it, modern govern-
ments do often do this so that they might meet the expectations 
they have raised among their electorate as to the services they 
will offer in exchange for their votes. 
Many people seem to think this money-printing exercise 
an extraordinary idea, no doubt influenced by the fact that a 
lot of economists argue that money-printing should not 
happen because it will, in their opinion, always debase a 
Joy of Tax.indd   45 04/09/2015   12:30
RICHARD MURPHY
46
country’s currency, with inflation running out of control as a 
consequence. Experience has, however, shown that this need 
not be the case. For example in the UK, where between March 
2009 and July 2012 the Bank of England bought £375 billion 
of UK government debt in the London financial markets1 in 
an exercise technically described as quantitative easing but 
which did, in reality, print an exactly equivalent sum of new 
government-created money and yet in 2015 the UK has had 
zero per cent inflation. 
To put this figure in context: total UK government debt in 
March 2010 was £759 billion and by March 2013, when the 
programme had ended, it was a gross sum of £1,185 billion.2 
So, over this period the government issued £426 billion of 
debt but during the same period the Bank of England – which 
is wholly owned by the UK government3 – repurchased £375 
billion of government debt from those who owned it. 
It is important to say that the debt repurchased was not 
necessarily the debt issued and the price paid for the debt 
purchased (£375 billion) may not have been the same amount 
as it was issued for: that is because debt once issued is not 
always traded at its face value.4 However, give or take a bit, 
the fact is that most of the value of new UK government debt 
issued from 2009 until well into 2012 was effectively can-
celled by the Bank of England simply creating money out of 
thin air to buy back a broadly similar amount of government 
debt in the financial markets. 
This issue of creating money out of thin air is important and 
needs explanation because, as will become clear, it is intimately 
related to the way in which taxes also work. Most people think 
money is notes and coin, or at least something created by 
government in place of notes and coin, and of fixed amount. 
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This, however, is now acknowledged not to be true by the 
Bank of England, although it took some time to get them to do 
so.5 The reality that is now accepted to be true by the Bank of 
England is that all money is created by banks making loans. 
This acknowledgement challenges another common per-
ception: most people think that when they ask a bank for a 
loan the money to form that loan will be money paid into the 
bank by other customers. In other words, the bank acts as an 
intermediary between lenders and borrowers. What has now 
been established is that this is not the case. Instead what the 
bank does when making loans is a conjuring trick that creates 
new money. The economic reality is that no savings deposits 
at all are technically needed for a bank to make a loan, and 
because this fact is, as I will show in due course, heavily 
related to a proper understanding of tax, it does need to be 
properly understood.
When a bank agrees to give you a loan they make that loan 
by effectively opening two accounts for you. One is a current 
account (for ease, let’s assume you haven’t already got one). 
The other is a loan account. If you borrow £10,000 what 
they then do is mark your current account as having £10,000 
in it. You’re now free to spend that however you like. At the 
same time they also mark your loan account as having 
£10,000 in it. You now owe that to the bank. And if you add 
the two accounts together (one being a debit and the other a 
credit, or a plus and minus if you like) then they add up to 
nothing: if you decided to cancel the deal immediately after 
arranging the loan, you could straight away repay what you 
are shown as owing in the loan account by using the money 
you are shown as owning in the current account, and there 
would be nothing left.
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Most importantly, please note that there’s no cash involved 
in this process at all. It’s just an accounting trick. Nothing 
more. Money is created by a stroke of a pen or some taps on 
a computer keyboard. There aren’t any physical processes 
involved. 
And also note that no one else’s bank balance is involved 
or affected in any way as a result of this loan being created: 
the money lent to you did not belong to someone else before 
you got it: it was created afresh just for you as a result of you 
asking for a loan. 
Of course that does not mean that other people will not be 
affected by this loan. Presumably you took it out to buy 
something. When you make that purchase you will pay the 
money from your current account and the recipient will pay 
it into their account. They will have more money (or reduce 
their overdraft) as a result. And this point is crucial: what this 
proves is that it is loans that create savings in an economy, 
and not the other way round – another statement the Bank of 
England now agrees is true.6 And the same is true even if the 
recipient was in overdraft – in economic terms paying off an 
overdraft is identical in its impact to a person saving.
In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that most things people think 
about tax are wrong; it has to be said most things people 
think about money are wrong too. But at least, in the case of 
money, the Bank of England has now acknowledged some of 
the errors, and has even said that almost all the economics 
textbooks that describe banking are also wrong as a result.7 
There are four further points to make about this process of 
money creation. The first is that there is, very clearly, profit 
to be made from creating money out of thin air. That’s espe-
cially true when money is something that almost everybody 
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wants, and which they are willing to pay to get their hands 
on, which is why banks can charge interest even though it 
cost them nothing to create the loan on which the interest is 
payable. No wonder banks are profitable.
Second, of course it is true that a bank can’t repeat this 
lending trick for ever, because if it did people would eventu-
ally realize there was no substance behind the promise the 
bank makes when someone takes out a loan. That promise is 
that the loaned money now in the borrower’s current account 
can be used to pay other people – a promise that is only as 
good as the bank on which the cheque is written. If a bank 
makes too many loans its ability to pay others may run out. 
Judging how much money can be lent before this point is 
reached is, of course, the confidence part of the trick of cre-
ating money.
The third is that, just as granting a loan creates money, 
repaying that loan destroys money. Loan repayment does not 
provide money for other people to borrow because that is not 
the process by which loans are made by banks; it simply takes 
the money that was lent out of circulation, for ever.
And lastly, since the government owns a bank – the Bank 
of England – it too can create money for its own use. Precisely 
because this is so easy, and partly also because commercial 
bankers wanted to protect their own right to create money, it 
is actually illegal for the Bank of England and other equiva-
lent EU central banks to lend directly to the governments that 
own them, but this has been got round by quantitative easing. 
In the quantitative easing process the government issues a 
debt (or gilt, as they are called) to a commercial bank which 
is then purchased by a Bank of England subsidiary company 
specially created for the purpose and to which the Bank of 
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England has lent the money (made out of thin air) to pay for 
the debt. The net effect is that government debt ends up 
owned by the Bank of England, which is owned by the gov-
ernment, so that the debt is effectively cancelled because you 
can’t owe yourself a debt. However, in the process of doing 
this money is created. Thus the government can indeed make 
money out of thin air as readily as any bank.
If you don’t believe me you wouldn’t be alone. The person 
who in my opinion was the second greatest economist of the 
last century, J. K. Galbraith, said:
The process by which banks create money is so 
simple that the mind is repelled.8
He was right: the process is so simple that we’re repelled by 
it. But now you know it’s true, and the Bank of England said 
so in 2014. It’s also true that the UK’s quantitative easing 
funding has effectively cancelled government debt, as evi-
denced by the fact that the Bank of England now hands the 
interest paid to it by the Treasury as a result of it owning 
government debt straight back to the Treasury from whence 
it came. That debt therefore now costs the government virtu-
ally nothing9 – and if that is not effectively debt cancellation 
it is hard to know what is.
So, there is proof that the government can print money to 
provide public services. It’s just a matter of regret that politi-
cians have not yet admitted the truth on this issue even though 
the Bank of England has been forced to do so. 
The Office for Budget Responsibility, for instance, still 
states total national debt to include this cancelled sum,10 
which is profoundly misleading, at best. The fact that it is 
Joy of Tax.indd   50 04/09/2015   12:30
THE JOY OF TAX
51
making such statements seems to be part of a whole political 
tactic of pretending that the government has run deficits of a 
scale that has simply not been true. That, in turn, appears to 
be part of the wider picture of not telling the truth about tax, 
whether deliberately or because the government genuinely 
does not understand it (a theme I will return to in the next 
chapter). Whichever is true, the reality is that from 2009 to 
2012, despite what has been claimed by almost all politicians, 
the government did balance its books (near enough) without 
raising nearly enough tax to do so.
That leads us back to the question of why the government 
chooses to tax at all, when it would appear to be easier not to 
do so. The answer is that although in theory a government 
does not need to tax there are in practice some very good 
reasons why tax still makes sense, although, yet again, these 
reasons are not the ones usually heard. 
First of all, the best, and in reality the main reason to use 
taxation is that tax lets a government reclaim the money it 
has spent into the economy, in order to stop the money supply 
over-expanding. 
I have shown that both the government and the banks can 
create money out of thin air, and do so. In the case of com-
mercial banks control is maintained by requiring that loans 
are repaid. That process of loan repayment, as noted above, 
quite literally destroys bank-created money. That’s important: 
loan repayment stops the amount of money in the economy 
increasing without check, which would result in inflation. 
It is just as necessary that the government has available to 
it a means of destroying the money it can create and spend at 
will into the economy, and that mechanism is taxation. 
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Taxation literally counterbalances government spending by 
reclaiming all or part of it from the economy. But what it 
never does is pay for the spending in the first place because 
any government can spend without tax. The almost universal 
commonplace that governments raise tax so that they can 
spend is a myth. 
I stress the point, the spending always came first. It may, 
rather like the chicken and egg conundrum, be hard to tell 
that now, as the spend and tax cycles run seemingly side-by-
side, but that was not always the case. Let’s go centuries back 
in history where we can see that kings did not start by raising 
taxes and saving up a war chest, and only then decide who 
they were going to pick a fight with. They instead, all too 
often, picked the fight, raised an army, borrowed the money 
to pay the soldiers (because this was in the days before they 
owned their own banks), and then raised the tax to repay the 
loans. Central banks were in due course created to get rid of 
the commercial banks as middle-men in this process, but the 
fact remains that the spending has always come first, and the 
tax second. So tax cancels the money-creation process, and 
does not pay for the spend itself.
So, counter-intuitive as it may seem, tax is not about 
money-raising, as most people think. It does not have that 
function. It reclaims the money the government has already 
spent.
You may think this is a trivial distinction, that reclaiming 
money spent is effectively the same thing as raising money, 
but it isn’t, by some way, and the change of perspective has 
some profound effects. First, consider the argument made in 
the previous chapter that all tax due does actually belong to 
the government. If you look on tax as reclaiming what the 
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government has spent into the economy this makes total 
sense.
Secondly, if you think of tax as raising money, and there-
fore that government has to raise money in the first instance 
before it can then spend you always, and automatically, pre-
sume that the capacity to spend is constrained by the amount 
of tax a government can raise, but, as I argue in this book, 
that is just not true. Because of the interaction between money 
and tax a government can always spend what it wants subject 
only to the constraints of inflation and the capacity of its 
economy to produce. Tax simply disappears as a constraint in 
that case, which should result in a radically altered mindset. 
In addition, if you see the spending as the primary part of 
the tax-and-spend relationship (and it is) then the process 
of reclamation of the money expended has to be consistent 
with the goals of the spending – else why you would spend in 
the first place? If the spending is for social objectives, and 
much of it will be in the case of a modern government, then 
tax has to be designed with that fact in mind. Arguments 
about ‘tax efficiency’, to some extent at least, become sec-
ondary in tax system design when tax and spend are seen not 
as unrelated issues but as wholly integrated mechanisms that 
a government can use to achieve its goals. This will be a 
recurring theme of this book; it demands that we think about 
tax in a wholly new way. 
It is important to note that the process of tax reclamation 
from the economy is not neutral. There are, in fact, five func-
tions that tax can fulfil when it is seen as a cash reclamation 
process, all of which are about the government putting its 
economic policies into effect through its control of this money 
recovery exercise. 
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The first of these other reasons (and so reason no. 2 in the 
overall list) for raising tax is that, as the modern monetary 
theory school of economic thinking suggests, unless a govern-
ment demands that taxes be paid using the currency that it 
issues there is no obvious reason for people to use that 
government-created currency in the economy it is trying to 
manage. In other words, the reason for demanding payment 
of tax is to make the local currency, issued, backed and con-
trolled by the government, the only useful currency in that 
place. 
The first time you come across this suggestion, which for 
many readers will be right now, it does seem a little odd. But 
the truth is, of course, that there are around the world many 
competing currencies that could be used for trading in any 
jurisdiction. Indeed, in countries where the shadow economy 
is very large, meaning that tax is rarely paid in full (if at all), 
there is ample evidence that currencies other than that issued 
by the local government are often used as the preferred basis 
for trading. This is why the US dollar is so popular in so 
many states where the shadow economy is significant in 
size.11 It is also why so many wholly illegitimate activities – 
such as the drugs trade – where taxes are not, of course, paid 
– are also known to favour the dollar. 
If, in contrast, those who trade know they will have to pay 
tax – whether it be VAT or income tax, national insurance 
and corporation tax – as a result of that trading, and know 
too that they can only settle that tax bill in the local currency 
of the country where they are trading, then they might as well 
remove all exchange risk from their transactions and actually 
use the local currency for the purposes of their trade in the 
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first place. After all, such tax bills can (but won’t always) 
amount to the single biggest combined outgoing of the busi-
ness: to trade in any other currency makes no sense in that 
case. Modern monetary theorists suggest that governments 
know this, and have always done so. And that, they argue, is 
why official coinage was the required basis for the settlement 
of tax even in the pre-democratic era and is also why nothing 
much has, in this regard, changed since then. 
The fact that government-issued coins and notes (or, in the 
present day, currency in its various broader forms) are 
required for this purpose of paying tax also serves another 
purpose for the government issuing them. By creating a 
demand for its coins and notes to settle tax liabilities the state 
ensures that those same notes and coins become readily 
acceptable as payment for the goods and services the govern-
ment itself wishes to buy within the economy it manages. The 
currency has a guaranteed value in exchange, which is the 
guarantee from the government that it will accept that cur-
rency back to settle debt: hence the ‘promise to pay’. In turn 
this allows the government to do what it wants, which is to 
spend. The conclusion is quite extraordinary: the process of 
taxation ratifies the value of money, and in doing so has made 
the modern economy possible.
The second additional purpose for tax is to reorganize the 
economy to ensure that it delivers the government’s economic 
goals. 
Money is, of course, an issue of some importance in any 
economy. In fact, given that inflation was the sole issue of 
apparent concern in the mandate for the Bank of England 
from 1997 until recently, you might have gained the idea that 
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money has been the most important issue to be addressed in 
the UK economy of late. I would strongly disagree: full 
employment, the sustainability of the economy and its ability 
to meet the real needs of those who live within it are all in my 
view of more importance than money; and yet if money is 
ignored none of those other objectives can be achieved. 
The amount of money in an economy has a dramatic 
impact on the scale of economic activity that takes place 
within it, and just two factors – the relationship between the 
amount of tax the government collects and its total spending; 
and the amount of money that is created by the banks 
when making loans – determine how much money (or credit, 
because all money is a promise to pay) there is in that economy 
to facilitate the trades people want to undertake.
The process of controlling how much money there is in the 
economy, to ensure there is enough to allow people to make 
the transactions they want but without there being so much, 
or so little, that inflation or deflation results, is a key part of 
government economic management and underpins this third 
reason for tax. 
The amount of commercial money creation is usually reg-
ulated by monetary policy, where the official base interest 
rate set by the Bank of England is the key economic variable. 
When this instrument of control fails – as it has over the last 
few years because banks have simply not been lending enough 
despite the base interest rate being near zero per cent – then 
the government has to control the economy through what is 
called fiscal policy instead. 
When fiscal policy is used to manage the economy a gov-
ernment injects its own money into the economy to make 
good the shortfalls arising from insufficient commercial bank 
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money creation: shortfalls that are effectively preventing the 
economy from running at full capacity (an issue explored in 
more depth in Chapter 4). There are two ways it can do this. 
The first is by running a deficit, i.e. spending more into the 
economy than it reclaims by tax, which then leaves money 
over in the economy, giving it a boost. The second is by quan-
titative easing. 
Both these processes can, of course, be reversed: govern-
ments can run surpluses (as happened in the UK from 1998 
to 2001), and bonds purchased via the quantitative easing 
process could be resold to the financial markets. That said, in 
the worldwide history of QE no bonds have been resold to 
date; and the running of surpluses is very rare. Deficit funding 
is the normal form of fiscal policy.
The purpose of both policies, monetary and fiscal, is to 
make sure that the economy keeps going when the markets 
do not deliver the outcome that a government desires within 
the economy that it manages. Almost invariably when fiscal 
policy is exercised – usually by deliberately setting tax reve-
nues to be less than government spending – the desired 
outcome is an overall increase in economic activity and so an 
increase in GDP. 
It is for good reason that fiscal policy is nearly always 
used in this one direction: there are very few governments on 
earth that would go through the aggravation of taxation at a 
higher level than its spending (so with no equivalent spending 
plans to justify it to the electorate), when it is instead much 
easier to control a booming economy by tightening bank 
lending conditions and raising interest rates, i.e. by using 
monetary policy, which is generally much less unpopular 
among voters. 
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This distaste for tax without spending is easily explained: 
since governments have no owners the idea of them accumu-
lating money for its own sake makes no sense. Long-term 
government surpluses are, in fact, a logical absurdity for pre-
cisely that reason, especially when alternative measures to 
control market excess are available. They are just like 
imposing saving on the people of a country, and few elector-
ates appreciate that happening to them. George Osborne 
might discover that if he ever really tries to run the long-term 
government surpluses he has said he plans to deliver. The 
infrequency of government surpluses over very long periods 
of history rather goes to prove the point. 
And the reality is that there has never, to date, been a 
shortage of buyers for government debt either. Which 
Chancellor in that case wants to simultaneously incur the 
wrath of the electorate by imposing enforced saving on the 
country and the wrath of the financial markets by denying 
them the government debt they want to buy? No wise one 
would, I suggest, unless the need to control inflation made it 
absolutely essential, and that is a rare event in modern econ-
omies. This is precisely why fiscal policy is almost invariably 
about boosting the economy when activity falls short of 
desired levels whilst monetary policy is used to shrink it when 
markets get ahead of themselves, and government debt is, as 
a result, almost never repaid. This last point is not the big 
issue that politicians make of it either: the fact is that the 
owners of government debt think it’s an asset and not a lia-
bility and most are happy to hold it for long periods of time 
and even pass it on to their children. To regard it as some sort 
of burden on future generations is therefore absurd: apart 
from anything else, as an asset it underpins many of the UK’s 
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pensions funds which would be lost without it. Perhaps even 
more importantly, run surpluses until all government debt is 
repaid and you reach a point where there is no government 
created money, at which time the economy would be at risk 
of outright collapse as the guarantee that underpins its 
medium of exchange would have gone. In that case, to be 
blunt, government surpluses can ony ever be short term exer-
cise, at best. 
To return to tax: governments clearly use taxation as an 
essential tool with which to reorganize the economy to 
achieve their desired outcomes. And precisely because gov-
ernments are elected to manage the economy no one should 
really trust any politician who says that they have as their 
main goal the balancing of the government’s books. Indeed 
that goal of a balanced budget makes no sense at all when 
read in the above context. It is, for example, possible in the 
right circumstances for the government to spend way in 
excess of the amount collected in tax and yet have no impact 
on inflation whilst delivering the completely beneficial effect 
of keeping the economy going when it would otherwise 
collapse from lack of demand, as the quantitative easing 
programme of 2009–12 demonstrated. The same is true of 
current government deficits, despite which we have no effec-
tive inflation in the UK. 
In fact, what anyone who proposes that government must 
run a balanced budget is saying is that the government should 
not undertake the job of managing the economy for the ben-
efit of the people who elect it, and that the economy should 
instead be allowed to run out of control if something goes 
wrong in the markets, with the government simply standing 
aside and letting that happen. In a modern democracy there 
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is no way that such an attitude is consistent with what is 
expected by any electorate, and the policy of balancing a 
budget is, as a result, either recklessly irresponsible, or a com-
pletely false promise made by a politician which they will 
inevitably fail to deliver.
It is, I stress, no modern realization that this is the case. 
Abraham Lincoln told Congress:
The monetary needs of increasing numbers of people 
advancing towards higher standards of living can 
and should be met by the government. Such needs 
can be met by the issue of national currency and 
credit through the operation of a national banking 
system [or designated monetary authority.] The 
circulation of a medium of exchange issued and 
backed by the government can be properly regulated 
and redundancy of issue avoided by withdrawing 
from circulation such amounts as may be necessary 
by taxation, re-deposit and otherwise. Government 
has the power to regulate the currency and credit of 
the nation.12
The interaction between money, inflation, the need to 
deliver economic activity for the benefit of all and the role 
that taxation has to play in that process has, then, long been 
appreciated. It has also, unfortunately, been long forgotten 
by some, at cost to us all. 
Keeping the economy going forward is, however, for most 
governments, only one objective out of many. There are 
others where tax can also play a significant role. So, for 
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example, since the Second World War most governments 
have, as a result of the universal suffrage that has had its 
greatest impact since then, made one of their key objectives 
the redistribution of income and wealth from those who can 
command considerable sums of one or both to those pres-
ently lacking sufficient to enjoy an adequate standard of 
living. The success, or otherwise, of these policies is some-
thing worthy of discussion, but not at this point; from the 
current perspective what is important is that most govern-
ments have not just paid lip service to this objective, but have 
also appeared to make some effort to achieve it. Given the 
disparities between words and action that I have noted so far 
with regard to tax this might be considered something of a 
surprise: a rare consistency between stated objectives and 
practice. None the less it is entirely appropriate to say that 
the redistribution of both income and wealth within an 
economy is the fourth reason for taxing.
That does not mean that taxation is the only way to achieve 
this goal: redistribution of income can, of course, be achieved 
through government spending. This happens when the gov-
ernment makes payments through a social security system to 
those in need. As already noted there is no reason for that 
spending to necessarily be financed by tax collected, and so it 
is possible for some redistribution to take place within an 
economy without tax being involved. It is fair to say, how-
ever, that most countries do deliberately use their tax systems 
to redistribute both income and wealth as a matter of policy.13 
The fifth reason for taxing is also policy related. Most people 
realize that whilst markets, like taxation, are a remarkable 
human invention that has enormously increased the 
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well-being of humankind they do, inevitably, sometimes get 
things wrong. This happens when the price a market sets for 
goods or services does not take into consideration all the 
costs or benefits that result from the trade in that activity. 
<text2>A very obvious example is to be found in the case 
of oil. Our economy would simply not function without oil at 
the present time and yet we know that burning oil creates 
enormous side-effects that economists call externalities. The 
most obvious of these externalities from oil is pollution, 
which we do need to manage through repricing via the tax 
system; but there are two further side-effects, also obvious, 
that would never be reflected in the market price for oil unless 
a tax charge was added to it. The first of these is global 
warming; the second is the fact that oil is going to run out 
and therefore, long in advance of that happening, any respon-
sible government needs to invest in alternative technologies 
that ensure society will continue to have the energy it needs 
after the time that the oil wells will have run dry. By adding 
tax to the price that we pay for oil-based products, most espe-
cially petrol and diesel, repricing reflects the policy intended 
to achieve these purposes.
There are, of course, other examples of externalities. For 
example, tobacco and alcohol products carry additional 
charges that help fund the impact upon health services, and 
the cost of care for those who suffer the consequences of 
using these products.
Now some will be cynical about this claim that such taxes 
are charged to reflect the externalities inherent in the prod-
ucts to which they relate. They will instead say that because 
the products in question are either essential or addictive they 
have what is called a very low price elasticity of demand, 
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meaning that if tax is added to them, even in significant 
amount, the demand for the product remains largely intact 
and that this simply makes them a very easy way of raising 
tax. There is no question but that the price inelasticity of such 
products has been exploited in the past (as, for example, with 
the tax imposed on tea imported into the USA which gave rise 
to the Boston Tea Party and all that followed from it), but it 
is now likely that the correction of externalities not reflected 
in their prices is the main reason for taxing these items. 
It is also possible to bring the price of an item down by 
tax-related means. This is often found in the case of VAT. 
Things like food, children’s clothes, books, new homes, rents, 
and other essential transactions are not subject to VAT in the 
UK precisely because the government wants to ensure that 
these goods and services are affordable, as a matter of policy. 
It uses tax (VAT in this case) to underprice them relative to 
other goods and services. 
This fifth use for tax is, then, best described as repricing 
those goods and services where the government thinks that 
the market has failed to reflect social or external costs in the 
prices that would otherwise be set.
There is a sixth, and last, reason to tax. Chapter 1 explained 
how over the course of our history the relationship between 
tax and democracy is intimate, and to some extent inextri-
cable. That remains the case today and there is some evidence 
(which I think compelling but about which not everyone will 
agree) that the more a person perceives a direct relationship 
between the tax they pay and the government, the more likely 
it then is that person will vote in elections. So, for example, in 
the UK many more people vote in general elections than other 
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polls because, I suggest, income taxes are a matter of signifi-
cance to many who vote and the role of income tax in the 
relationship between those many voters and the government 
is obvious. On the other hand, fewer people vote in local gov-
ernment elections because there are many who appreciate 
that the taxes that they pay to local government represent 
only a small part of its total spending and have, therefore, 
little impact on its decision-making process. The same could 
also be argued of European Union elections where there is no 
obvious tax connection at all. 
It is consequently my belief that it is important that every- 
one does pay some income tax, and that is precisely why I 
have so much difficulty with the suggestion that taking people 
out of income tax (but no other tax) is beneficial. I do not 
think that is the case: I think that such a policy instead leaves 
people alienated from government and that this undermines 
the effectiveness of our democracy. I strongly suspect that, 
given the psychological importance accorded to income tax, 
this is another relationship that also works in reverse: over 
time governments come to think that people who do not pay 
that tax do not matter. The final reason for taxing is, then, to 
raise representation.
Taking all these factors together we have six reasons for any 
government to tax, all of which conveniently start with R:
1. Reclaiming money the government has spent into the 
economy for re-use 
2. Ratifying the value of money
3. Reorganizing the economy
4. Redistributing income and wealth
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5. Repricing goods and services
6. Raising representation
With that range of reasons for taxing it is not surprising that 
it remains high on most governments’ agendas. It is clear tax 
really does deserve its role at the heart of economic debate. 
All that remains to be said is it’s a shame that so much non-
sense is talked about it. Correcting that nonsense is the subject 
of later chapters. 
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[chapter title]
Tax, as the first three chapters of this book have shown, is 
not something most of us need to be compelled to pay. As 
even HM Revenue & Customs say, the reality is that most of 
us pay tax voluntarily. 
And as those same chapters note, the idea that tax is about 
raising money to pay for the government’s spending is wrong. 
Any government can spend without taxing, if it so wishes, 
although for the very good reasons noted in Chapter 3, few 
would want to do without taxation altogether. That’s because 
most politicians realize that tax is very often the most effec-
tive way in which a government can influence the working of 
the economy for which it is responsible for the benefit of the 
people it has been charged with governing. 
It is for precisely this reason that tax is not about oppres-
sion, a loss of freedom or even a loss of income; it’s actually 
about how to make collective choices that work best for the 
communities we all live in. That is why most of us pay it. We 
know from our own experience that tax does help deliver to 
us things that we quite definitely want, and would now find 
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very difficult to do without, and on which we want a say, 
which democracy allows. 
The truth is that debate about tax should be all about 
choice, and most of the rest of this book will have that subject 
as its recurring theme. But before getting to that discussion it 
is vital to note that there are some who would really rather 
that we talked about other things when it comes to tax. Their 
arguments have to be addressed head on before we can con-
sider the great things tax can do for us.
There are, broadly speaking, three groups who wish to 
undermine tax debate, all of whose voices are heard very 
loudly whenever the subject is raised at present. 
One group is, by and large, made up of mainstream politi-
cians. For entirely erroneous reasons, which I in part explored 
in Chapter 3 and will now explore in more depth below, they 
now appear to suffer from selective ignorance when it comes to 
taxation. As a consequence almost all politicians are offering a 
prescription of austerity as a solution to all economic ailments. 
This, I think, is bizarre, because for reasons that I will explain 
such a policy cannot work to achieve their stated objective of 
a balanced budget, despite which almost all seem committed 
to the famous Thatcher mantra that ‘there is no alternative’. 
As a result they are collectively denying us the Joy of Tax, for 
reasons that I suspect most of them do not understand.
Another group, in contrast, do in my opinion know exactly 
what they’re doing when it comes to tax. These people are 
libertarians based in think tanks such as the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, the Taxpayers’ Alliance and bodies such as 
the Institute of Directors. Their object is, in the apparent 
name of freedom, to deny us the Joy of Tax by making sure 
that democratic choice with regard to tax, as most would 
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understand it, is not available in the future. They hope to 
deliver this under the guise of flat taxes, whose false allure is 
something I will address in this chapter. 
Lastly , there are people who really do not want tax to 
work as it should. On the whole these people are motivated 
by what can best be described as greed, although they do 
their utmost to hide it. Indeed, many of them do their utmost 
to hide everything they do because they are undermining the 
effective operation of the existing tax system so that it cannot 
deliver what is intended of it. Much of that opposition activity 
is located in tax havens where the people doing the dirty 
work are very often accountants, lawyers and bankers, whose 
clients are the largest companies and some of the wealthiest 
people in the world. There are also those who cheat the 
system more locally by evading more mundane taxes; all are 
seeking to undermine the collective objectives that the tax 
system seeks to fulfil.
Given the strength of these three lobbies it is no wonder 
that it has been hard to see how tax can do its best for us. We 
need to examine how and why so many powerful, and some-
times misguided, interests have been lined up against it before 
we can turn, in the following chapters, to look at the choices 
we could make with regard to tax if only these objections are 
overcome. The objections each of the three groups raise will 
be considered in turn, starting with the dogmatic ideology of 
libertarian flat tax proponents. 
The deniers of choice
There are in the UK some who really do want to deny us 
choice with regard to tax, and they know exactly what they 
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are doing. To put it bluntly, what they’re up to is not subtle: 
their aim is to ensure that the choices that tax enables (as 
noted in the previous chapter) are taken off the political 
agenda for good – and in the process it seems pretty clear that 
they want to undermine democracy itself. 
These people are right-wing libertarians. They are well 
funded and populate many think tanks located around 
Westminster of which the best known are probably the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (often referred to as ‘Margaret 
Thatcher’s favourite think tank’, with some justification), the 
Adam Smith Institute (whose namesake would likely shudder 
at much of what they say) and the so-called Taxpayers’ 
Alliance, whose relationship with most taxpayers seems 
remote at best. All of them are secretive about their funding. 
None make it clear in whose interests they really act, but 
what they do undoubtedly have in common are a number of 
beliefs that most of us would find pretty odd, and in some 
cases quite alarming.
For example, some of these organizations have a strange 
relationship with democracy. As example, in 2005 the 
Institute of Economic Affairs published a paper by Brad 
Walmsley under the title ‘The Corruption of Universal 
Suffrage: Tax, consent and the tyranny of the majority’.1 In it 
he argued that:
Simple majority rule results in a tyranny of the 
majority. Politicians auction taxes in order to buy 
votes, oppressing the productive and producing 
economic instability. But simple majority rule is 
inferior to the historic right to just government. 
Since taxpayers cannot be said to have consented to 
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taxation under simple majority rule, it represents 
unjust government. Therefore, the power to tax 
must be separated from the legislature since it is 
elected by universal suffrage. Consent to taxation 
can only be obtained from the taxpayers casting one 
vote for every pound of tax they pay; you have more 
say, the more you pay. 
This is an idea about as far removed from the concept of 
democracy as it is possible to get. It is really an argument for 
plutocracy, a system of government where those ruling are 
granted power by virtue of their wealth. 
The fact that Walmsley also argues that people have not 
consented to tax by voting in elections might also surprise 
many: this idea is very obviously untrue, but the argument is 
made time and again by those organizations. So, in 2014 Tim 
Worstall, an Adam Smith Institute fellow, stated that ‘democ-
racy is not all it’s cracked up to be’2 whilst in 2012 Adam 
Smith Institute director Dr Eamonn Butler wrote about the 
‘tyranny of the majority’3 – a term much favoured by these 
groups. What they mean by it is that the right that democracy 
on the basis of universal suffrage provides to a government to 
create progressive taxation is an assault by the majority on 
the rights of the wealthy minority. 
The ethos of these groups is, in fact, very clear. They focus 
upon the individual, the rights of private property, the pri-
macy of markets and the abuse that they think flows from the 
ability of democratically elected government to interfere in 
these rights (which they consider inalienable) in the collective 
best interest, which they do not recognize exists. They seek to 
promote their viewpoint in a number of ways. The method 
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most relevant to the discussion here is their promotion of 
what they call flat taxation. 
Those who propose flat taxes promote them by saying that 
they are ‘simple’ and that as we would all like tax to be simple 
this must mean flat taxes are good for us. Nothing could be 
further from the truth for most people in this country, so let 
me clarify what most flat tax proposals involve. 
First of all they always focus upon income tax even though, 
as I noted in Chapter 2, that tax represents only about 27 per 
cent of all UK tax revenues at present. With regard to this tax 
it is always suggested that there should be a single tax rate, 
with all higher rates of tax being abolished as a result. So, for 
example, the latest serious proposal for a flat tax in the UK, 
which has come from something called the 2020 Tax 
Commission, a joint venture between the Taxpayers’ Alliance 
and the Institute of Directors,4 suggests a flat tax rate of 
30 per cent. In this particular proposal that would cover 
national insurance charges as well as income tax, which 
would mean that, while many people currently paying basic 
rate tax would find their overall tax rate falling a little, many 
pensioners and those who live on modest investment incomes 
would see a significant increase in their overall tax rate since 
at present they do not pay national insurance. 
This flat income tax would include a single personal allow-
ance, which this so-called Commission suggests should be set 
at £10,000 a year, although that is now less than is already 
available under the existing income tax law in the UK. On the 
grounds that this personal allowance would ensure that those 
on low incomes would always pay slightly less in tax as a 
proportion of income than those on higher incomes, flat tax 
proponents argue that their tax proposals are progressive, 
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but that is, as is so commonly the case in taxation, a claim 
that involves some misrepresentation of the truth.
The first misrepresentation is that whilst flat tax propo-
nents argue that they will simplify the tax system by abolishing 
a number of allowances and reliefs, including for example 
those on pension contributions, they also always seemingly 
wish to open some enormous loopholes that could only ever 
be of real benefit to those with significant income. So they 
would, for example, not only abolish all higher rates of tax 
but would also abolish all taxes on company profits, stamp 
duty, inheritance tax and all taxes on capital gains. 
Such proposals are not put forward by chance or with the 
aim of tax simplification. It is, of course, the case that higher 
rates of income tax, the highest rates of stamp duty and 
almost all capital gains tax and inheritance tax are paid by 
the well-off minority whose wealth these organizations seek 
to protect. These taxes and rates do, after all, represent ‘the 
tyranny of the majority’ in the opinion of those who propose 
flat taxes. 
What those proponents of flat taxes usually fail to men-
tion, however, is that abolishing all these taxes and replacing 
them with flat taxes would also provide those possessing 
wealth with considerable opportunity to avoid the remaining 
flat income tax. So, for example, if an individual transferred 
their employment income to a company and did not subse-
quently withdraw it by way of salary or dividend, then under 
flat tax proposals that income would go completely untaxed 
for as long as it remained within the company, which could 
be for an indefinite period. The ability to make ends meet 
without having to rely upon one’s earnings is, of course, 
something that only a few can enjoy, and, by definition, those 
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people are wealthy. Flat taxes would, therefore, let those who 
are already wealthy accumulate their earnings tax-free, in a 
way denied to everyone else. That is the complete antithesis 
of a progressive tax system. 
In that case the so-called simplicity of flat taxes actually 
encourages and permits tax avoidance by a wealthy few, 
while making sure that most of the rest pay any tax they owe. 
The result would be that flat taxes would considerably 
increase inequality of wealth and of after-tax income. Almost 
all research now shows both those inequalities to be pro-
foundly harmful to the health of any society, as even the 
World Economic Forum (hardly a den of left-wing thinking) 
has now recognized.5 This is an outcome that the think tanks 
promoting flat taxes seldom seem to mention. 
Another odd feature of flat taxes rarely mentioned by their 
proponents when they claim that everyone will benefit from 
them is that VAT and other so-called indirect taxes – alcohol 
and tobacco duties, fuel duties and the like – all seem to be 
ignored by these proposed reforms, and yet it is these taxes 
that hit many of the people with lowest incomes in this 
country hardest of all, whereas income taxes have little 
impact on them at present. This is confirmed by the Office for 
National Statistics. In 2011–12, which is the year for which 
information is most recently available at the time of writing,6 
households with the lowest 20 per cent of incomes in the UK 
paid just 10.2 per cent of their total incomes in direct taxes 
like income tax (to which flat tax reforms would apply) and 
26.5 per cent of their income in indirect taxes such as VAT (to 
which flat tax reforms would not apply), whereas households 
in the top 20 per cent of income earners paid 24.7 per cent of 
their total incomes in direct taxes and only 10.8 per cent in 
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indirect taxes. Leaving aside the important point that as a 
result the bottom 20 per cent of income earners actually paid 
a higher proportion of their income in tax than the top 20 per 
cent (36.7 per cent compared to 35.5 per cent) under the 
present system, it is evident that flat tax reforms, by addressing 
only direct taxes, would leave those on lower incomes largely 
where they are now in the amount of tax they pay, while 
delivering big tax cuts for those on higher incomes. As a 
result, and yet again, inequality would increase.
No one should, then, be in any doubt that proposals for 
flat taxes are all about big tax cuts for those who are already 
well off and about little or no change at all, at least in tax 
rates, for those on lower incomes. This is hardly surprising, 
because this is exactly what the political philosophy of those 
proposing these taxes would lead one to expect. 
This, however, is not the end of the story. If large tax cuts 
are proposed for the well off and a whole raft of other taxes 
are to be abolished, then there is another inevitable conse-
quence to be considered: if inflation is to be avoided, 
government spending must fall to match the reduced amount 
that the state can recover from the economy by way of tax. 
The 2020 Tax Commission makes a virtue of this, saying that 
in their view no more than 33 per cent of national income 
should be taken by way of tax as government revenue. In fact 
it sets this as both a target and a cap. In doing so, they do, of 
course, make the mistake noted in Chapter 3 of thinking that 
tax is raised to cover spending and not to reclaim what has 
already been spent, but this error may be deliberate on their 
part because the proposal is specifically intended to cap 
spending. 
Again, there should be no surprise about this: all the 
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organizations promoting flat taxes believe that the state is 
inefficient, that its role in the economy should be kept as 
small as possible and that the private sector is the source of 
all wealth. But this idea of capping the size of the state has an 
enormous impact, not least because reducing the state to such 
a low level of spend has not been known in the UK since 
before the Second World War,7 at which time, of course, there 
was no NHS and education ended at 14 for most people. The 
graph in Figure 3 provides the data. 
Based on the above data average government spending as 
a proportion of GDP from 1948 (when this ratio stabilized 
after the Second World War) to 2010 was 39.5 per cent. This 
immediately shows how difficult it would be to achieve a 
spending ratio of 33 per cent; and it might be even harder for 
the 2020 Tax Commission to accomplish its goal since it also 
wants to reduce the national debt. To achieve this it must also 
be proposing that the government run a surplus on its budget 
as well as a cap on the total tax take. This would imply tax 
spending might have to be at a level somewhat less than 33 
per cent of national income, which poses a whole range of 
issues.
The first is that, as I will show in the next part of this 
chapter, it is nigh on impossible to balance a government’s 
budget. There are simply too many variables for anyone 
to predict what will happen with any reliability. Despite 
what politicians like to say it seems that people inherently 
realize this. So, when Alastair Darling tried to decree by 
Act of Parliament8 in 2010 that there would be a steady 
decline in the government deficit over the life of the next 
parliament, no one believed him. It seems as likely that 
no one will believe George Osborne’s plans to mandate 
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government surpluses, announced in 2015. The reason was 
succinctly explained by George Osborne himself in the House 
of Commons in 2010:
Figure 3: UK government spending as a percentage of 
GDP, 1900–2010
Source: UKPublicSpending.co.uk
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Let us remember what one of the economists whom 
the Prime Minister himself appointed to the 
Monetary Policy Committee has said about the Bill. 
Willem Buiter has said: ‘Fiscal responsibility acts are 
instruments of the fiscally irresponsible to con the 
public.’9
Likewise no one should believe flat tax proponents when they 
say that they can achieve the same outcome. The fact is that 
a government has sometimes, as it did in 2008, to pick up the 
pieces when things go wrong in the economy. 
The flat tax proponents’ commitment to cap government 
income and spending is, in that case, a deliberate attempt on 
their part to stop the government intervening in the economy 
for the public good, come what may. This would effectively 
remove the management of the economy from the remit of 
government, wholly undermining much of the purpose for 
taxation as noted in the previous chapter. When coupled with 
the move to end redistribution via tax, through the removal 
of so many taxes on those from whom wealth would other-
wise be redistributed, and the effective elimination of taxes 
that might be used to reprice market failures, flat taxes can be 
seen as a coordinated effort to close off many of the options 
that a government has to use tax for social purposes. This, then, 
would severely curtail the scope for action of any democratic 
government – because the cap on revenue and spending is 
deliberately designed to reduce the choices available in a demo-
cracy and is as such a direct assault upon democracy itself. 
This is not by chance. In 2006 I interviewed Alvin 
Rabushka, the co-creator of the flat tax idea.10 He told me 
then:
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I think we should go back to first principles and 
causes and ask what government should be doing 
and the answer is ‘not a whole lot’. It certainly does 
way too much and we could certainly get rid of a lot 
of it. We shouldn’t give people free money. You 
know, we should get rid of welfare programmes, we 
need to have purely private pensions and get rid of 
state sponsored pensions. We need private schools 
and private hospitals and private roads and private 
mail delivery and private transportation and private 
everything else. You know government shouldn’t be 
doing any of that stuff. And if it didn’t do any of 
that stuff it wouldn’t need all of that tax money so 
that’s the fundamental position and as long as you’re 
going to have government do all that stuff you’re 
going to have all those high taxes.11 
This is democratic choice under attack in its most extreme 
form. Few flat tax advocates would go as far as Rabushka, 
but you need to see what he says to realize where those 
who propose these taxes are coming from. It’s not an exag-
geration to say that their agenda is to take away your right to 
choose. 
We should also be under no illusion about the fact that this 
would be at enormous cost to us all. In 2008 when the banks 
nearly collapsed, a flat tax system with a cap on government 
spending would have meant the government could not have 
intervened to save the economy. It would have gone to the 
wall, and with it most business in this country as well as 
the savings of a great many households. Unemployment 
would have increased more rapidly than it did, and there 
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would have been no capacity to pay any compensation to 
those thrown out of work through no fault of their own. And 
as GDP would, inevitably, have fallen, the situation would 
have got worse, since a cap fixed as a ratio of GDP requires 
that spending falls in recession – which would exacerbate the 
impact of failings in the market economy and create more 
extreme boom and busts, which is exactly what most people 
would think government should work to prevent but which 
flat taxation makes considerably more likely. 
In that case it is vital to realize that flat taxes are not really 
about just having one rate of income tax or about tax simpli-
fication. They’re about limiting the power of democracy and 
letting markets run riot without any ability to constrain the 
consequences. That, I suspect, is not what many of those who 
find flat taxes superficially attractive on the basis of their 
so-called ability to simplify the tax system might want but, as 
seems to be so commonplace with regard to tax, what is said 
regarding flat taxes and what is actually the case are almost 
the opposite of each other.
The veil of ignorance
The crash of 2008 had enormous consequences for our 
economy, and will continue to do so for a long time to come. 
One reason for that is the amount of nonsense that has been 
spoken by so many politicians from so many parties on the 
way to tackle these issues, especially since 2010. From that 
year onwards most politicians in most countries impacted by 
the crash of 2008 have seemed to think that the biggest 
problem they face is the size of their government’s deficit. In 
thinking this they reflect the idea that tax is raised to allow 
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spending, and not, as is actually the case, that tax is the rec-
lamation of spending that has already happened.
It’s important to be clear about the UK government deficit. 
The UK government’s spending and income from 1997 to 
2014, expressed as a proportion of national income, is shown 
in Figure 4. Government income during this period remained 
Figure 4: Government receipts and spending as a 
percentage of GDP, 1997–2014
Source: Author’s calculations based on HM Treasury budget data over 
the period
Current government 
spending as a % of GDP
Total government 
spending as a % of GDP
Current receipts as a % 
of GDP
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very near the long-term normal rate of around 38 per cent of 
GDP. Spending patterns, on the other hand, varied signifi-
cantly. From 1997 until 2002 government income exceeded 
all its spending, whether on current commitments (like paying 
staff in the NHS) or on investment (such as building new 
hospitals). 
As will also be noted, if one excludes expenditure on 
investment, government income overall exceeded spending 
until 2007–8. It was only the decision by the government to 
invest more heavily after 2002 that resulted in total govern-
ment spending exceeding income; and it is perfectly normal 
practice to borrow in order to invest (or to spend ahead of 
recovering money from the economy in the case of a govern-
ment). Also note that whilst there was borrowing, the sums 
involved were fairly small, commonly little more than 1 to 2 
per cent of GDP. 
I make these observations for what should be a very 
obvious reason, which is that spending appeared to almost 
everybody to be well and truly under control until 2008. That 
‘almost everybody’ included David Cameron and George 
Osborne, who were during this period committing themselves 
to match Labour spending plans. 
It is also evident from these data that in the period when 
the economy was overheating, from 1997 to 2001, the gov-
ernment reorganized the economy by effectively withdrawing 
money from it through deliberate underspending: fiscal policy 
to constrain an over-exuberant market was in operation. In 
the aftermath of the dot.com crash, when the government 
feared that a recession was possible, it again intervened to 
reorganize the economy for the benefit of people of this 
country: this time by investing, deliberately overspending in 
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order to inject money into the economy (and build a lot of 
schools and hospitals in the process). The aim was to prevent 
a downturn in the wake of a serious stock market crash where 
the FTSE 100 halved in value (which is a fact often forgotten), 
and the policy was successful, according to the criteria that 
all politicians had agreed upon: growth continued uninter-
rupted and people rewarded the Labour government by 
re-electing it. This was tax at work in the way democracy 
intended.
It was in 2008 that everything changed. Government 
income fell because the economy went into recession. Some 
big companies went into a period of heavy loss-making and a 
lot of people lost their jobs. Those companies and those 
people stopped paying corporation tax and income tax as a 
result. More significantly, expenditure by government had to 
increase. Part of that was automatic: if more people are 
unemployed and the incomes of those who are employed are 
falling in real terms, as they have been for most people in the 
UK since 2009,12 then it is inevitable that government 
spending on both in-work and unemployed social security 
benefits will increase.
There is another point to note though: in 2009 the then 
government substantially increased its investment in the UK 
economy with the deliberate aim (as in 2002) of averting a 
serious economic crisis. This worked: the evidence appears 
unambiguous. By 2010 the UK economy was recovering 
because of the money that the UK government had injected 
into it. But then investment by the new government was cut, 
as Figure 4 shows: much less money was spent into the 
economy whilst the amount recovered from it remained 
broadly consistent, and there was a downturn again as a 
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result. Unfortunately it remains the case at the time of writing 
that, in terms of per capita GDP, the UK is still a long way 
short of getting out of this situation. 
Despite this politicians of most of the UK’s leading parties 
(the SNP, Greens and Plaid Cymru apart) remain dedicated to 
programmes of austerity under which they would all plan to 
cut government spending still further between 2015 and 
2020. This, they argue, will ensure that the UK government 
deficit is cleared. However, at the same time they all want 
to promise growth in UK GDP, which has, for better or 
worse, become the barometer of UK national economic 
competence.
Unfortunately, this combined goal of balancing the govern-
ment’s books while maintaining growth is for all practical 
purposes impossible to achieve. None the less these politi-
cians continue to make the offer. I can think of three possible 
reasons for this, all worryingly unattractive. 
First, the politicians involved might be knowingly offering 
something they are aware is impossible to deliver. I trust that’s 
not true because I retain the hope that politicians aim to tell 
the truth, although I am concious that a great many people 
have given up on that expectation.
Alternatively, they may have been influenced by the dogma 
of the right-wing think tanks that this chapter has already 
explored, and as a result believe that it is their duty to cut the 
size and role of the government they want to be a part of, to 
fit what they believe to be the available tax revenues – when 
such a concept is meaningless, as I argued in Chapter 3. If so, 
they have sold out on the democratic process, and that would, 
of course, justify the cynicism that many feel about their 
motives. 
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Thirdly, there is the possibility that they simply do not 
understand what they are offering and what the real nature of 
tax is. I am going to be generous and assume that in many 
cases this may be true; I therefore need to explain the real 
situation.
The first thing all politicians have to realize is that, as I 
have already shown, tax and money are pretty intimately 
related at a macroeconomic level. (Macroeconomics is the 
process of looking at the economy as a whole.) In that case 
you would think that money and its relationship to tax would 
be a really important part of the study of macroeconomics, 
but it is not. Instead the subject is either very largely ignored 
or is incorrectly taught, as (with regard to money) the Bank 
of England had to admit in 2014. I did, of course, explore this 
issue in depth in Chapter 3, but because of the significance of 
the matter it is worth repeating some of the comment made in 
the Bank of England first Quarterly Bulletin for 2014, when 
it had to say things like:
the relationship between monetary policy and money 
differs from the description in many introductory 
textbooks13
and 
The reality of how money is created today differs 
from the description found in some economics 
textbooks14
and 
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This article explains how, rather than banks lending 
out deposits that are placed with them, the act of 
lending creates deposits – the reverse of the sequence 
typically described in textbooks.15
The Bank had to be blunt: what it was saying was that what 
had been taught to generations of economists about how 
money works was not just wrong but exactly the opposite of 
the truth. 
Unfortunately, instead of this fact being recognized we still 
have to endure a prevailing political view of both money and 
tax that is based on misconceptions and so is crippling us. 
This incorrect view is essentially a microeconomic one that 
assumes that government works very much like a business. 
You will be familiar with this idea: many politicians refer 
to ‘UK plc’ as if the government operates like a quoted 
company. 
The origin of the idea isn’t hard to find: Margaret Thatcher 
very clearly based most of her economic understanding on 
the corner shop run by her father. In this quite literally small 
world view of national economics the rule of Mr Micawber 
applies:16 if money coming in from tax revenues exceeds 
money going out then everything will be just fine. If the 
reverse is true it is said misery results. 
It is fair to say that this might have been true for Mr 
Micawber and it might well be true for a small business 
without an overdraft facility from a bank, but for a govern-
ment this is complete nonsense, for one very obvious reason. 
This is that, unlike Mr Micawber and any business, a govern-
ment with its own sovereign currency can, as explained in 
Chapter 3, print its own money whenever it wishes to make 
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good a shortfall in its income. If, therefore, there are willing 
buyers for its debt (and this has been the uninterrupted case 
in the UK since 169417), running a deficit (or reclaiming less 
tax from the economy than you spend) is simply not a problem 
for a government. You would think that missing this fact 
would be a cardinal sin for any economist, let alone politi-
cian, and yet it is the norm. Of course this situation of being 
able to run deficits would change if a time came when a gov-
ernment could not sell its debt, but, given that there is a 
savings glut in the world at present and a shortage of secure 
assets in which to invest, the prospect of the government 
being unable to sell its debt seems very unlikely for a long 
time to come. 
So, it seems that the glaringly obvious has to be spelled out 
once again: there is no reason why any government should 
have to balance its books unless it really wants to do so as a 
matter of policy – which would only be wise if that economy 
was booming (as it was, for example, in the period 1997 to 
2001), and the government wanted as a result to temporarily 
withdraw cash from the economy by underspending, and 
thus calm down over-activity to prevent an unsustainable 
boom. Since we are in nothing like that situation now, a bal-
anced budget would be absurd. Indeed, it is very obvious that 
overspending is essential at present if the economy is to get 
the cash it needs to keep going. And there is sound economic 
rationale behind this requirement for more cash to be injected, 
by effectively under-collecting tax, if the economy is not going 
to crash. 
There are actually only four sectors in an economy at a 
macroeconomic level: national income is made up of total 
consumer spending plus total government spending plus 
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total investment made in the economy plus total exports less 
the total cost of imports. Those are the only sectors that we 
need to consider. It is important to note that money and tax 
do not seem to be part of this equation. That’s not by chance: 
this equation is about what really happens in the economy 
and not how we pay for it. However, there is a way in which 
money plays a very real part in this equation, since the four 
sectors trade with each other through the medium of the 
national currency; and, because of a simple accounting rule 
that for every debit there must be a credit, the interactions 
between them have to balance out. It is impossible for it to be 
otherwise. 
Now if you combine the politicians’ desire for GDP to rise, 
meaning that the sum of consumer spending, net investment, 
government spending and net exports must increase, with the 
necessity for transactions between the sectors to balance, 
something rather interesting happens which relates directly to 
the discussion on government spending and tax, and so to the 
scale of the deficit and the level of savings in an economy.
What the requirement of balance between the sectors 
demands is that if one sector borrows another must save, 
and vice versa. There is no alternative option: double-entry 
accounting requires that this is so. Thus if consumers save 
then someone else, whether it be the government, investors or 
the net overseas sector, must borrow. The overseas sector 
effectively borrows by net exporting, by the way; the corol-
lary is that net importing represents saving in the UK, the 
saving being the amount by which we have not paid those in 
other countries for the net goods and services that we import, 
because they have effectively left the funds they are owed in 
sterling in the UK.  
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This is important. At present consumers are saving,18 even 
if only by repaying their mortgages while interest rates remain 
low. Business is not investing:19 indeed big business is sitting 
on record piles of cash.20 And we are running a large and 
growing trade deficit,21 meaning that the overseas sector is 
saving in the UK. There is only one net possible outcome of 
all this, and that is that the government has to borrow. It 
genuinely has no other option: the other sectors’ behaviour 
have made that a necessity and there is nothing whatsoever, 
as the backer of the currency (which it is), that it can do 
about it.
To put this another way, politicians might say they can cut 
their way to closing the deficit, but that’s just not true unless 
they want to crash the economy in the attempt to do so. What 
they seemingly fail to appreciate is that cutting spending to 
save cash and so reduce borrowing may be possible in a com-
pany but it’s not in an economy. That’s because in a company 
if, for example, you sack an employee they do, as far as the 
company is concerned, go away. In the case of the economy 
as a whole the situation is quite different. You can put a gov-
ernment employee out of work and if they cannot find another 
job – which is often what happens in a recessionary environ-
ment – they are still there in the country: they still need to be 
fed, educated and have health care, use the roads, claim ben-
efits and be housed. Only now they aren’t doing anything in 
exchange for all those needs being met. 
This is yet another case where in reality things work exactly 
the opposite way from how most politicians seem to think 
they do. You simply can’t cut your way out of a budget deficit 
if you’re a government; it just does not work that way. In 
fact, it’s worse than that: cutting is positively counter- 
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productive because government spending is part of GDP, 
which means that cutting government spending may not only 
fail to reduce the deficit but also actually harm growth and 
produce substantial knock-on effects. Those knock-on effects 
should be obvious, but George Osborne certainly didn’t take 
them into account in 2010 and maybe they are still off his 
radar in 2015 as he launches on another major round of 
austerity.
When Osborne cut government spending in 2010 he 
expected to produce what he called ‘expansionary fiscal con-
traction’. In other words, he thought taxpayers would assume 
lower public spending would lead to tax cuts, and so they 
would increase their borrowing, and consequently their 
spending, straight away, confident that they would be 
enjoying a higher net income in the future. In that case, 
Osborne thought, the economy would expand as a result of 
his reducing the fiscal stimulus. It might sound bizarre, but 
that’s the logic on which the economics of austerity was 
based. 
But George Osborne was wrong. That’s not what people 
did. The UK’s household savings ratio increased from an 
average of about 3 per cent of income from 2004 to early 
2008 to an average of about 6 per cent from 2009 to 2014.22 
When matched with falling household incomes since 200923 
this has meant that overall consumers have been spending 
less. The expansionary fiscal contraction George Osborne 
hoped for did not happen among consumers because they 
actually concluded that if all the safety nets that they were 
used to were being withdrawn as a result of reduced govern-
ment spending, and the job security they hoped for was being 
reduced for the same reason, then they would need to save 
Joy of Tax.indd   89 04/09/2015   12:30
RICHARD MURPHY
90
more for the proverbial rainy day. That was the obviously 
predictable reaction to government spending cuts, but was 
one George Osborne completely missed.
The graph in Figure 5 illustrates how this played out 
in practice; it shows data from the Office for Budget 
Figure 5: Household gross debt to income expressed as a 
percentage
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility Fiscal Forecasts, March 2014, 
Table 3.3324
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Responsibility for actual changes in the ratio of household 
debt to household income in the UK from 2004 to 2014 and 
forecast changes on to 2019. Over the period for which the 
OBR then had data people were reducing their overall debt, 
which is the same as saving. But what the OBR forecast in 
2014, and forecast again in 2015, is that there would be a 
change in the ratio with debt rising again thereafter.
I stress, they had no choice but to make this forecast: the 
OBR know all about the balances I am discussing here and 
know that if the government is to clear its deficit then someone 
else has to borrow, so they forecast that consumers would 
begin to do just that: it was the only way they could say that 
government borrowing would be reduced.
They did the same with investment. Figure 6 shows the 
Office for Budget Responsibility data on that, as at March 
Figure 6: Business investment as a percentage of GDP
Source: Office for National Statistics, Office for Budget Responsibility25
Pe
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2015. In nominal and real terms business investment has 
been low, and is only just improving now, but what is clear is 
that to make the forecast of government debt reductions 
work the OBR is having to suggest that business investment 
will over the next few years reach all-time record highs, and 
that means companies will have to borrow. I hate to disillu-
sion them, but there is not a hint that this is really going to 
happen.
Just for the record, Figure 7 shows the balance of trade 
data from 1979 on. It’s not too optimistic either, and with it 
being clear that emerging markets are unlikely to grow sig-
nificantly in coming years as Chinese expansion slows, a 
dramatic change in our balance of trade is unlikely.27 
Bringing all this together it’s clear that in view of these 
trends – increasing private saving, which suppresses con-
sumption and so GDP, and falling business investment, which 
also suppresses GDP, and broadly static trade – it has only 
been the government’s overspending and its quantitative 
Figure 7: UK balance of trade from 1979
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com / Office for National Statistics26
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easing programme that has kept the economy going for the 
last few years. 
What is also clear is that when the government says it will 
balance the budget it actually knows it can only do this if 
consumers and businesses (and households buying new 
houses, which counts as investment) spend a great deal more 
over the next few years than they have of late, and that they 
must borrow to do this. The price of falling government bor-
rowing will, then, be substantial increases in private debt. If 
that does not happen then those cuts in government spending 
can only have one net outcome, and that will be a fall in GDP 
that will trigger more saving, less investment and maybe 
fewer exports as we lose whatever competitive edge we have, 
all of which are very bad news. These are the only two options 
available as a result of the chosen austerity policies of all 
major UK political parties (the SNP, Greens and Plaid Cymru 
excepted): either there is a private sector credit boom or we 
get seriously worse off and our economic security falls. 
And all that is because politicians say they want to balance 
the government’s books by making tax income equal the 
amount the government spends into the economy each year 
when, as I have shown, there is no reason for them to do that 
at all.
So why do they claim they must balance the books? Is it 
because they actively want a private credit boom (with the 
inevitable crash that will follow)? Or is it because they so 
dislike what the state does for people that they want to cut it 
come what may (the Conservative Party plans to cut state 
spending as a percentage of GDP from 41 per cent to 35 per 
cent during the 2015–20 parliament28)? Are they hiding the 
truth, which is that if the government wants to run a surplus 
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(i.e. it wants to spend less than it receives, which is a precon-
dition of reducing debt) then someone else in this ‘balancing 
act’ has to run a deficit if GDP is to be near enough stable? 
Or is it that they just don’t know?
This is not, I stress, to say that change is not possible. 
Given that the government’s target to spend less cannot be 
achieved in isolation, as I have just shown, then alternatively 
consumers can be encouraged to spend more; but we must be 
clear about the consequences for debt in this case unless there 
is a policy to increase real wages. It’s also possible to invest 
more and we could even try to run a trade surplus if we really 
wanted to balance the government’s books, but the point 
about all three is that none of them can ever be achieved by 
cuts in government spending: that’s impossible. These things 
can only happen if, for example, the government gives a 
sound reason to business or consumers to spend more – and 
its rhetoric on cuts in spending and jobs does just the oppo-
site of that (because the government is both the biggest 
spender and the most significant employer in the country). 
Or to put it another way, the pursuit of austerity actually 
guarantees that the government will fail in its objective of 
balancing its books. Which means that if we are to clear the 
government’s deficit the only way to do it in the current envi-
ronment is for the government to spend.
Yes, you read that right. The truth is that the government 
has to spend if it wants to save. Because if it spends it creates 
jobs. If it creates jobs it has more people paying tax and fewer 
on social security benefits. And if the increase in number of 
jobs creates an increased demand for workers employees’ real 
wages rise. And that further increases the government’s tax 
take and also reduces in-work benefits. And of course that in 
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turn leads to more consumer spending, and so more tax take. 
And then business invests to meet consumer demand and so 
GDP rises, and tax take with it. And on, and on, in a virtuous 
circle that ensures that the deficit falls (which calms overseas 
investors’ nerves). And when GDP rises and tax take increases 
the government can cut its own spending or withdraw more 
from the economy in tax and that does not harm GDP, while 
the increased revenue take ensures that the government heads 
towards a balanced budget.
And what’s more, people are very obviously happier. And 
that’s the Joy of Tax. It simply works to deliver well-being 
when nothing else can. All we need to do is have enough 
people tell politicians that this is truly how it is. I nominate 
you for the job; I am already on the case.
Those who don’t want to make tax work
What this chapter has so far shown is that we have some 
people who deny us choice with regard to tax because they do 
not realize how it really should work, and others who would 
deliberately deny us the choices that tax makes available if 
only they could. That just leaves to be considered those who 
really don’t want the tax system to work as it should for rea-
sons of their own self-interest.
<text2>In very many ways the story of this group of people 
needs less telling than do the first two, precisely because most 
people have already heard of this group. Those who do not 
want the tax system to work as it should are called tax 
abusers, although it should be said they come in two distinct 
varieties. The first lot are tax avoiders and the second lot are 
tax evaders. People in both groups take the risk that the tax 
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returns they submit will be found to be wrong. In the process, 
by seeking to retain for themselves money that properly 
belongs to the state, they are (since tax avoiders are exploiting 
unintended loopholes in the system) depriving the rest of us 
of those funds and are seeking to defeat the social objectives 
they could help achieve. That is why I generically term them 
tax abusers.
Tax avoidance, which lawyers, accountants and bankers 
(who are the people who tend to sell this abuse) habitually 
say is within the law, is essentially submitting a tax return 
when you’re not sure whether what you have claimed is 
entirely legal or not, but with the chances being that if you 
are found to have got it wrong you will not have broken any 
law, even if you have to pay some additional tax and a pen-
alty as a consequence, to which no criminal sanction will 
apply. I stress that such behaviour is quite different from 
taking advantage of tax reliefs the law specifically permits. 
So, for example, if you pay money into a pension fund on 
which tax relief is due in accordance with the law, you are 
reducing your tax bill, but you haven’t avoided any tax 
because the law says none was ever due. Tax avoidance and 
tax planning within the law should not be confused: they are 
not remotely similar to each other.
Tax evasion, in contrast, is submitting a tax return that 
you know to be untrue, either because it excludes income that 
should have been declared, or because expenses are claimed 
which are not appropriate for tax purposes. In both these 
cases criminal sanctions could apply to the person submitting 
the return, although that does depend upon them being 
caught. However, in most tax systems (the UK’s included) 
people know that the odds of being caught evading tax are 
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low, as they also are of being caught avoiding tax. What is 
more, those who do get caught may very well not be prose-
cuted. Tax avoiders and tax evaders both rely on the low 
odds of being found out and so both are abusive of the tax 
system. 
So how do these abuses work and how do those perpe-
trating them get away with it? The first thing to say is that in 
very many cases these abuses can only be done by people 
whose income is not automatically declared on their behalf to 
their tax authority. This means that most employees are 
unlikely to be heavily involved in either tax evasion or tax 
avoidance whilst most businesses or self-employed people 
have the opportunity to be involved in one, the other, or both. 
It’s also true that those who have investment and other 
sources of untaxed income also have more opportunity to 
partake in this activity. How they do it varies, depending on 
the sums involved.
Tax evasion is rife among the lowest-earning self- 
employed. They often hide their income by taking cash. 
Alternatively they may choose not to declare that they have 
any self-employed income at all to the appropriate tax author-
ities. There are more than 5 million self-employed people in 
the UK and even HM Revenue & Customs think at least 40 
per cent of them under-declare their income, which is a figure 
that fails to take into account the number not declaring they 
are self employed at all. Under-declaration of tax in this sector 
is, therefore, commonplace.29 
Those with rather more income who are seeking to evade 
tax might form a company based in the UK to run a trade 
and then simply fail to file the accounts and tax returns that 
are due. I estimate that maybe 400,000 companies a year are 
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doing this.30 The resulting loss of tax runs to well over 
£10 billion, in my estimate. There are at present almost no 
mechanisms in place in the UK to detect this fraud. 
Others evade tax by not declaring investment income, 
rental income (especially common in the buy-to-let sector), 
capital gains tax that is due, or inheritance tax that they may 
owe.31
And some use tax havens and offshore arrangements to 
hide their crime of tax evasion. In 2014, at long last, the gov-
ernment recognized the inherent criminality of this offshore 
abuse.32 That, however, came too late to do anything about 
the considerable sums already stashed offshore by those who 
have been involved in this activity. In 2014 I estimated that 
offshore tax abuse cost the UK £4.8 billion a year. However, 
a word of caution is needed. Whilst it is commonplace to 
think that tax havens are the root of all evil when it comes 
to tax evasion this is not true. Total tax evasion in that year 
may, in my estimate, have come to £84 billion, so offshore is 
only a small part of the problem. 
A common factor in all these abuses is the suppressing of 
information from view. What’s surprising to most people is 
that this applies to a great deal of tax avoidance as well. Tax 
avoidance is hidden from view in a number of ways, but one 
of the most common remains the use of offshore structures 
including companies and trusts. In this case, however, the 
existence of the structure may well be declared to a tax 
authority, and it may even be the case that the nature of the 
transaction is disclosed; the gamble is that the tax authority 
will not have the time or resources to challenge the structure 
that has been created. 
So why, in that case, is offshore used? As tax avoidance 
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schemes often cost a great deal of money to put in place, it 
tends to be wealthy people and large companies who use 
them, and the sums involved in each tax avoidance trans-
action are bigger. High-profile people and large companies do 
not now wish to be publicly associated with tax avoidance 
because of the adverse publicity that tax campaigners (me 
included) have created about this issue over the last few years. 
(There is some academic evidence that suggests that some 
companies caught out not disclosing their offshore activities 
have subsequently increased their tax payments as if in reac-
tion to that publicity.33) Offshore trusts and companies offer 
their users anonymity, since their names do not have to go on 
public record; similarly many public companies that use off-
shore rely on the fact that accounts of their offshore subsidiary 
companies do not have to be made available, to hide the 
extent of that activity from the public’s eyes. In this way they 
explicitly hide the tax avoider from view, which is a key part 
of their attraction. 
It is, however, important to note that, despite current 
public perception to the contrary, the total loss of tax resulting 
from tax avoidance is substantially less than the losses that 
arise from tax evasion. To put things in proportion, I esti-
mated in 2014 that the loss to tax evasion in the UK might be 
more than four times greater than the loss to tax avoidance. 
HM Revenue & Customs think the ratio between evasion 
and avoidance might be only about 3 to 1, but in my opinion 
they dramatically underestimate the level of tax evasion. 
Whichever figure is closer to the truth it is obvious that eva-
sion is the bigger problem.
Why do I include tax abusers among those who are seeking 
to deny the rest of us the choices that are available with 
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regard to tax? In my opinion the minority of people in this 
country who evade or avoid tax are grabbing opportunity for 
themselves at cost to the rest of us. This is ‘free-riding’ the tax 
system. They do not want to give the state the money that 
really belongs to it, and are willing to take risk to keep that 
cash for themselves, and in so doing they are also seeking to 
deny everyone else the opportunities that are rightfully theirs. 
This is not a victimless crime. The honest majority are the 
victims of their abuse and that is true whether they avoid or 
evade. This action is usually completely deliberate. So, for 
example, Bournemouth University tax lecturer Richard 
Teather has written for the Institute of Economic Affairs 
(Margaret Thatcher’s favourite think tank) that:
While I am not seeking to condone dishonesty  
or criminal activity, from an economic perspective 
this is merely another example of tax competition: 
indeed, it is often necessary behaviour in order to 
take advantage of tax havens. Without the willingness 
of some to engage in this sort of activity, tax 
competition would be much less effective and 
therefore reduce the benefits that flow from it  
for the rest of us.34
This is about as close as I suspect anyone could have got to 
endorsing the process of tax haven abuse as a means to under-
mine the democratically elected choice of governments.
There is also the self-interest of the many advisers who sell 
tax avoidance to consider. The UK tax market of the big four 
firms of accountants is likely to be worth at least £2 billion a 
year in 2014. Of course, not all of this relates to avoidance, 
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but nor are these firms by any means the whole market: there 
are 10,000 other firms of chartered accountants alone in the 
UK, and tax services are also provided by other types of 
accountant and lawyers and bankers. All these professions 
have generally shown remarkable reticence when called upon 
to back increased transparency in the tax system and there 
can be little doubt that this is because the opacity that makes 
it easier for them to sell tax avoidance provides them with 
considerable commercial advantage. I am not suggesting, 
even for a moment, that these professions do, in any way, 
willingly help tax evaders, but the fact is that by defending 
opacity for the purposes of tax avoidance they also assist 
those who use that same opacity for the purposes of tax 
evasion. 
The result is that these professions not only seek to prevent 
reform to the tax system which would enhance the choices 
and options available to many in this country if only the right 
amount of tax were handed over to our tax authority of what 
is its rightful property, but also unwittingly assist tax evaders, 
who are even bigger part of this problem.
To summarize: in my view three things are necessary if tax is 
to be used to best potential for the benefit of society as a 
whole. The first is that politicians must be better educated 
about tax, as should be newspapers and other media organi-
zations who comment on this subject. There is no excuse for 
the continuing misunderstanding of the role that tax has to 
play in our economy, and what the impact of non-payment is. 
In particular, arguments for austerity for austerity’s sake must 
be recognized to be as hopelessly wrong as they really are.
Secondly, the threat to democracy itself from those who 
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promote flat taxation and who seek to take away the choices 
that tax enables within our economy must be highlighted to 
everyone who believes that the political process has to be 
based upon the right of people to choose.
Lastly, tax systems have to be designed to make sure that 
those who seek to abuse them – whether in ways that they 
would argue are within the law, or whether by overtly crim-
inal practices – are prevented from undertaking such activities, 
which represent selfish greed on the part of those who wish 
to free-ride the system at cost to everybody else to whom 
opportunities are denied as a result.
All three groups perpetrating these errors of judgement 
deny well-being to the majority in this country. It is up to all 
of us to make sure that these mistakes are put right.
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Tax and choice
By now you will have realized that I think tax systems are so 
important because, along with government spending priori-
ties, they are the best mechanism by which an elected 
government can embed the social values it represents in the 
economy that it is charged with managing.
What you will also have realized is that if any government 
wants growth and a balanced budget then it hasn’t got the 
option of withdrawing from the economy for which it is 
responsible. It instead has to, firstly, engage in that economy 
and, secondly, has to decide precisely what that engagement 
is all about. It is an act of folly, verging either on irresponsi-
bility or an abandonment of democratic duty, for any 
government to do otherwise. 
What that then means is that some tough decisions have to 
be made about tax, taking into consideration the discussion 
in Chapter 2 on just what tax is, that in Chapter 3 on why 
governments tax when there are other options available 
to them, and the analysis in Chapter 4 on the nature of 
money and how fiscal policy (or the management of the 
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government’s deficit) inextricably links tax, money and eco-
nomic management together, whether some would like to 
claim otherwise, or not. 
The result is that making decisions on tax can either be 
seen as an enormous burden in addressing the near impos-
sible problem of guessing right now what action is needed 
to deliver future well-being, the outcome of which decisions 
will inevitably be disappointing on occasion, or it’s an enor-
mous and liberating opportunity to build the future that 
people want and which politicians can, and should, offer. 
Unsurprisingly, I take the latter view and I guess it’s my hope 
that I can persuade you to share that view, or I wouldn’t have 
written this book.
At last three conclusions flow from these observations. 
The first is that tax and morality are inextricably linked: it 
is impossible for moral judgement to be removed from 
decision-making on tax.
Second, because decisions on tax are, hopefully, subject to 
democratic scrutiny then tax is always and inextricably 
political.
In turn this leads to the third, and obvious conclusion, 
which is that no debate on tax can ever be objective. Any 
consideration of tax issues is always, and inevitably, subjec-
tive whether those engaging accept that is the case or not. We 
all bring our own value judgments, life experiences, preju-
dices, hopes and values to all aspects of tax. Those who say 
otherwise are deceiving themselves, are lying or are econo-
mists (and a Venn diagram might indicate some serious 
overlaps between those categories).
Might I suggest those three conclusions are just about the 
only incontrovertible statements in this book? I think they are 
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right. Everything else, pretty much without exception, you 
can disagree with and it does not prove me wrong: it just 
proves we disagree. That in itself means that my claim that 
tax is all about choice has, by definition, to be right. And 
choice means we have to decide (which is what the rest of this 
book is about). 
In that case we should want those decisions to be the best 
and most informed they can be. To achieve this, it is crucial 
that the process used for the decision-making is the fittest for 
the purpose. It is important, too, to identify what constraints 
there might be on what we can decide. I believe there are 
some fundamental preconditions for the existence of a good 
tax decision-making process in any society which, if they are 
not met, will result in a tax system that fails to meet people’s 
expectations.
Education – the first condition for a good tax system
It is absolutely essential that people understand what tax is, 
what it can do, what options are available, how a tax charge 
is created, how it works, and in turn is accounted for, how it 
is enforced, and what recourse is open to anyone who thinks 
the tax system has treated them inappropriately or unjustly. 
For a topic that most will have never seen discussed in a tax 
book that is a long list of issues to consider, but some have 
already been addressed in this book. So I have, for example, 
already discussed what tax is and what it can do. I have also 
explained how tax impacts on the economy. 
What I have not yet said is that I think it vital that these 
issues – including views that differ from my own – be widely 
understood and taught in schools, colleges and universities. I 
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am amazed that is not already happening, when for a period 
of more than fifty years the UK government has collected one 
third or more of our national income in tax. In 2014, 
according to the HM Treasury budget, that total will exceed 
£600 billion for the first time. Tax, then, is at the heart of our 
economy. Indeed, tax is at the heart of our society. But we do 
not talk about it, and we do not teach it, and that is little 
short of a national scandal. 
The result of this glaring omission is that it is all too easy 
for some to represent tax as simply a ‘bad thing’ that one can 
only ever want to make as low as possible, irrespective of the 
consequences. That shocks me and leads me to ask if that is 
the best we deserve. Surely something a little more serious is 
required on an issue so important we contribute a third or 
more of our national economy to it? 
It is astonishing how little attention UK universities pay to 
tax. In June 2014 I searched the ‘Which? University’ website 
for undergraduate courses. When I asked for a course in 
accountancy I was offered 573 courses at 122 universities. 
When I asked for a course in tax the response was ‘We’re 
sorry but we couldn’t find any results to match your search 
terms. Check the spelling or try a broader search’. If medicine 
is ultimately the study of death then death gets 406 courses at 
89 universities but the other supposed certainty in life is 
apparently worthy of none. Now in noting this fact I am not 
saying that I believe that there should be a rash of new under-
graduate courses in taxation. But I am saying I think the 
academic study of tax woefully inadequate in the UK at 
present and, given its central role in the understanding of so 
many other subjects, that an understanding of tax should be 
an essential component of courses on, for example, medicine, 
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social work, politics, economics, philosophy, sociology, edu-
cation and much more besides. How can any of these subjects 
be properly understood if the environment in which they 
exist and are funded is not appreciated? For the same reason, 
I think tax should be a compulsory part of the school curric-
ulum. Our collective ignorance about tax has to be banished, 
and along with it the negative attitude that prevails. Only 
education can do that, and it’s fundamental if we’re to have 
really informed decisions on tax. 
Research – the second condition of a good tax system
Informed decisions are impossible without access to the rele-
vant information: we must have good research into the 
options available to us when we come to make decisions on 
tax. The sad fact is that we are a very, very long way from 
achieving this goal right now. 
HM Revenue & Customs do, of course, undertake some 
research on tax in the UK, but almost entirely within the con-
straints of the systems that we already have. They also have 
to work with incredibly limited budgets; so much so that 
almost no tax decision is reviewed after implementation to 
ensure that it achieved its stated objectives. We have, in effect, 
a state tax authority with no feedback loop within its own 
research systems to review success and failure. No wonder 
mistakes have been made time after time after time.
In addition to HMRC we have one major tax research 
centre in the UK, which is part of the Said Business School at 
Oxford University. Unfortunately this Oxford Centre for 
Business Taxation is heavily funded by big business1 and, 
whilst it would be good to think that this has no influence 
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upon its research output, in my opinion that is not the case. 
There is, unfortunately, no equivalent centre anywhere else in 
the UK (which in itself makes my point about a lack of 
research) and there is as a result significant crossover between 
this Oxford centre and the Institute for Fiscal Studies on 
policy issues (such as the Mirrlees Review on the future of tax 
design2). So strong is this relationship in fact that it is easy to 
see the two bodies as synonymous at a policy level. That was 
uncomfortably illustrated when one of the principal authors 
of the Mirrlees Review section dedicated to corporate taxa-
tion,3 Prof. Michael Devereux of the Oxford Centre for 
Business Taxation, argued in the Financial Times in December 
2012 that ‘The best reform of corporation tax would be its 
abolition’.4 That hardly looks like a view wholly independent 
of the interests of some of his major funders. 
Whilst it is, of course, the case that there are other tax 
researchers at other UK universities, and even a body called 
the Tax Research Network that apparently provides opportu-
nity for them to highlight their work, these academics have 
been noticeable only by their absence from the very signifi-
cant tax debate that has fired public imagination in recent 
years and it is rare indeed that any are called to give evidence 
to Parliament.
Talking of Parliament, it too is without adequate research 
resources on this subject. The House of Commons Library 
does produce some useful papers, occasionally, but they are 
only literature reviews. More importantly, critical commit-
tees like the Treasury and Public Accounts Committees do 
not have research budgets to ensure that the information they 
are given by bodies like HMRC are credible. This is absurd, 
and in marked contrast to the USA, for example. How can 
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MPs pass good tax legislation when they have so few resources 
available to them to ensure appropriate questions are asked 
on tax (or any other issue, come to that)?
In 2009 when the UK’s Department for International 
Development wanted to review the available research litera-
ture on tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditures in 
developing countries it had to ask a professor at the Oxford 
Centre for Business Taxation to do the work and almost all 
the literature he found was prepared by NGO researchers5 – 
of whom, I should add, I was one. There is nothing wrong 
with NGO research, but the fact that in some quite critical 
areas (including work on the UK tax gap – the difference 
between the amount of tax that should be paid in the UK and 
the amount that is actually paid – where my own work is just 
about the only available alternative to that offered by HM 
Revenue & Customs6) there is no material from other sources 
is dismaying given the importance of the issues in question. 
More research is needed if all the options that are really avail-
able to us are to be understood and the decisions that 
politicians are being asked to take are to be properly 
appraised.
Proper policy preparation
Good tax law requires that a government offer soundly 
thought out draft legislation to a parliament for approval, 
with well-reasoned arguments being given in its favour and 
with proper costings of likely impacts being stated. Given 
how important tax is you would think that this would be 
the least that could be expected of the Treasury, which is, 
after all, the most powerful department in government. 
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Unfortunately, you would be wrong. The vast majority of 
documents issued by the Treasury in support of their policy 
proposals either reiterate proposed legislation in slightly 
plainer English without offering explanation, or seek com-
ment on a prescribed set of questions that inherently support 
the intended proposal. Impact assessments rarely reveal the 
basis on which they are calculated, or the ranges of uncer-
tainty within which they were prepared. Assessment of 
outcomes is almost unknown. 
All of these issues compound some of the fundamental 
problems inherent in the way in which we create tax law in 
the UK. One of these problems goes back a very long time, 
and is the consequence of a decision made in the House of 
Lords as long ago as 1869, when a judge named Lord Cairns 
said:
If the person sought to be taxed comes within the 
letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the 
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On 
the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the 
tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the 
law, the subject is free, however apparently within 
the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear 
to be. In other words, if there be admissible in any 
statute what is called an equitable construction, 
certainly such a construction is not admissible in a 
taxing statute.7
We do not have a lot to thank Lord Cairns for: what he in 
effect said was that every ‘i’ must be dotted and every ‘t’ must 
be crossed or there is no hope of recovering tax in the UK. 
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The upshot is that every year hundreds of pages of tax law 
are produced to plug unintended loopholes in earlier legisla-
tion, that some lawyer or accountant, somewhere, has lit 
upon as a means to avoid tax without infringing ‘the letter of 
the law’ – abusing the intention of Parliament, as Lord Cairns 
permitted them to do.
It is true that in 2013 a tax General Anti-Abuse Rule was 
introduced in the UK8 (in the creation of which I played a 
part) which had the intention of overcoming some of the 
problems that Lord Cairns created, but in my opinion the 
time has come to change our whole approach to tax legisla-
tion in the UK and put it onto what is properly called a 
purposive basis. Every tax law would have attached to it a 
statement of exactly what it is meant to achieve and there 
would be a requirement that whenever a tax official or a 
court has to interpret the law they do so in accordance with 
the stated intention of the legislation. We could then mas-
sively simplify our tax law, because we would not need to 
anticipate every single possibility that might arise and make 
provision for it when drafting legislation, but could instead 
depend upon reliable interpretation of the intention of 
Parliament to deal with any future dispute over ambiguities. 
Another immediate and obvious advantage would be that 
those members of Parliament who are not trained lawyers or 
tax specialists would have some chance of understanding the 
legislation they are asked to approve, as would the rest of us. 
There are yet larger problems inherent in the current struc-
ture of HM Revenue & Customs, which despite having the 
task of implementing legislation is also given effective respon-
sibility for writing most of it on behalf of the government. 
The core difficulties have to do with a shortage of specialist 
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knowledge and experience, and an inbuilt bias towards par-
ticular interest groups.
If HMRC is to undertake this work of preparing legisla-
tion and policy it should do so in a balanced and objective 
way, and yet the very structure of department makes that 
highly unlikely. Not only are many of the executive, full-time, 
working directors of HMRC not tax specialists (including 
the chief executive at the time of writing) but the five non- 
executives all come from big business and two of them at the 
time of writing are former senior tax partners in Big 4 firms 
of accountants. This bias in favour of big business is not by 
accident; it is by design. Past statements by HMRC have sug-
gested that they, or ministers, believe that it is only those with 
large business experience who have the skills to be repre-
sented on this Board despite the fact that HMRC is also 
responsible for the taxation of smaller businesses, 30 million 
or so individuals and a host of other organizations, all of 
whom, are as a result of the bias in Board appointments, 
effectively excluded from representation in HMRC deci-
sion-making processes. Why those who lead unions, NGOs, 
charities, pension funds, pensioner organizations, small busi-
nesses and others apparently lack such skills is not clear.
That problem is exacerbated by the apparent shortage 
of experienced staff at HMRC, especially when it comes to 
creating tax policy. I have witnessed this at first hand on a 
number of occasions, firstly when representing trade unions 
in discussion at the Treasury when they were invited to such 
debates before May 2010, and more recently when invited in 
a personal capacity to sit on the advisory panel helping write 
the General Anti-Abuse Rule introduced in 2013. What is 
continually surprising is how inexperienced many of the staff 
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in charge of taxation policy seem whether they come from 
HM Treasury or HMRC (although the latter are usually 
better, for the obvious reason of having tax experience), and 
how dependent these departments are, as a result, on staff on 
secondment to either of these departments from big firms of 
accountants or lawyers. In one absurd situation draft UK 
government policy was being routed for discussion through 
PricewaterhouseCoopers email servers because the person 
serving as secretary to a committee was on secondment from 
that firm. Margaret Hodge, the chair of the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee, has raised this issue 
with regard to staff secondment from KPMG.10 
Those same firms, the professional bodies of which they 
are members, and their multinational company clients, tend 
also to dominate the consultation processes that are suppos-
edly central to the creation of UK taxation policy, again 
suggesting that there is considerable bias in the way in which 
this tax policy is prepared. As Lord Joffe, a member of the 
House of Lords Economic Affairs sub-committee that scruti-
nizes Finance Bills, said in the House of Lords in July 2014:
On the basis of the evidence received, I agreed and 
supported all the sub-committee’s recommendations. 
However, I was concerned about the very narrow 
base from which that evidence was drawn. There are 
some 420,000 partnerships of one form or another in 
the UK, 90% of which have three or fewer partners. 
Despite that, the evidence that the sub-committee 
heard was overwhelmingly from associations, 
organizations and professional advisers who 
represent large partnerships, which probably make 
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up less than 1% of all partnerships. Professional 
advisers inevitably had potential conflicts of interest 
in that some of their members would benefit from a 
rejection of the proposed changes in the law.11
There is very good reason to believe that the basis on which 
tax legislation is prepared in the UK is inappropriate and that 
it does, inevitably, produce legislation biased in favour of 
particular interest groups. In a democracy this is, surely, 
unacceptable and is a matter in need of urgent reform.
Proper scrutiny – the basis of good tax law 
Deficiencies of expertise, resources and appropriate advice 
continue to hamper the decision-making when proposed tax 
legislation reaches Parliament, which is the only body that 
has the power to approve it. In the UK at present that almost 
invariably means the Westminster parliament, but the process 
of devolving tax powers to the Scottish parliament is well 
under way and such powers are also likely to be given in due 
course to the Welsh and Northern Ireland assemblies. There 
are demands for such powers to be given also to major cities, 
London in particular.12 If and when this happens, the short-
comings in the system that are already evident at Westminster 
are likely to be exacerbated in devolved parliaments and 
assemblies – unless something is done to address them.
Because much of the legislation is written in language 
about as far removed from plain English as it is possible to 
get, I have on far too many occasions been called by members 
of Parliament who, tasked with looking at draft tax legisla-
tion, have had to admit that they have almost no idea what a 
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particular piece of law has been proposed to deal with, and 
why, or what it might mean. I make no criticism of them for 
that: the shortcomings lie in the parliamentary briefings from 
HM Revenue & Customs, which in far too many cases are 
unhelpful (they frequently simply restate the proposed law, 
clause by clause, in slightly different language), and in many 
more are missing necessary information, such as the likely 
economic impact of what is proposed. In the face of this 
unhelpful approach from the government, parliamentarians 
need their own expert advice to work out precisely what they 
are being asked to approve, and yet, rare exceptions apart, 
the only resources they can draw upon are the same big firms 
of lawyers and accountants who have, all too often, been 
heavily engaged in lobbying for the particular form in which 
the legislation is already being presented.13
If we really want proper tax legislation then we must give 
parliamentary committees tasked with scrutinizing that legis-
lation their own budgets so they can purchase their own 
independent advice from those who they choose to offer com-
ment upon the legislation they’re being asked to consider. 
Only then might we get good tax decisions. 
The accountability of HM Revenue & Customs
Once tax legislation has been created you would think that 
the question of accountability for its enforcement would be 
an issue of little concern, but that is far from the case. In fact, 
HM Revenue & Customs is the only major government 
department for which no minister is responsible. It is true 
that the MP holding office as the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury reports to Parliament on the actions of HMRC and 
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there is no doubt that he or she can call in the department’s 
permanent secretary for discussion if appropriate, but there is 
no official direct line of responsibility from that permanent 
secretary to that minister, or in turn to Parliament. 
The reason for this is in the department’s name: Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs is technically responsible to 
the Crown. As noted in Chapter 1, after centuries of dispute 
between kings, queens and Parliament it was resolved that no 
monarch could raise a tax without Parliament’s consent, but 
to this day, in the obscure way in which the UK constitution 
appears to work, the revenue and duties collected remain the 
property of the Crown. The fact that the Crown is repre-
sented in this case by the First Secretary to the Treasury, who 
it turns out is the Prime Minister, does not matter: HMRC 
remains technically unaccountable to Parliament. 
For a long time the MPs who have sat on the Treasury 
Committee of the House of Commons have appeared reluc-
tant to claim power of scrutiny over HMRC’s actions. It fell 
to Margaret Hodge MP and her Public Accounts Committee 
to take on this role in such spectacular fashion during the 
2010–15 parliament. She has had to pioneer, despite consid-
erable criticism (not least from colleagues on the Treasury 
Committee), a form of accountability for HMRC without 
having resources provided to her to do so, and all this in 
the face of Treasury indifference, and sometimes outright 
hostility. 
It is, of course, time that this absurd situation ended. There 
should be a minister in charge of a department that has direct 
responsibility for HMRC and all its actions and that minister 
should be directly accountable to Parliament. Parliament 
should in turn provide its appointed scrutineers of that 
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department with an adequate budget so that they can prop-
erly research its activities and hold it to account for both its 
successes and failures. Proper, functioning democracy should 
surely suggest that this change is essential.
Access to HMRC
The whole process of democratic government, if it is to func-
tion effectively, is dependent upon a set of checks and 
balances. Different countries create these in different ways. In 
the UK we create such checks by having two chambers to our 
parliament and by having a government that is drawn from 
the ranks of the largest party (or coalition parties) in the 
House of Commons, to which it is supposedly accountable 
through proper processes of scrutiny. Another essential ele-
ment is the existence of a functioning legal system that can 
ensure that the law is enforced as intended, to which people 
can make proper appeal if they feel that injustice has been 
done. 
By and large the UK has a reasonable track record here: 
people have the option of challenging HMRC’s decisions in 
special tax tribunals and there is some assistance provided to 
help them do so. But there are problems before that stage is 
reached – which is the situation that impacts most people. If 
truth be told, for most people in the UK the real problem with 
tax decision-making is not how we ended up with the laws 
we have (which is the issue I have concentrated on up to this 
point in this chapter) but how they come to be asked for the 
amount of tax that is expected of them.
Once upon a time, which for these purposes I will call 30 
years ago, HMRC ran a strong and vibrant system of local 
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tax offices, with one located in just about every community 
of any size in the UK. There may have been historical reasons 
for this: systems were not automated and little communi-
cation was electronic, of course, so that having a letterbox 
through which people could put their correspondence to their 
tax inspector within the locality did, to quite a large degree, 
make sense. There was, however, something much more 
important than that in this local tax office network. What it 
recognized was that tax does, metaphorically, represent the 
price we pay for living in a democracy, and that if we are to 
see democracy in action in our communities we do, therefore, 
have to see our tax office present in the places where we live 
and work. That is what these local offices did. We were taxed 
by people we might have been to school with, and who were 
now our neighbours. We knew them, and, perhaps just as 
importantly, they knew us, and who the rogues were (including 
among the professionals with whom they had to deal). The 
system created local confidence, local effectiveness and local 
intelligence which was targeted at reducing the tax evasion 
that undermined the local economy. As a result, and of course 
on occasion a little grudgingly, the system worked quite well 
for all concerned, even if the rogues did not agree. 
This was in the days when tax in the UK was run by two 
independent departments, one called the Inland Revenue and 
the other HM Customs & Excise. The first department ran 
direct taxation, like income tax, corporation tax, capital 
gains tax and inheritance tax, whilst the second ran indirect 
taxes like VAT, customs duties, excise taxes and so on. 
These two departments had very different attitudes towards 
their work. The Inland Revenue, by and large, presumed that 
they were dealing with tax-compliant people and maintained 
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relationships that were respectful and which sought to resolve 
problems on the basis of understanding. Until its merger into 
HMRC HM Customs & Excise (at least in my impression) 
presumed most people were crooks until proved otherwise, 
an attitude no doubt dating from their ancient origin as ‘the 
Customs men’ whose task it was to beat smuggling, on which 
many local economies were dependent in the eighteenth and 
even nineteenth centuries. (There were of course exceptions 
to the rule on both sides.) 
Since the merger of the two departments there is no doubt 
that the old Customs attitude has prevailed within HMRC. 
Many who have to deal with HMRC think that the assump-
tion that we are all crooks now prevails, quite widely. Worse 
than that, though, is the new department’s change in attitude 
towards public service. As already noted, its Board has been 
deliberately dominated by people drawn from big business 
and its full-time directors have been recruited from outside 
tax departments, and the consequence is that HMRC has 
been seen, rather bizarrely, as a revenue-spending department 
within government even though it is, of course, and very 
obviously, the only really significant revenue-raising depart-
ment government has. Despite the fact that over the last few 
years it has, to the annoyance of most taxpayers, persisted in 
calling those with whom it deals its ‘customers’, when that is 
the last thing that they feel they are, it has at the same time 
refused to entertain the idea that those ‘customers’ might ever 
be right or be deserving of something akin to a service. 
The result has been all too obvious. With cost-saving made 
the department’s absolute priority it has, between 2005 and 
2015, cut more than 35,000 staff from its payroll, reducing 
the total number of employees from over 90,000 to about 
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55,000. There are now plans in place for further substantial 
staff reductions, with most of the job losses falling on  those 
who actually deal with taxpayers, whether in person or on 
the phone.  
Local tax offices have been closed in their scores across 
the country, with a significant loss of local knowledge as a 
consequence, leading directly (in my opinion) to a rise in tax 
evasion. 
Just as worryingly, in 2014 all the HMRC local enquiry 
offices, where a person could go to meet revenue officials face 
to face, were shut, with up to 2,000 jobs prejudiced as a 
result, making a mockery of the claim that HMRC would 
provide an alternative service in people’s homes instead. 
Telephone centre staff with limited training have replaced 
local-based staff with expertise in the tax system, and now 
even these telephone staff are to be replaced with online 
computer-based enquiry systems. Taxpayers will be expected 
to navigate a set of frequently asked questions and pick out 
an answer to their query, whether or not it fits one of the pre-
scripted scenarios.
The idea that in these circumstances any taxpayer can truly 
understand the decision-making of the tax authority that 
demands payment from them is very hard to sustain and 
alienation from the system is the inevitable consequence – 
which brings me right back to the point where I started this 
consideration of the necessary preconditions for an effective 
tax decision-making process. That starting point was the sug-
gestion that there is an absence of education on tax within the 
population at large, and now, quite shockingly, within HMRC 
itself, where trained staff are being replaced by computers. 
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Transparency
Given the appropriate political will it is not difficult to achieve 
change. Creating that will is the challenge. Over the past ten 
or so years a group of us have campaigned to get rid of the 
secrecy that used to surround so much to do with tax – a 
secrecy aided, abetted and encouraged by tax havens and big 
business – and we have, by and large, won the greater trans-
parency we have demanded, albeit imperfectly as yet. 
Before I go into more detail, I need to take you through the 
process of tax, which, I have long argued, involves six stages: 
1.  You have to define the tax base, which is done by 
creating the law, broadly speaking, using the process  
that I’ve outlined above. 
2. You have to find where the tax base actually is. So, for 
example, if you decide to tax wealth, but it’s all hidden 
outside the country, then you’ll have a particular 
problem imposing that tax. 
3. You have to actually quantify the tax base: you have to 
be capable of putting a monetary value on what you are 
going to tax or it is very hard to tax it. This is more 
difficult than you might think, since a lot of accountancy 
is just too subjective to form a basis for taxation. For 
example, do you really know the value of the house or 
flat you live in, let alone the land it sits on? Until the 
arrival of web sites like Zoopla most people could only 
have made a vague guess at this, and then only if there 
were other nearby houses of similar type they could 
compare. Even now such estimates may be wildly 
inaccurate in some cases.
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4. You have to ensure that the right rate of tax is applied to 
the right tax base at the right time to collect the tax 
owing. This requires a strong tax administration. 
5. Government spending that creates the need for tax in the 
first place should be properly allocated in accordance 
with a budget (something we are good at in the UK).
6. All of this process should be accounted for openly, and 
with due reporting back to the parliament that approved 
the tax in the first place, or the democratic principle fails 
(something we’re really bad at).
The issue of finding where tax bases are hidden has been 
the subject of a virtual revolution over the last decade. If, for 
example, in 2005, near the start of our campaign, anyone had 
called for a wealth tax many people would have laughed at 
the idea, because, as was widely known at that time, it was 
really easy back then for almost anyone to take their assets 
out of the UK and locate them in a tax haven, after which 
there was almost no prospect of that wealth being traced. 
What is extraordinary is that over the last few years this has 
changed, or is in the process of changing, for a number of 
reasons.
Although I was told as recently as 2009 by the UK Treasury 
that there was no chance of what is called automatic informa-
tion exchange of data on the accounts held in tax havens by 
UK residents taking place in my lifetime, it is now going to 
happen, with all the benefits of it flowing through to the UK’s 
HMRC in the next few years at the latest. What this means is 
that if a UK resident has any interest in a bank account, com-
pany, trust or other arrangement in one of a whole list of tax 
havens, including all those operated under UK control such 
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as Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, the Cayman Islands, the 
British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and more, then that place 
will have an automatic and legal responsibility to report the 
fact through their governments to HM Revenue & Customs. 
So suddenly what was hidden in these havens completely 
beyond view will become transparent. And the same trans-
parency is also being created across the EU and beyond. The 
change is dramatic, and very welcome. 
But the change is not restricted to the tax haven world. 
Again, pretty much as a result of the work of tax campaigners 
like the Tax Justice Network and Global Witness, pressure 
has been brought to bear on the UK government and the 
governments of many other places, including tax havens, to 
ensure that their registries of companies include details of the 
beneficial owners of those companies and not just those per-
sons who lend their name as nominees to be recorded on 
public record. This is another vital development because it 
will make it much harder in future to disguise the ownership 
of a company in any country, including tax havens; and con-
sequently money flows designed to avoid or evade tax can be 
more easily traced. 
These measures on beneficial ownership of companies are 
not yet comprehensive enough: it seems unlikely that this 
information will be placed on public record, where it would 
be available to people who trade with these companies, and 
who need to know it. However, it is another step in the right 
direction and signals that further progress in due course is 
possible.
Finally, on the transparency agenda, in September 2014 
the form of accounting for multinational companies called 
country-by-country reporting14 received the endorsement of 
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the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
for use for tax reporting purposes.15 As a result it is likely that 
over the next few years all countries with the headquarters of 
a multinational corporation located in their territory should 
be supplied with a full set of the corporation’s accounts 
broken down on a country-by-country reporting basis. That 
country receiving the data will then be expected to share 
that information with a wide range of other (but not all) 
countries in which that group trades; the exceptions being 
countries which do not have tax information sharing agree-
ments with the country in which the head office is located. 
The country-by-country reporting data will include sales 
(split between those to real customers and those to other 
group companies), the number of employees, profit, tax pro-
vided for in the accounts as well as tax paid, and the net 
investment in the jurisdiction by the group. The object of the 
exercise is simple: to show if there is a mismatch between 
the apparent scale of the operation of the multinational cor-
poration in a country and the profit it declares there. This is 
done by estimating the scale of real economic activity in the 
jurisdiction based on sales, number of people and assets and 
comparing that data with the profit allocation to it. The 
method is not perfect of course, and is not a basis for taxing 
in itself. What it does do is provide an indication of whether 
a tax authority needs to investigate a company in more depth 
and if so about which jurisdictions investigation needs to take 
place. This might happen, for example, if the country-by-
country reporting accounts of a multinational corporation 
showed a significant part of its profits arising in, say, 
Luxembourg or Jersey, even though it appeared that the level 
of sales in that place was very limited, as was the number of 
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staff. In combination these factors might suggest that profit- 
shifting into the low-tax jurisdiction was taking place which 
required investigation to ensure that tax liabilities were 
properly stated in countries where the trading was really 
happening. 
Although it is very firmly intended by the OECD, which 
has oversight of international tax rules, that this data not be 
made available on public record at present, the EU has not 
accepted this line and has demanded a limited form of this 
data be published by EU banks from July 2014 onwards. In 
my study of this data, which was published in July 2015,16 I 
showed that there was very clear suggestion of profit-shifting 
taking place, with billions of euros of profits appearing to be 
reallocated by just seventeen EU banks to places like Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Singapore, Ireland, Jersey and the Isle of Man, 
all of which have reputations as tax havens, and away from 
countries like Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Spain. 
Unsurprisingly, the reaction from big business, and most 
especially that based in the USA, has been furious.17 Those 
who have gained enormously from using tax havens and from 
the secrecy that corporate accounting combined with tax 
haven opacity has been able to create do not want to give up 
the benefits without a fight, but the moves are all against 
them. It is widely thought that country-by-country reporting 
will be voluntarily disclosed by many companies within a few 
years, paving the way to mandatory publication by all multi-
national corporations. The days of dark dealing may be 
coming to an end. 
So what has all this to do with the question of choice 
regarding taxation, which is the theme of this chapter? The 
answer is that these reforms have made available many 
Joy of Tax.indd   125 04/09/2015   12:30
RICHARD MURPHY
126
choices that even a decade ago were unimaginable. It is true 
that more progress can be made in many of these areas. For 
example, it is absurd that information is now to be supplied 
to HMRC on the use that UK-resident people make of com-
panies located in tax havens when the same information is 
not at present supplied by UK-based banks to HMRC. Still, 
the precedent set internationally makes it easier to secure 
national legislation that will provide our tax authorities with 
the information they need to track down the owners of com-
panies that might owe tax. And these data transform the way 
in which we can tax and so the options available to us. We 
can now decide what and how we want to tax, and put the 
procedures in place to do so, with much greater confidence 
than has ever existed before that we can actually charge the 
resulting taxes with a good prospect of them being paid. This 
creates a new era in taxation. And that in turn creates another 
exciting possibility, that tax can become the fault line in the 
political system where real political choice can be made, 
including at the ballot box. 
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The underpinnings of a  
good tax system
In Chapter 5 I argued that tax was about choice, and that, if 
we wanted it, that choice was now available to us. Choice is, 
however, something with which most of us feel uncomfort-
able. Choice is pretty easy to handle if the question is whether 
or not we want to go to see a particular film tonight. In that 
case the options available are clearly defined and the conse-
quences rarely extend beyond upsetting the person asking if 
we choose what they think to be the wrong option. But when 
the question is about what sort of tax system we want the 
options are not so narrowly defined and the choices available 
for making decisions are really wide. 
The 2014 referendum campaign on Scottish independence 
offered a small insight into the complexity of the decision- 
making processes we might go through when considering 
how to exercise choice on tax. Although the question on the 
Scottish ballot paper looked innocuous enough (it was just 
six words and asked ‘Should Scotland be an independent 
country?’) the range of emotions and of issues discussed 
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as people tried to make up their minds was enormous. 
National currencies, tax systems, the economy, benefits, 
membership of the EU, defence, energy needs, the desirable 
level of state spending, and much more came up in debate. 
Despite that what was never quite clear from either side was 
what were the guiding principles that drove their desires (bar 
an obvious feeling among many voters that Scotland could be 
trusted to run its own affairs whilst others clearly thought it 
could do better by remaining in partnership with the other 
countries in the UK). What decision criteria should apply to 
such a choice? And how are they specified? That’s the tough 
point where rationalization of gut instinct becomes hard.
Tax evokes questions that are as complex. Leaving aside 
the question of statehood for a moment (because I will return 
to it later) what really matters when it comes to tax is that 
everyone involved understand what the principles underpin-
ning a tax system are. I am talking here about the principles 
of the system as a whole and not just those of its administra-
tion – an area of debate that has seemingly been neglected for 
a very long time.
Adam Smith did address this issue, way back in 1776, in 
his book The Wealth of Nations1 in which he suggested four 
maxims for tax. Extraordinarily these maxims are still widely 
quoted, as if unanswerably correct, today, largely because no 
one seems to have tried to replace them. They are worth 
quoting (each extract below being based on the original text, 
but shortened to contain only its key elements):
1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute 
towards the support of the government, as nearly 
as possible, in proportion to their respective 
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abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which 
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the 
state. 
2.  The tax which each individual is bound to pay 
ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of 
payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to 
be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the 
contributor, and to every other person. 
3.  Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the 
manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient 
for the contributor to pay it. 
4.  Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take 
out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as 
little as possible over and above what it brings into 
the public treasury of the state. 
To put it another way, these can each be summarized in a 
single word:
1. Equity
2.  Certainty
3.  Convenience
4.  Efficiency.
Several points arising from these maxims are worth noting. 
The fourth maxim, for example, supports the view that there 
is no sense in running a government budget surplus. The first 
makes it very clear that the tax relationship is by no means a 
one-way traffic: for example, Smith realized the imperative of 
having a functioning state if wealth is to be created. 
That said, of these maxims (as Smith himself called them) 
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only the first deals with the goals of the system as such. The 
others largely relate to its operation, and so concern matters 
I discuss in more depth in Chapter 7. The only real principle 
Smith offered was equity. If one had to make a choice of a 
single principle to guide a tax system equity, or equality as we 
might now call it, might be a very good one, but it is a some-
what limited basis for a whole tax system: there must be more 
principles underpinning a modern tax system than that if 
appropriate choices are to be made as to its design. I suggest 
it is time to move on from Adam Smith and that there are at 
least four such principles we need to take into account, which 
are:
1. Peace
2.  Equality
3.  Truth
4.  Simplicity2
You can call them PETS for short, but I am not sure I would. 
Each, I think, suggests an idea that is critical to the creation 
and success of a modern tax system. 
Peace
Let me get the glaringly obvious out of the way first, and say 
I realize that throughout history war and tax have been inti-
mately related. Indeed, at one time war was the major reason 
for tax and it should, therefore, be no surprise that, as noted 
in Chapter 1, Magna Carta limited the king’s right to tax 
precisely because he had been demanding tax to fund wars 
that were unpopular with his barons. 
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If war and tax are linked in that way so, by obvious impli-
cation, are peace and tax. Peace reduces the amount of tax 
required to be extracted from an economy. The relationship 
is almost that simple, and most would think that this out-
come would be a good thing. 
That said, even the most fundamental of libertarian 
thinkers seems to think tax acceptable if it relates to the main-
tenance of law and order and the preservation of private 
property rights (some of them seem to think there is little 
further role for government); but if you look on these two 
goals as ‘keeping the peace’ then you have a further link 
between tax and peace.
However, in proposing ‘peace’ as a principle to underpin 
the tax system I am using the word to represent something 
much more than these rather limited aspirations. It is my 
belief that tax is a fundamental mechanism used to reconcile 
society’s conflicting economic goals and needs, because the 
way in which tax is collected does, in my opinion, both reflect 
and shape the society that charges it. No society can survive 
for long without reconciling these goals unless it resorts to 
oppression. 
This reconciliation is possible, in my view, because tax 
represents the ‘consideration’ paid by people who live in a 
country in exchange for the social contract that exists between 
them, its government, and each other. There is mutuality 
implicit in that coexistence, but necessary mutuality almost 
inevitably gives rise to conflicts, some of which will be eco-
nomic. It is my belief that tax can and should reduce the risk 
of such conflicts by reducing inequality in society, using 
resources more equitably, making sure all basic needs are met 
and at the same time providing people with access to the 
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means to make their own livings in the way that they want; 
and, if that outcome is achieved, then economic conflict is 
less likely and so peace will result.
The other three of my fundamental principles also have 
a role in achieving this reconciliation. Greater equality in a 
society clearly reduces tension. Simplicity, if it increases 
understanding and certainty, does the same, whilst truth is 
the bedrock of trust, which is the foundation for peace. My 
themes aren’t unrelated. But there is more to the peace that 
tax can bring than that. Tax is about buying into the society 
of which we are a part.
That is why, as I explained in Chapter 2, paying tax is a 
voluntary act for most of us. And that is why not paying tax 
due is seen as an affront to those who have paid, which is 
why we have laws to punish those who deviate from the 
norms that society imposes. The overwhelming majority of us 
want to live in harmony, and accepting the role of govern-
ment, and its right to tax, is part of accepting the mutuality 
that really does underpin successful communities. 
The concept of mutuality can be extended to the interna-
tional level. It is dangerous to suggest, as many do, that we 
should promote tax competition between states, since all 
competition is necessarily predicated on the idea that it is 
acceptable for participants to fail. We cannot afford failed 
states and anything that even hints at that possibility has no 
place in the international tax system. That does not mean 
that international uniformity is necessary, but cooperation 
and, where appropriate, harmonization, are essential if tax is 
not to be an instrument for one state to exercise control over 
another. It is no coincidence that those who propose tax com-
petition are the ones who are seeking to exercise that control. 
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Time and again right-wing think tanks have made statements 
like the one below from Dan Mitchell of the US-based Center 
for Freedom and Prosperity, writing on this occasion for the 
UK-based Adam Smith Institute.
Tax competition exists when people can reduce tax 
burdens by shifting capital and/or labour from 
high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. This 
migration disciplines profligate governments and 
rewards nations that lower tax rates and engage in 
pro-growth tax reform.3 
The emphasis is mine, and appropriate. Think tanks like 
those Mitchell works for go out of their way to defend tax 
havens.4 And what they are really saying is that tax havens 
should be able to use their laws to undermine the tax laws of 
other states by inducing the relocation of economic activity to 
low-tax jurisdictions.
There can be no doubt that some low-tax states – like 
Ireland – have induced some real companies to relocate real 
economic activities through the offer of low taxes. But even 
places like Ireland are also part of the tax haven activity 
which induces no real change in economic activity at all, 
merely the relocation for tax purposes of where accountants 
record the profits of the companies for whom they work. 
This process is called profit-shifting.5 
Profit-shifting is, I stress, a pen-pushing exercise, usually 
backed by a lot of paperwork. Perhaps the biggest single 
exposé of the activity to date came from the Luxleaks disclo-
sures in late 2014.6 The key issue there was secrecy, as it 
always is in these cases. Large companies secured tax 
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advantages from the use of obscure Luxembourg subsidiaries 
that had little or no economic substance to them, where the 
detail of what they were doing was hidden from the states 
who lost tax as a result.
This is the reality of tax competition from tax havens that 
right-wing think tanks promote on behalf of their corporate 
funders. In most cases tax havens are better described as 
secrecy jurisdictions.7 They are places that intentionally create 
regulation for the primary benefit and use of those not resi-
dent in their geographical domain, that regulation being 
deliberately designed to undermine the legislation or regula-
tion of another jurisdiction. To make sure that, as far as 
possible, those trying to avoid the regulation of their home 
country cannot be identified, the secrecy jurisdiction also cre-
ates a deliberate, legally backed, veil of secrecy that ensures 
that those from outside the secrecy jurisdiction making use of 
its regulation cannot be identified to be doing so. This, of 
course, is exactly what Luxembourg did in the Luxleaks 
cases. Most of the tax scandals of recent years have revolved 
around this tax haven secrecy being used to hide the artificial 
relocation of profits. Google moved profit to Bermuda behind 
a veil of secrecy; Starbucks did much the same to Switzerland 
via the Netherlands; and Amazon did it to Luxembourg: the 
theme is always the same.
This is not true competition or anything like it. Any econ-
omist knows that fair competition requires that all the 
participants have available to them all the information they 
need to make an informed decision. Tax competition works 
in exactly the opposite way, and hides from view everything 
that it can, which reveals what this activity really is: it is eco-
nomic warfare waged from tax havens that are places that 
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have sold their right to legislate in order to facilitate attacks 
on the law of other countries, and then provide secrecy to 
ensure that those involved cannot, as far as possible, be 
identified.
No wonder then that peace is such an important word for 
tax. This tax war has to end, and cooperation is now essential 
or the whole foundation of the state, and its right to tax, will 
be undermined and with it will go all the activities on which 
so many depend, because the right to choose them will be lost 
as democracy will have been undermined.
All this suggests that the principle of peace, when it comes 
to taxation, has a lot to offer internationally but there are 
other gains to be had at a domestic level. Most importantly, 
tax, and the spending to which it is linked, has to settle the 
futile war that has waged for far too long between left and 
right, and between pragmatists and dogmatists, on whether 
the state or the private sector is better at doing certain things, 
when the reality is that each has its very obvious strengths in 
some situations, just as it also has very obvious weaknesses in 
others. If peace means creating sufficient harmony for poten-
tially conflicting parties to co-exist and tolerate each other 
then there are gains to be had in resolving these differences.
Take for example the idea few would question that a tax 
system should encourage innovation, skills and enterprise. 
That seems like a statement of the obvious in the twenty-first 
century. And almost without exception people will presume 
that in saying so I am referring to an activity that takes place 
in the private sector; and yet, as recent research by Professor 
Mariana Mazzucato8 has shown, many major technological 
developments that most people think been created in the pri-
vate sector have in fact resulted from government-funded 
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research, including most components of the internet and 
mobile phone technology. Clearly it makes sense for tax to 
fund innovation, skills and enterprise wherever they are to be 
found, and whoever owns the entity where they occur; the 
ownership issue does not matter as much as achieving 
the desired outcome. This is a fact that a tax system should 
recognize: the goal of peace in that same system is to make 
sure that the party best able to undertake an activity should 
be chosen on ability, and not dogmatically. Tax should not set 
parties against each other when there is an outcome to be 
achieved; in fact it should do just the opposite.
Tax has to support business to undertake these tasks in the 
private sector, but also has, for example, to support the NHS, 
and the state-funded arts, and educational establishments, 
and so many others if and when they seek to achieve the same 
goals. We have to see this continuum from state to private 
sector, and from tax to subsidy if we are not to set parties 
against each other and so deny people the chance to deliver to 
their best potential, whatever type of organization they work 
in. Getting this right is about creating a harmonious and bal-
anced economy: I think that might be called one at peace with 
itself. We’re far from there right now. 
Equality
Just as peace is a word fairly easily linked to tax, so is equality. 
Adam Smith was keen on it, after all. That said, as with peace 
this is an issue where I think we need to go beyond the 
obvious.
The obvious thing to say when it comes to tax and equality 
is that anyone giving more than a moment’s thought to this 
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issue would deem it essential that people on similar levels 
of income and in similar circumstances should, within the 
same society, pay similar amounts in tax irrespective of 
the source of their income. This, in taxation terms, is called 
horizontal equity. The trouble is that, while it might be 
obvious that horizontal equity is important, we are very bad 
at delivering it. 
Horizontal tax equity would be easy to achieve if there was 
one type of income and maybe only one way to receive it, but 
life, of course, is not as simple as that. There is earned income, 
that can come from employment or from self-employment, 
and investment income, that can come from low-risk bank 
savings, high-risk dividend income, rents and a host of other 
sources. The state too can provide income to individuals, 
some of it taxable (such as pensions), and some which is 
untaxed (certain benefit payments, for example). All these 
possibilities create complications in the achievement of any 
logical horizontal equity in the tax system. What is more, 
there are ways to receive income through a company rather 
than as an individual; long ago, limited liability companies 
were invented, and they have traditionally had lower tax 
rates than individual people, although the reasons for this 
have been long forgotten in most cases. That too creates a 
distortion when it comes to horizontal equity. 
All these issues need to be addressed if tax is to deliver all 
the advantages of which it is capable. Unless that is done, 
then, for example, the absurd situation can arise where a 
person who owns a company can receive within that com-
pany an income of £1 million in the year and pay tax of no 
more than 20 per cent on it, whereas another person gener-
ating the same income in the same way but who chooses to 
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record it as individual earnings from self-employment could 
pay tax at more than double that rate in the UK at the present 
time. We are, as a result, a very long way from horizontal 
equity right now.
Horizontal equity is taxing income of equivalent amount 
at an equivalent tax rate; the other form of tax equality that 
is usually identified is vertical equity. Vertical equity ensures 
that a tax system is progressive, which means that the overall 
tax rate that a person pays increases steadily as their income 
rises. There are complications in achieving this goal too, in 
the first instance from the existence of state benefits, but also 
from the fact that the tax system as a whole is much bigger 
than the income tax system most people tend to think about. 
Figure 1 on page 00 gives a breakdown of the tax revenues in 
the UK in the year to March 2014 with the proportions each 
tax contributes to the total. Such is the complexity of all these 
varied taxes that it is now generally believed that in practice 
the tax burden in the United Kingdom is not progressive at all.
Figure 8, based upon data from the Office for National 
Statistics for the tax year 2010–11, gives an indication of 
how the tax burden is distributed among income groups at 
present. In itself this chart shows the difficulty of delivering 
vertical equity in a tax system: when taxes on consumption 
are high (as they are in the UK when the combination of VAT, 
excise duty and other charges is taken into account) and those 
on low incomes spend all they have (and sometimes more 
besides because of untaxed income sources or borrowing), 
then what appears to be a partially regressive tax system 
results. In fact, the 10 per cent of people with the highest 
incomes in the UK appear to pay less in total taxation than 
many on lower incomes. 
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Equality may be the name of the game in tax, but we aren’t 
delivering it – and that is taking into account only the obvious 
issues relating to tax and equality that most people tend to 
think of.
As I said at the start of this section, there is rather more to 
tax and equality than these obvious considerations. To pre-
sume that equality, when it comes to tax, is restricted to such 
technical issues as those already mentioned would be absurd. 
Tax has the means to shape society, including the degree of 
equality within it; and this is not just by the way a govern-
ment taxes, but also by the choices made about what to tax 
(or not), what to give allowances to (and not) and what to 
spend state resources upon, or not. Taking this broader 
Figure 8: UK tax paid by income decile, 2010–11
Source: Richard Murphy and Howard Reed, ‘Financing the Social State: 
Towards a full employment economy’, April 2013, Class Think Tank9 
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perspective, I would suggest there are three aspects of equality 
within society that should be considered in creating a tax 
system with equality as its guiding principle.
The first of these is that anyone must, if they are to have 
any chance of equality in life, have the basic means to partic-
ipate in the society of which they are a part. If they cannot 
participate in that way there is clearly a total failure in terms 
of equality. This, I stress, is not an absolute measure: the 
material needs that must be met to participate in a modern 
society are somewhat greater than those required to simply 
stay alive. So, for example, in a society where everybody has 
a mobile phone, the person who cannot afford one is neces-
sarily excluded. In 1990 it would have been impossible to say 
that a mobile phone was essential to participate in society; 
now it probably is. The material need that must be met to 
ensure equality is, then, a relative measure dependent upon 
time and place, and any tax system has to recognize that fact.
Beyond material need there is, secondly, the idea of equality 
based upon sufficiency. If a person is to fully participate in 
the society of which they are a member then they must have 
access to not just material well-being but also sufficient edu-
cation, emotional support and both physical and mental 
well-being. It does of course depend on the individual whether 
they actually take up the opportunities, but unless the chance 
to access all of them is available, unconditionally, it is clearly 
impossible for it to be argued that equality exists. 
Additionally, whilst any tax system should promote the 
opportunity for a person to earn their own, sufficient, living, 
there is equally an obligation inherent within that tax system 
to ensure that a person who cannot, for any reason, achieve 
that goal is adequately protected from the consequences and 
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can still participate in society. In the first instance this means 
that the tax system must be flexible enough to reflect the way 
some people want, or have, to work. So, for example, it must 
embrace the twenty-first-century trend towards flexible employ-
ment, multiple jobs and a combination of self-employment 
and employment, in ways that have not happened to date. 
Secondly, it is clear that the tax and social security systems 
must be integrated to ensure that there is equality of treat-
ment, which is not always achieved. 
It is then important to note that this issue extends beyond 
mere cash payments to and from the individual. Ensuring 
availability of resources such as appropriate housing is an 
essential part of this process of achieving equality of suffi-
cient well-being to participate in society, as too is a policy of 
full employment. It is pointless having a tax system that says 
it promotes equality of sufficiency but does not also promote 
the means to deliver it. One can, of course, extend this notion 
to education and healthcare as well as many aspects of the 
social welfare system on which so many depend at some point 
in their lives. 
It follows that within this definition of equality is to be 
found most of the framework of what we call the welfare 
state. Indeed, if we extend the definition of sufficiency a little 
to cover not just a point in time but a person’s well-being 
throughout their life then the entire welfare state system is 
included. And it is entirely right that equality of sufficiency to 
participate should not just relate to the current moment; it is 
a measure that has to exist, even as it changes, across time. 
So, for example, the young must be cared for by society, even 
though they cannot as yet contribute in a material sense 
towards well-being, and similarly the elderly must be 
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provided for even if their current material needs were not 
anticipated at the time that they were making active material 
contribution to the society of which they are a part. 
In this context there is, I suggest, a fundamental inter-
generational contract that says that one generation will look 
after the next in exchange for that next generation in due 
course caring for them when they are no longer able to con-
tribute as once they did. This is the real basis for pension 
provision, however those in the financial services industry 
like to dress the issue up, and the tax system has to recognize 
that fact. What is more, equality of sufficiency for the elderly 
to participate requires that this obligation be met even when 
the outcome was not anticipated, as might be the case at 
present when increased life expectancy has significantly 
extended the average period of a person’s retirement. Meeting 
these needs is not just contractual obligation: it is an equi-
table obligation as well, and any tax system has to reflect 
that.
It is also important to note that this concept of equitable 
obligation between generations extends beyond those gener-
ations already born. It is very difficult for most people to 
imagine making commitments well beyond our lifespans, and 
yet the latest grandchild of those in old age today might quite 
plausibly live for a century, and that grandchild’s grandchil-
dren if born during their old age might live for another 
century after that. In that case any expression of sufficiency 
must consider the needs of future generations for a long time 
to come, not least in setting limits on the impact the present 
generation can make upon this planet. 
Survival and sufficiency are concepts relating to minimum 
expectations. With luck many people will have the opportunity 
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to exceed their minimum expectations, will indeed have the 
opportunity to fulfil their potential and achieve personal 
goals. Individuals of course vary greatly in their talents, and 
their goals will be diverse. They will measure success or ful-
filment by different criteria. This is where the concept of 
equivalence comes in – the third aspect of equality I want to 
discuss. Equivalence is about people achieving different things 
that have comparable worth in their own perception, and the 
diversity will include diversity of income. Equality of both 
sufficiency and opportunity demands that the contributions 
people make in tax differ according to the monetary surplus 
each has over the sum required to achieve sufficiency, so that 
equivalence can exist for the benefit of all in a society. 
Sufficiency is a base line in defining this contribution: equiv-
alence is the goal. 
Here, thankfully, there is theory that helps us, and it is 
equivalence and not equality on which we rely to come up 
with an answer on redistribution. What we know from eco-
nomic theory, which can also be readily confirmed by life 
experience, is that as any person’s income increases, the value 
to them of each additional pound, dollar, euro, yen or other 
currency that they earn reduces. The precise amount by which 
the value of each pound (etc.) falls could be the subject of 
endless and largely pointless debate, and it will vary from 
person to person and maybe from time to time, and the rate 
of change will not be consistent across a person’s whole 
income range (by definition), but what is indisputable is that 
to the person who has an income of £10,000 an additional £1 
is almost invariably worth more than that same £1 is to the 
person who has an income of £100,000. If that is true then it 
follows the loss of £1 to a person earning £10,000 costs them 
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more in terms of the impact of the loss suffered than the loss 
of £1 costs a person earning £100,000. Since it is undeniable 
that paying tax does feel to some people like a loss of money, 
it follows that to achieve equivalence in the contributions 
made by people on different incomes, both the overall tax 
due and the marginal tax rate payable by the person with a 
lower income must be less than those charged on the income 
of the higher earner. Equivalence of contribution, measured 
by the loss suffered, demands that this is the case and as a 
result progressive taxation must be a fundamental feature of 
any tax system if it is to achieve the goal of promoting 
equality.
There is now a strong body of evidence that suggests that 
this approach to equality produces better outcomes for all the 
people in a society. We now know that more equal societies 
tend to be wealthier, healthier, happier and overall more 
prosperous than unequal societies. The work of professors 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett has been fundamental in 
establishing a common understanding of this seemingly 
obvious truth and although there are some economists who 
have challenged the way in which they have evidentially 
supported their claims the fact is that the vast majority of 
observers think these objections nitpicking, at best. The 
claims made by Wilkinson and Pickett in their book The 
Spirit Level represent truths that are self-evident to most 
of us.
But in that case the very real practical challenges in deliv-
ering equality, some of them already mentioned at the start of 
this section, have to be addressed if principles are to be turned 
into reality. 
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Truth
Truth should, if truth be told, be the foundation of all suc-
cessful tax systems. All such systems are based on voluntary 
compliance, since there is never enough resource available to 
any tax authority to check the tax disclosures of all taxpayers. 
Unless there is honesty between the taxpayer and tax authority 
about what income and assets the taxpayer has that might 
need to be taxed and, in turn, honesty from the government 
about how the tax system works and for what benefit, then 
the relationships of trust that are essential in the tax system 
fail. The result of that failure is cost to all parties arising from 
burdensome regulation, as well as increased inequality as a 
consequence of people successfully cheating the system.
It would be fantastic if it could be said that this depen-
dence upon taxpayer honesty could be relied upon to produce 
correct tax returns, but that is not the case. The latest best 
estimates of the scale of the shadow economy – that part of 
economic activity not recorded, in order to ensure tax is not 
paid – in the EU member states are shown in Figure 9.
It is ironic that some of the states on this list most associ-
ated with being tax havens (Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, and, yes, the UK) have some of the smallest 
shadow economies. Perhaps the irony is that they have less 
need to steal their own taxes since they’re quite good at 
stealing other people’s instead. Low as it may seem in per-
centage terms, however, the UK’s shadow economy of 9.7 per 
cent implies unrecorded income of maybe £180 billion a year 
and tax lost of at least £70 billion as a direct result. Dishonesty 
is big business even in one of the relatively clean countries. 
When shadow economies reach the levels seen in some Balkan 
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Figure 9: The shadow economy in EU member states as 
percentage of GDP
Size of shadow economy – %
Austria 7.5
Belgium 16.4
Bulgaria 31.2
Cyprus 25.2
Czech Republic 15.5
Denmark 13.0
Estonia 27.6
Finland 13.0
France 9.9
Germany 13.0
Greece 23.6
Hungary 22.1
Ireland 12.2
Italy 21.1
Latvia 25.5
Lithuania 28.0
Luxembourg 8.0
Malta 24.3
Netherlands 9.1
Poland 23.8
Portugal 19.0
Romania 28.4
Slovenia 23.1
Spain 18.6
Slovakia 15.0
Sweden 13.9
UK 9.7
Average 18.4
Source: Friedrich Schneider, 201310
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countries then the threat to the financial stability of the state 
as well as to the extent to which it can successfully intervene 
in its own economy is severely prejudiced, as has been seen 
in the case of Greece. No tax system is ever going to have 
the resources to pursue and enforce full payment of all the 
tax owed, so punishment of those deviating from the norm 
of making full payment will always in practice be the excep-
tion. From all this it is apparent that truth is an issue that 
has to be focused upon in any tax system if it is to be truly 
effective.
The aim of doing so can be simply stated: all tax auth-
orities need to ensure the maximum possible voluntary 
compliance with the tax laws of the state to which they are 
responsible.
This might sound straightforward, but is significantly more 
multi-faceted than simply passing laws imposing draconian 
tax penalties. Indeed, if voluntary compliance is the aim such 
laws almost contradict the objective of the system: the focus 
of attention has to be different.
The first such focus has to be on the political system. For a 
tax system to be successful the political system that promotes 
it has to be genuinely democratic, free of corruption and 
capable of delivering political leaders who can be considered 
trustworthy. The example has to be set at the top. If it is not 
then corruption filters downwards.
That then suggests the second issue of concern: a country’s 
tax authority has to be staffed by people who are themselves 
considered to be trustworthy. If corruption exists, and 
becomes widespread within a tax authority, there is no chance 
whatsoever that the right amount of tax will be collected in 
that country. This issue is not unrelated to the first: it is only 
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honest politicians who can command an honest tax authority 
for fear of it otherwise turning on them. 
Third, every effort must be made to encourage taxpayer 
compliance with the rules of the system. This not only involves 
making sure that the obligations a taxpayer has to comply 
with are well known to them – which is a form of telling the 
truth in its own right – but also involves letting the taxpayer 
know that the tax authority can and does have means to 
check that they are being honest, and ensuring that such sys-
tems are actually in place. This last activity is far too little 
known about at present. It should, for example, be the case 
that a tax authority knows about all large bank deposits in 
people’s bank accounts, and also large purchases, such as 
houses and cars, so that these can be checked to see if they are 
consistent with declared incomes. And it should also be the 
case that tax authorities have access to bank data on the ben-
eficial ownership of companies to make sure that when 
limited companies are used those making use of them can be 
properly identified and be held to account if they abuse tax 
law. Simple systems such as these, that make people aware 
that their chances of being caught cheating are high, will 
encourage truth-telling, even if a little persuasion is needed. 
Domestic honesty is not, however, enough. The issue of tax 
havens, and the deliberate veil of secrecy that they provide to 
their users has already been discussed in this book, and this 
has rightly been one of the main focuses of attention for those 
seeking tax justice over the last decade or so. There is not, 
and can never be (barring a threat to human rights, which 
would have to be tested on a case-by-case basis), a justifica-
tion for refusing to supply information on income earned by 
the resident of one country in another place if that data is 
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needed to ensure that tax is paid in the right place, at the right 
rate and at the right time, but that refusal is just what tax 
havens have long done, and might still seek to do despite 
recent efforts in this area by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, unless considerable effort is 
put in place to force their compliance. This then is one aspect 
of international honesty that needs to be tackled.
The other is the honesty of multinational corporations. No 
one really knows whether it was ever intended when limited 
liability was first made commonplace in the UK in the 1850s 
that one company should be capable of owning another, 
meaning that there could be layers of limited liability within 
a group of companies. What we do, however, know is that 
this has become the norm, with some conglomerates now 
comprising thousands of companies in many different coun-
tries. This creates a massive problem with truth- telling. The 
first problem is in even identifying what companies make up 
the group, which publishes one single set of accounts for its 
shareholders. So, for example, in June 2015 a report11 found 
that Walmart has built an undisclosed network of 78 subsid-
iaries and branches in fifteen overseas tax havens. These 
subsidiaries had never been subject to public scrutiny before, 
in part because Walmart had not listed them in its annual 
10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
in the USA. The shareholders of Walmart might never have 
known that they had an interest in these entities but for that 
research. Similar research in the UK has also revealed many 
companies failing to list in their accounts or annual return 
filings to the UK regulator just which companies actually 
make up their group. This has meant that it has been almost 
impossible to find out the composition of some multinational 
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corporations. This problem is compounded when subsidiaries 
have been registered in tax havens and have not therefore 
been required to place their accounts on public record, 
meaning that it is not possible, if a multinational corporation 
chooses this to be the case, to find out what activity is actu-
ally undertaken in many of the countries in which they might 
trade.
Awareness that this opacity within some of the world’s 
most powerful corporations, including the complete absence 
of data on what tax they pay on a country-by-country basis, 
has given rise to a demand from 2003 onwards for the new 
form of accounting called country-by-country reporting, 
already referred to in Chapter 5.12 The demand is that groups 
of companies tell the truth about who they are, where they 
are and what they really do. It would seem an obvious 
requirement but it has been fought tooth and nail by big busi-
ness since the idea first began to hit headlines. Despite that in 
September 2014 the OECD made it the strongest recommen-
dation to that date of its Base Erosion and Profits Shifting 
process13 by saying that countries should demand this data to 
help them work out the risk in multinational corporations for 
tax purposes; the UK became the first to actually do so in 
2015, and others have now followed. However, such was the 
business paranoia about the data, which may show just how 
sensitive the information really is, that companies persuaded 
the OECD that the data should only be available for private 
use by tax authorities, meaning most of the secrecy remains 
intact. Thankfully, tax justice activists from very many orga-
nizations, along with members of the European Parliament, 
have made clear that this is unacceptable, and as a result the 
European Commission remains under continuing pressure to 
Joy of Tax.indd   150 04/09/2015   12:30
THE JOY OF TAX
151
force these data into the open, which I am sure will happen 
one day. 
The message is a simple one: that truth might underpin all 
taxation, but we are a long way from it being the norm. As a 
result the fight to secure it, as far as possible, to ensure that 
tax can deliver all the benefits it is capable of goes on. 
Simplicity
Simplicity is the holy grail of tax design; it is what everyone 
seems to say they want and yet it’s the thing that absolutely 
no one gets. There is good reason for that: the current com-
plexity of our tax system is based on mutual mistrust. This 
goes back far into history. Those who are taxed appear to 
have never trusted those who tax. It seems likely that the sen-
timent has always been reciprocated. The consequence is that 
complexity has been designed into the UK tax system from 
the outset, from which it has never recovered.
So, for example, when income tax was first created in 
something close to its current form in the UK in 1803 it was 
given what was called ‘schedular form’.14 There were five 
‘Schedules’ labelled A (income from land and buildings), 
B (farming profits), C (public annuities), D (self-employment 
and other items not covered by A, B, C or E) and E (salaries, 
annuities and pensions). This has largely changed now 
(though only very recently), but what is important is to realize 
why the tax was established in this way: the aim was to make 
sure that no one tax officer could know all the details of a 
taxed person’s income. Opacity was a design feature of UK 
tax from the start.
As if this was not bad enough, UK tax law has, as has 
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already been noted in some detail, developed on what might 
best be described as a ‘strict legal’ basis, when an ‘equitable’ 
basis would be of much greater use. This is a significant dif-
ference in a common-law country, which the whole of the UK 
is for tax purposes. A legal basis of interpretation of the law 
essentially requires that the words used in both law and in the 
way in which a transaction is constructed be looked at in 
isolation to determine whether tax law applies to them or 
not. In contrast (and I am aware I am simplifying matters a 
bit) an equitable interpretation of the law requires that the 
purpose of the law be established by a court, and the purpose 
of the transaction be reviewed, after which the way in which 
tax law is applied to that transaction is then interpreted in the 
light of both these things. It is indisputable that on occasions 
UK courts have swung towards this equitable approach to 
tax law, and have surprised everyone when they have done 
so, but the fact is that this is not the established way UK tax 
law works: the letter of tax law is what tax is based on and 
this has had enormous consequences. 
The first such consequence is that because all language has 
imprecise meaning tax lawyers and accountants have sought 
to take advantage of the uncertainties in the wording of tax 
legislation to find loopholes that their clients can exploit. A 
vast amount of tax avoidance activity has arisen from this 
willingness of tax advisers and their clients to take a risk on 
the interpretation of law, which has been justified by their 
getting away with it on far too many occasions. Secondly, 
and as importantly, because no government has been willing 
to put a general anti-tax avoidance principle into UK law 
(although I did write one which was presented to the House 
of Commons by Michael Meacher MP as a Private Member’s 
Joy of Tax.indd   152 04/09/2015   12:30
THE JOY OF TAX
153
Bill in 201215) all measures taken to beat tax avoidance 
activity have relied upon a process of laying tax law upon tax 
law to try to close loopholes, with the inadvertent conse-
quence that on many occasions further loopholes have been 
opened, and the complexity of tax law becomes ever greater. 
That is why we now have tax law that grows by up to 1,000 
pages of close type each year.
If we are seeking simplicity in taxation then the time for a 
principles-based approach to tax has very clearly arrived. 
Statements of principle by tax authorities on which taxpayers 
can rely are of particular importance in this regard: the mis-
trust on both sides, to some degree justified. has persisted for 
too long. The way to overcome this is to have purposive leg-
islation: that is legislation that not only spells out the detail of 
how the law will work but also says what it is meant to 
achieve. The reason for that is to give guidance to taxpayers, 
their advisers and any court considering a dispute on how 
they can expect any law to be used. So if, for instance, a piece 
of law said it was intended to regulate the transfer of the 
ownership of property between spouses and civil partners, it 
would be obvious that this law could not be used to govern 
transfers between unrelated people, and any attempt to do so 
would be bound to fail. I have picked a simple example, but 
such clarity would stop many disputes, and would also, 
importantly, make it clear when HM Revenue & Customs 
are using law in a way that was not intended by Parliament, 
which has happened. Saying what a law is meant to do as 
well as how it is meant to do it is an obvious way of simpli-
fying everyone’s understanding of the law. 
That said, simplicity in tax law will never be achieved and 
it may not always even be desirable. In a complex world rules 
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will be required for complex situations and it is, I hope, by 
now very obvious from all that I have written that if tax is to 
achieve all the tasks that are expected of it then it will have to 
have a very broad scope – if only to give taxpayers the choices 
they need on such simple issues as whether to buy or lease a 
business asset. 
At which juncture it is also important to repeat what was 
said in an earlier chapter, which is that what many people call 
a simple tax system – a flat tax system – might be anything 
but simple. Almost nothing is as it seems in taxation. 
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The policy decisions tax  
must impact 
Tax does not exist in a vacuum. Nor is tax just about raising 
money. Tax should instead be a way that a government imple-
ments key elements of its vision for the society it wants to 
create on behalf of the people it represents. As a consequence 
tax policy cannot be decided upon in isolation, let alone be 
siloed in a Treasury; it must be integrated across the whole 
range of issues that the government wishes to address 
It is simplistic to say that there are four positions that 
might be taken on the role of government in the economy, but 
brevity requires that I reduce the options to be considered.
The first such position is that of the anarchist, who would 
argue that no government has the right to take a position of 
authority on any issue and as such should not engage in the 
economy. It’s a position, but not one that I will consider fur-
ther: I not only disagree with it, I also think it entirely 
impractical. So, I think, do the vast majority of people. 
The second, third and fourth positions lie on one contin-
uous spectrum. They move from the right-wing position that 
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the state has to exist but should play as small a role in the 
economy as is consistent with the maintenance of law and 
order, defence and protection of the weak and vulnerable, 
through the position that has largely persisted in the UK for 
the last seventy years where the state thinks it has both the 
right and the duty to intervene to achieve a wide range of 
social and economic goals, to the socialist viewpoint, now 
little heard, that the state should not just intervene in the 
economy but own, control and manage large parts of it.
Just as I dismissed the anarchist position on the role of 
government so too am I going to dismiss the overtly socialist 
one that implies state ownership of much of the means 
production, because I think it lacks the balance needed 
to make any society work. I also believe it has little mass 
appeal. That leaves two options on the political agenda when 
it comes to deciding upon the role of government, and so 
taxation. 
If the volume and quantity of media comment was to be 
the basis for decision-making, rather than democracy, then 
the second option, of minimal state intervention, would 
appear at present to have much support. However, and at the 
same time, the media clamours whenever the state fails to 
fulfil a function that is seemingly inconsistent with this objec-
tive of minimal intervention. If one looks at what has actually 
been happening in government decision-making, observation 
suggests that the third scenario of a decidedly mixed state 
very largely prevails in practice, though with varying success 
as to outcomes. 
The reality of UK politics (and that of much of the western 
world) is now about debate between parties who in practice 
compete for what they (by and large) describe as the middle 
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ground, with dispute centring on just where the middle might 
be – but all set against an undercurrent of comment based on 
the minimal-state ideology of the right, which has rarely pre-
vailed in practice, but which at present provides the only 
apparent alternative to a range of centre-ground thinking. 
The paradoxical duality in the stance adopted by the media 
reflects this situation. 
All of this should be considered pragmatically. Whatever 
the claims made by those competing in the centre ground of 
politics and their more right-wing opponents, the reality 
is that collective experience has created an expectation of 
what the state might supply in the UK, against which the 
performance of any politician is measured. There is, for 
example, an expectation that there will be something 
approaching full employment, and that there will be eco-
nomic growth that benefits most people, although there is 
indifference as to whether that growth comes from the public 
or private sector.
To support that growth it is assumed that the state will 
supply an education for all, now to the age of eighteen. 
Beyond that age the consensus has broken down, but on the 
other hand there has been broad agreement that state educa-
tion might now start at three and not five: the loss in one 
direction has been largely compensated in the other.
The role of the NHS is rarely questioned in the UK: the 
right to healthcare that is almost universally free at the point 
of supply remains almost beyond challenge, even if how it is 
supplied is a matter of some contention.
We also expect to be able to get to the NHS, education and 
work without interference: we expect the state to provide 
roads and, even if railways and buses are run by (state- 
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subsidized) private enterprises, we expect the state to ensure 
that such services are available. It may be that we pay for 
elements of our transportation but it’s government that we 
blame if the infrastructure to facilitate it is not present.
In just the same way, we blame the government for housing 
crises even when we do not now expect most homes to be 
provided by the state sector.
There is also a universal expectation that the state will 
supply law and order and national defence. Regarding 
defence, expectations may have somewhat diminished, but 
on law and order they are growing. The scale of the threats 
from which we demand protection has increased enormously, 
from terrorism to cyber crime to paedophilia, and many of 
those, in turn, demand interventions across a much wider 
range of activity.
Changes in our ways of living have also produced new 
demands. We expect many more products to be safe than past 
generations could have conceived of, and get very angry if the 
government gets any such risk assessments wrong. Media 
comment may suggest that we hate ‘health and safety’, but 
the reality is that we are utterly dependent upon regulation to 
ensure we can safely consume products whose suitability we 
have no way of appraising ourselves. 
We expect the state to remove and dispose of the rubbish 
we create, which moreover we now demand happens in an 
environmentally friendly way. 
In all this we now also expect to make choice: the possi-
bility is recognized that the option Scotland chooses may not 
be the one that England, Wales or Northern Ireland wants 
(and they may each be different too). 
It’s therefore no surprise that the demand for government 
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services is remarkably consistent, and even if the government 
elected in 2015 thinks it can reduce the amount of GDP ded-
icated to the sector from 41 per cent to 36 per cent there are 
many (from the Institute for Fiscal Studies onwards) who just 
can’t make their figures stack. 
As explained in Chapter 3, tax is not just about collecting 
money, but is itself, if the tax system is optimally designed, 
aligned to the range of social objectives I have just noted, 
with the deliberate intent of helping achieve these goals. So, 
in addition to raising revenue (or, more correctly, reclaiming 
cash already spent), tax must also:
1.  Reprice goods and services to correct for market failures
2.  Redistribute income and wealth
3.  Reorganize the economy, and do so in ways that:
4.  Raise representation in the democratic process, and
5.  Ratify the value of money.
And, as Chapter 6 made clear, all this has to be done within a 
framework that emphasizes:
1.  Peace 
2.  Equality
3.  Truth, and
4.  Simplicity.
That policy framework challenges much of the existing 
language of tax. So, for example, within this context efficient 
taxes are not just those that are cheap to collect per pound 
raised. And nor are they even the ones that necessarily raise 
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lots of money, although there is no reason why either should 
not be true. Efficient taxes are those that best integrate tax 
recovery with government policy across the whole spectrum 
of its objectives.
As a result it cannot be said that there is a such a thing as 
an ideal rate or combination of rates when it comes to any 
one tax if each of them is considered in isolation. That’s 
because the amount that some taxes (such as income tax, 
VAT, national insurance and corporation tax) raise has such 
significant impact on the level of activity in the economy that 
this fact, and their interaction with other taxes, has always to 
be borne in mind when considering such issues. Design of 
these taxes is accordingly multi-faceted. You just can’t debate 
the design of these taxes or the rates at which they are applied 
without thinking about both the micro and macro impacts 
simultaneously. Policy demands that you do. 
So, for example, you wouldn’t cut VAT and raise national 
insurance if you wanted to take the heat out of a consump-
tion boom whilst wanting to give a boost to exports. The 
exact opposite behaviour would be appropriate if that was 
your policy goal because an increase in VAT usually cuts con-
sumer demand, whilst cutting national insurance charges, 
especially for employers, can give exporters a potential cost 
advantage. And you might need to take this action to achieve 
the overall policy goal regardless of whether you felt 
the adjustment to either tax was desirable in its own right. 
This is precisely why flat taxes cannot work for a modern 
government: they are just not nuanced enough to meet its 
macroeconomic management needs.
Let me, then, draw some very clear policy inferences. 
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Inference no. 1
The total tax-take of the tax system as a whole has to be 
designed (as far as is possible) to suit the needs of the 
economy at a point in time. This is not about balancing 
the books. It is about giving the economy the amount of 
stimulus (or not) that it needs to ensure that there is 
maximum employment, growth and stability.
Inference no. 2
The way in which the tax-take happens is not neutral. 
The broad balance between taxes matters, so there must 
be enough of them. Having levers to pull is vital.
Having established those points let me stress that who 
pulls the levers also matters. It is now increasingly apparent 
that electorates think regionally and even locally as well as 
nationally. This is being matched by a demand for the 
increased devolution of taxing powers that must be met if 
the demand for representation is to be achieved. However, 
as the discussion of tax competition in Chapter 6 made clear, 
without care and without appropriately designed delegated 
authority there is a real risk that those granted the power 
to tax might be persuaded to use it to promote a form of 
competition that is, at the very least, unhealthy and even 
counterproductive. A race to the bottom in tax that can (and 
may be intended to) deny government the right to withdraw 
revenues from the economy, can mean that the scale of ser-
vices supplied must be cut. There is enormous potential for 
conflict here that has to be avoided.
There are obvious ways to overcome this risk by good 
design that correctly matches policy and tax objectives. The 
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first is to devolve the power to tax land to regional and local 
government. This has, of course, been long established in the 
UK as a whole, and for good reason.
The second way to prevent tax conflict is to avoid devolving 
the right to tax mobile resources. That means the right to tax 
most forms of capital wealth (excluding land) and most 
investment income has to be kept at national level because 
both these asset types can be so easily relocated. This mobility 
already gives rise to substantial problems with cross-border 
taxation and these problems would only be exacerbated if 
these tax bases were managed entirely regionally. 
The third way to prevent tax competition within a state is 
to avoid devolving the taxation of companies because these 
can, notoriously easily, relocate their activities, as so many 
multinational companies have proved. Because countries 
around the world are already having to take so many steps to 
counter the negative impacts of tax competition for the cor-
porate tax base it would be absurd to increase the risk of loss 
from this issue by devolving corporate tax responsibilities 
within the UK. 
Fourth, there is good reason for not allowing the devolu-
tion of powers over sales taxes. This is because, once again, 
sales are so easily relocated, especially when made over the 
internet or when they are of services rather than goods. Sales 
taxes (including duties, which are especially susceptible to 
smuggling, as is commonplace, for example, across the border 
between the north and south of Ireland) should be harmo-
nized as much as possible and so not devolved. 
Which then leaves the question, what’s left to devolve? 
Apart from land tax, already mentioned, I suggest the pres-
ently suitable candidate is tax on income earned from work, 
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which exists in two forms in the UK: income tax and national 
insurance. The sums involved when it comes to revenue from 
work are not that dissimilar in the case of these two taxes. 
There are several options for exactly how to devolve powers 
over these taxes, assuming both remain in use (and I note 
reasons for replacing national insurance later in this book). 
One would be to provide local control over the income tax 
base of the resident population by devolving the power to 
allow offsets against income. So, for example, regions might 
be granted the right to restrict some allowances to basic rates 
of tax – such as the allowance on pension contributions – or 
to deny them altogether. Another possibility would be to give 
regions limited rights to create new tax-free income streams if 
they relate to activities within their region, e.g. investment in 
collective housing schemes or local bonds used to fund 
regional infrastructure. 
That said, whilst it continues in use it seems more logical 
to devolve one or both of employer’s and employee’s national 
insurance to localities in their entirety. It is relatively easy to 
locate most employees, and so ‘cross-border’ disputes could 
be minimized. In addition, there are few allowances and 
reliefs (excluding the exemption for those of retirement age) 
in national insurance so that what effectively is being devolved 
is a decision on rates. Companies operating in a number of 
regions would find it relatively straightforward to run par-
allel systems to cope with differing rates of national insurance, 
which would not be the case for income tax rates. A further 
argument in favour is that national insurance, being a tax on 
labour, provides an obvious counter to the taxation of capital 
tied up in land – which I am advocating should also be 
devolved locally – thus producing the balance of real political 
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and economic choice to be exercised in local government that is 
vital to its credibility and the choice it has to offer an electorate.
There are other options that could also be added into the 
mix. So, whilst I definitely do not recommend that income or 
wealth taxes be devolved as a whole I do think that some of 
the many choices available within them could be made at a 
local level. For example, the option of charging additional 
taxes on rental income could be available as part of local 
taxation, and it may also be appropriate for all taxes on 
local rents to be accounted for locally. Control of allowances 
and reliefs against rental income, such as deductions for 
|insulation, double glazing, and other socially desirable 
improvements, might also be devolved and could give a real 
boost to local housing policy debate.
Inference no. 3
Locally devolved taxes must be designed to enhance 
local decision-making, the local economy and local 
democracy, or they make no sense at all.
Right now the UK’s policy on tax devolution is, unfortu-
nately, in that category of making no sense at all.
This then suggests a fourth area of policy concern. As 
already noted, tax has a macroeconomic function and this is 
related to management of the national economy as a whole. 
This objective cannot be forgotten even if the devolution of 
taxing powers takes place, and, that being the case, regional 
and local governments will have to exercise their powers 
within an overall framework that they must agree to, but 
which may eventually require arbitration procedures in the 
event of dispute. 
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That framework would have to suggest how much tax was 
expected to be raised from the local economy for which each 
regional or local government was responsible, taking into 
account both the macroeconomic position and the national 
government target on redistribution of income and wealth 
into or out of the area in question. This issue is essential: 
there is no country that enjoys anything like an equal geo-
graphic distribution of either income or wealth, and that 
inequality must not be exacerbated by the creation of devolved 
taxing powers. To protect against this, the principle of 
cross-subsidization that has long been inherent in the UK 
economy (but which the current government is threatening to 
modify in the cases of Northern Ireland and Scotland) has to 
be preserved and even reinforced within the framework of 
devolved powers. 
The object for doing so should be obvious: it is about 
ensuring that those devolved layers of government do really 
concentrate on managing their economies and do not, like 
tax havens, use their powers to undermine the right of other 
regions to collect the tax owing to them. The aim of devolu-
tion is better government, not worse, after all. That can only 
be achieved within agreed policy frameworks. 
Inference no. 4
Devolved taxes must operate within an agreed national 
framework of macroeconomic management.
Having established these goals it is next essential to look at 
the more detailed levels of policy coherence that will, inevi-
tably, fall largely to central government. What is undoubtedly 
true is that at present our tax system is riddled with policy 
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incoherence. Take, as example, one of our more anachro-
nistic taxes, national insurance. This tax was designed in the 
Second World War for a post-war era where long-term, secure 
employment was envisaged for the vast majority of people, 
with only a small minority being considered likely to be in 
self-employment and the use of limited companies by those 
self-employed people being presumed to be rare. As a result 
this tax was designed in two parts: one charged on the 
employee and the other on the employer. The aim was three-
fold. First, national insurance was meant to fund the new 
National Health Service. Second, it was meant to fund new, 
much enhanced pensions, at a time when many people did 
not live for long beyond the designated retirement age of 
sixty-five,1 and thirdly the national insurance contributions a 
person made determined their entitlement to many in-work 
(or rather, out-of-work) benefits, from which the self 
employed were excluded, which is why they paid much lower 
rates of contribution.
This was a great tax at the time. There was policy coher-
ence throughout its design and by using the then new Pay As 
You Earn system it was easy to collect, as the vast majority of 
people in the country had one job, and many of them stayed 
with the same employer for many years. What could go 
wrong?
The economy changed; that’s what happened. We now 
have five million self-employed people and, as importantly, 
large numbers of people in multiple employments that they 
change frequently (with some periods on benefits in between 
those employments, on occasion). In addition the cost of the 
NHS, let alone pensions and other benefits, has far out-
stripped the national contributions now made that are 
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supposed to pay for them, as life expectancies, living stan-
dards and medical complexity have all advanced. The result 
is that national insurance as now charged makes no sense at 
all in the modern economy of work.
It does not make sense in some other ways either. First, 
hundreds of thousands of self-employed people now form 
companies to reward themselves for their work by way of 
dividend payments, which do not attract a national insurance 
charge. As a result national insurance charging is now riddled 
with loopholes: the design of this charge and the availability 
of limited liability entities at incredibly low cost has per-
mitted, in combination, what is, in effect, massive tax abuse.
Second, when there is now an employment crisis in the UK, 
whether it relates to low pay, youth unemployment, under-em-
ployment or zero hours contracts, charging national insurance 
on jobs in a way that suppresses wages and at the same time 
adds to employer cost makes no sense at all. There is no eco-
nomic logic left to the tax.
And the contributory principle has almost gone. It is true 
that to get a full old-age pension thirty years of contributions 
have to be paid, but the fact is that those not well off who do 
not qualify on the basis of their national insurance contribu-
tions rightly get other benefits to make up the shortfall. The 
whole tax has become anomalous.
Inference no. 5
The tax system has to be under continuous review to 
make sure it is not past its sell-by date. Those taxes that 
no longer make sense have to be replaced if the tax 
system is not to undermine economic objectives.
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What is clear is that unless such reviews happen perverse 
consequences will follow: national insurance may have been 
well designed for a purpose but that has long gone and the 
result may now be as counterproductive as once it was advan-
tageous. Tax design is not neutral, and whilst a tax may be 
good at reclaiming money from the economy (and national 
insurance is, contributing over £100 billion a year to the UK 
Treasury), that does not mean that it is efficient.
Inference no. 6
Money raising and tax efficiency are not the same thing.
 
It follows then that tax must be integrated into the social 
policies of government and the tax decisions a government 
makes should always be viewed through the lens of their 
social policy consequences. How to achieve this goal is con-
sidered in more depth in the next chapter. Examples of areas 
where alignment might be required are the focus of attention 
here.
There are obvious policy issues where this interaction 
between tax and policy is essential. These include:
• Growth
• Employment
• Innovation and enterprise
• Banking
• Benefits and pensions
• Education
• Housing
• Environment
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Others could be selected; these are sufficient to prove the 
point. It is important to note, though, that some areas where 
policy coherence is required are generic and others relate to 
scale. So, for example, the relationship between tax and 
growth is fundamentally an issue of scale. Government 
activity is a key contributor to measures of growth, since gov-
ernment spending and investment play a significant part in 
the various elements that make up national income; but 
unless that activity is on a large enough scale it won’t have 
the necessary impact on the economy as a whole when gov-
ernment intervention is required. If the market fails to deliver 
stable growth (as it usually does fail) it needs to be counter-
balanced by government intervening to either inject or 
withdraw money, in order to ensure stability is maintained. 
So, if consistent growth is to be achieved, government spending, 
and so the extent of government activity, simply has to be big 
enough to ensure that its intervention will be noticed. 
There is another dimension to this issue of scale: precisely 
because the government has to be able to withdraw from the 
economy on occasion (when the market is booming beyond 
capacity) then, by definition, it is impossible for the govern-
ment to restrict its activity to the barest minimum that 
represents the basic obligation it must fulfil if the state and its 
people are to survive, because none of that could then be 
withdrawn if macroeconomic management demanded it. In 
other words, and as a matter of fact, the state must in normal 
times be undertaking activity that is discretionary, and on 
occasion even activity that could be undertaken by the 
market, because if that is not the case then government dis-
cretion in economic management is lost, and the objective of 
achieving stable growth goes with it. 
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An example might make the point. The government has 
some activities that it undertakes because it thinks them desir-
able although they are not essential. The Olympic Games was 
one; quite a lot of business support might be another. If there 
were an economic boom it would be entirely reasonable to 
withdraw from such activity precisely because it would not 
then be needed or because the private sector could fund it 
itself. But unless the option of withdrawing from such activity 
is available without harm arising then the macroeconomic 
management flexibility that is essential to restore balance 
when an economy is overheating would not be available to 
the government. 
How does this impact taxation? Simply by saying that the 
tax system cannot be minimized so that it has minimum 
impact on the market. 
Inference no. 7 
The tax system is intended to have an economic impact 
and so must be big enough to deliver it.
Big taxes – income tax, VAT, corporation taxes, excise 
duties and right now national insurance – do then have to be 
in the tax system in some way or other. Without them, or 
similar taxes, the tax system is just not big enough to work. 
That may appear to be a circular argument, but once you 
accept that tax is about more than raising money it is also a 
necessary one. 
Let’s be clear though: growth as recorded by GDP (gross 
domestic product) is not the same as delivering full employ-
ment. Growth comes from a variety of sources, including 
rents, profits, speculation and even from growing asset prices, 
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such as those of residential property. And some very signifi-
cant areas of growth, like the rise in financial services over 
the last decades, have been increasingly marked by large sales 
and profits from a declining number of employees. So having 
a state sector large enough to handle market volatility in 
order to deliver continuing growth is not enough. That 
growth has to be shared with people whose main opportunity 
to participate in the benefits of growth is through work.
So how does the tax system create work beyond those 
55,000 or so people currently employed by HMRC? As 
already noted, right now it does not. Because national insur-
ance charges employers to tax for having employees it does 
the exact opposite of what is intended in this regard. 
Perversely, and at a time when there is a savings glut in the 
world2 and there is no need whatsoever to encourage yet more 
money to be put aside in the economy for no productive pur-
pose (because the level of investment is in no way dependent 
upon the level of savings in an economy, as the discussion in 
Chapter 4 on the way money is created has shown), the net 
effect of this bias is to massively overtax labour, which needs 
to be put to work on decent wages when too many people in 
the UK are currently paid too little and too many people have 
low-productivity jobs. The tax system reinforces both these 
undesirable trends by creating marginal tax rates that, when 
seen from an employer’s perspective, can amount to about 
45.8 per cent of the total stated salary cost of employing a 
person at the UK median wage of around £26,000 a year. 
This is made up of 20 per cent income tax plus combined 
employer’s and employee’s national insurance of 25.8 per 
cent of stated gross pay at this level of income. In contrast the 
marginal tax rate paid on unearned income of a similar 
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amount is very unlikely to exceed 20 per cent, and could 
actually be less depending upon its source. When it is more 
employment and not more savings that the UK needs, the UK 
tax system is working hard to achieve the exact opposite out-
come, judging by the signals of desirable activity that it is 
sending to the economy. 
This can happen in the other areas noted as well. So, for 
example, with regard to small business, tax policy should 
encourage risk-taking and investment, prevent unfair compe-
tition and ensure that effective succession planning is possible. 
These are key business objectives. However, at present it does 
instead encourage the diversion of effort into tax planning 
and avoidance because the tax rates on self-employment and 
the tax payable by companies on broadly similar income can 
be significantly different. Above fairly low levels of earnings 
there is almost always a significant advantage to incorpo-
rating a business for tax purposes, and that distortion makes 
no sense for most businesses, not least because it adds to the 
supposed burdens of admin that is meant to harm business 
effectiveness. 
In addition, for those who are both employed and self-em-
ployed (as is increasingly common) the tax system could 
actually encourage portfolio working. But it does not. The 
PAYE system, which was so effective in 1945, is now so rigid 
that it forces people into either false self-employments or to 
moonlight, such is the complexity of getting tax right within 
the system. This makes no sense at all.
As it also makes no sense that, when high marginal tax 
rates are held to be such a disincentive to work, those who 
have been to university and consequently have taken out stu-
dent loans have 9 per cent of their earnings above a relatively 
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low threshold deducted in loan repayments – a tax for all 
practical purposes – on top of income tax and national insur-
ance. When you add it all together it is actually possible for a 
graduate on £25,000 a year to have tax and loan deductions 
of 41 per cent showing on their pay slip, and an effective tax 
rate, including employer’s national insurance that reduces 
their real pay, of approximately 50 per cent. When this rate is 
widely argued to be a disincentive to work for those earning 
more than £150,000 a year in the UK it is perverse that it is 
readily applied to large numbers of those earning around 
median pay in this country. Either the rhetoric or the policy is 
wrong in this case. 
It is also perverse that the tax system interacts with the 
benefits system so badly (and will still do so after the intro-
duction of universal credit) that marginal tax rates of up to 
80 per cent are possible over small, but significant, ranges of 
income as people move off benefits and into work: as they 
start paying tax and national insurance but lose support from 
the state as a result. 
Banking is another area where tax and policy conflict. 
Since 2008 many politicians have argued we need to diversify 
the UK economy away from financial services, but those same 
services are at the same time under-taxed. Not only does the 
UK have a wide range of its own tax havens available so that 
banks can hide their profits offshore, it also does not charge 
VAT on financial services and so relatively underprices 
banking activity as if it were an essential service like health-
care and education, and that makes no sense at all. 
The pension system too, after changes from George 
Osborne, lacks any tax logic. For many years it was the case 
that when an individual or employer made a contribution to 
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a private pension they very clearly reduced an obligation on 
the state to provide a pension, so tax reliefs (and, on occa-
sion, national insurance reliefs) on pension contributions 
made sense. But over time the logic of this relief has been 
eroded. Pensions are now becoming little more than another 
form of saving for those better off. The provision of tax relief 
to encourage savings that the economy does not need and 
which, in the vast majority of cases, simply increase the 
wealth divide (because only those already sufficiently well off 
to make ends meet can, in the main, make pension savings) 
makes little sense, and yet such reliefs cost the UK Exchequer 
more than £48 billion a year.3 
Nor is there any sense in other tax-related encouragements 
for saving which have no link to what the saved funds are 
used for, such as ISAs. They would only have a point if used 
to promote local investment, social projects or environmental 
projects, all of which are underfunded. 
This is also true of a plethora of investment-related tax 
incentive schemes that are, in reality, little more than tax shel-
ters. The social benefit arising from the sums expended, 
effectively to subsidize these schemes, for social purposes that 
are rarely adequately defined, is almost invariably unquanti-
fied, so that the real cost to society, and those less well off 
within it, cannot be understood.
The illogicality extends to housing. We have excepted peo-
ple’s homes from capital gains tax. Meanwhile, to an extent 
seen in few other societies, the UK has suffered from house 
price inflation as people have been willing to overpay for 
houses knowing that the shortage of housing supply and the 
favourable tax treatment it has enjoyed have made houses an 
ideal form of wealth preservation however irrational the 
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resulting allocation of the housing stock, or wealth within it, 
might be. This problem is only exacerbated by the differing 
tax treatment of buy-to-let and buy-to-live-in housing. Buy-
to-let housing, usually purchased by those who already have 
a home and some wealth and which is intended to provide 
an investment return, is given tax relief on the cost of sums 
borrowed to fund the acquisition, but buy-to-live-in property 
does not enjoy similar treatment. As a result, speculative 
property is, to a large degree, paid for out of pre-tax income 
but housing for those who really need it is paid for out of 
post-tax income. The illogicality is obvious.
The same is true with regard to the environment. We tax 
least the most carbon-emitting form of transport, which is air 
travel. We also encourage the carriage around the world of 
goods that could easily be produced locally, by not taxing the 
extremely dirty bunker fuel of the world’s largest ships. And 
almost invariably the tax system demands no return at all to 
the resource that is scarcest of all in our world – the planet 
itself. That payment of a return to the planet is, however, 
possible. If only we taxed excessive consumption we would, 
without doubt, create funds for future generations who will 
have to manage the legacy of our mistakes, such as nuclear 
waste. We could also fund investment in the alternative tech-
nologies that we collectively need. That, however, requires 
new forms of tax altogether. They are possible. But they 
have to be designed around policy coherence and goal 
congruence. 
As the example of national insurance demonstrates, we did 
do that at one time. And now we don’t. What we cannot, 
unfortunately, do is move in one go from where we are now 
to where we need to be. Tax systems cannot handle that 
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degree of disruption. But nor can change work if we do not 
know where we might need to go. So, based on the principles 
already set out in this book, the next chapter discusses what 
some characteristics of an ideal tax system might look like 
before, in the final chapter, I suggest how we might move 
towards that goal from where we are now.
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The ideal tax system
The essential quality of the taxes that we need is that they 
must work. It’s worth recalling what that means. Taxes must 
do six things, that were noted in Chapter 3. They have to:
1. Reclaim money the government has spent into the 
economy for re-use 
2. Ratify the value of money
3. Reorganize the economy
4. Redistribute income and wealth
5. Reprice goods and service
6. Raise representation.
And, as noted in Chapter 6, they have to be built on the foun-
dations of:
1. Peace
2. Equality
3. Truth, and
4. Simplicity.
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That being the case it is important to understand just what it 
is that makes an ideal tax system. 
First, it must be possible to define what is being taxed. This 
is called the tax base. 
Second, it must be possible to locate that tax base. Quite 
literally, that means it must be possible to find it. 
Thirdly, having found it then it must also be possible to 
quantify that base in ways that do not attract too much dis-
pute. Some taxes are more prone to such valuation problems 
than others. 
And even then, fourthly, there is the small matter of 
working out who actually owns the tax base. After all, issuing 
a tax bill to an unknown person does not increase the chance 
of it being paid. 
Finally, there is the issue of doing all these things account-
ably or a government will quickly lose public confidence in 
the justice of what it is seeking to do. This chapter considers 
these issues.
Defining the tax base is a much more complex process than 
most people, tax experts and economists included, think it to 
be. Most of them use relatively trite descriptions for the taxes 
we now have. So, for example, they split taxes between direct 
taxes (on income, capital gains and profits) and indirect taxes 
(on sales, consumption and use of facilities). And they use 
terms such as sales and profits, as I have just done, to describe 
the tax bases. This, however, will not do. Tax bases need 
much more consideration than these mere descriptions imply 
if confusion about how taxes and tax systems work is to be 
avoided.
The important word in the last paragraph is ‘systems’. For 
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too long this word has been forgotten and so individual taxes 
are discussed in isolation. This is a mistake. Our taxes should 
not exist in isolation from each other: they exist to suit overall 
goals and they must be appraised in that case on the contri-
bution each tax can make to achieving those collective goals.
What helps make this possible is the realization that all our 
taxes share some quite strong common themes. In particular, 
although it is hardly ever said, they do in practice almost 
entirely relate to the taxation of wealth. This is hardly sur-
prising: tax is (as I have argued) intimately related to money. 
Because tax is about reclaiming the money the government 
has spent into existence, possessing money is a necessary pre-
condition to paying tax. And since money is our most 
common measure of wealth, the link between tax and wealth 
is not hard to establish. Despite this it does, however, need 
explanation.
The first linkage between tax and wealth is to be found in 
many of our most widely known taxes, such as income tax, 
corporation tax and capital gains tax. These are, in fact, all 
taxes on the accumulation of wealth. That is because income, 
if properly defined, records the increase in our wealth over a 
period of time before taking into account the spending we 
incur to maintain ourselves. 
A wide range of activities can contribute to that increase in 
wealth. Most of us will think of income from work, whether 
from a wage or the profit from a business activity, as the pri-
mary source of that increase but in practice these are far from 
being the only sources of this wealth accumulation over time. 
Cash received from rents, investment income, the sale of our 
own property at a profit, and the receipt of gifts can all 
increase our cash wealth. Historically many of these have 
Joy of Tax.indd   179 04/09/2015   12:30
RICHARD MURPHY
180
been treated differently for tax purposes but the reality is that 
as far as anyone is concerned (and I stress, anyone) £1 from 
one source of accumulated wealth is identical in economic 
value to £1 from any other source. In fact, when put side by 
side as coins, or when mixed together in a bank account, it 
would be impossible for a person to tell whether a particular 
£1 was from earned income resulting from work, or from 
savings income (such as interest on a bank account), or from 
a capital gain on the sale of shares or a house, or a gift from 
another person. A pound is a pound is a pound and each 
contributes in the same way to a person’s well-being, albeit 
(as already noted) the more of such pounds that there are the 
less each one is individually significant to the person who 
owns them (which is why progressive taxation not only 
makes sense, but is economically necessary). 
This idea of wealth accumulation has broader applica-
tions. So, for example, some forms of wealth accumulation 
are only possible because of licences granted by the state. 
Examples include income from royalties on patents and copy-
rights: these would not exist without state support. In such 
cases the idea that all income is to be treated equally for tax 
breaks down: specific extra charges might be justified by the 
type of structure from which the income is earned and the 
extent to which the state is required to help create the legal 
form and maintain the contractual claim to that income 
stream. This might apply to the income a person earns from 
companies and trusts, or from royalties. 
This logic has particular relevance in the case of banks 
who can, as has already been noted in this book, create money 
out of thin air because they have been granted a banking 
licence, and can then charge interest on the funds that they 
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have created costlessly. The gain in this case is technically 
called seigniorage, which is usually defined as the profit made 
by a government by issuing currency. Banking licences actively 
outsource this right to make profit: additional taxes on banks 
seek to recover the additional wealth that they have accumu-
lated as a result. 
In combination these observations make an important 
point: what they imply is that some of the preferential tax 
regimes that have existed, for example for capital gains, 
which have attracted additional tax allowances for the people 
that enjoy them and have often been taxed at lower rates than 
are charged on income, make no economic sense. Capital 
gains, once the original cost of acquiring whatever is sold has 
been taken into account, should logically be taxed in exactly 
the same way as any other source of income, and be added 
into the individual’s total income for the purposes of calcu-
lating the appropriate tax rate to charge. The only Chancellor 
to ever get this right in the UK was, slightly oddly, Nigel 
Lawson. 
One knotty question arises from treating capital gains as 
income in this way which is whether inflation should be 
ignored in calculating the amount of gain made on the sale. 
In a time of high inflation to ignore its effects would produce 
an unjust outcome: people would be taxed not on their 
increase in wealth, but on the falling value of money. There 
have been periods, such as the 1970s and 1980s in the UK, 
when this was a real issue and steps had to be taken to pre-
vent this injustice. When, however, inflation is consistently 
low, as it has generally been in the UK for some time now, 
simplicity demands that inflation be ignored for tax 
purposes. 
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Perhaps even more controversially, the idea that all 
increases in wealth are, as a matter of principle, similar for 
taxation purposes implies that what a person receives as a gift 
should be subject to tax in the same way as their income. This 
is, of course, completely contrary to current UK taxation 
practice, where people making gifts on death, or in the seven 
years before it, are subject to tax on the amount given away 
but the recipients are not charged tax. That is the way that 
Inheritance Tax works, and it is deeply unpopular as a conse-
quence. That is actually unsurprising: economically the tax is 
completely inconsistent with any other tax base the UK uses, 
and people may sense its illogicality. 
But what should be put in its place? If, as is obviously true, 
gifts increase a person’s wealth, it appears unjust that they be 
tax-free when the increase in wealth resulting from work 
is taxed. Pragmatically, however, there are problems: for 
instance every parent provides for their children in ways that 
might be described as gifts which nobody would want to tax, 
not least because those gifts do, almost certainly, come out of 
the donor’s income and not their accumulated wealth. A tax 
on the receipt of gifts, desirable as it might be, does therefore 
need mechanisms to ensure that it only charges real transfers 
of wealth from one person to another. If that could be done 
the logic of adding such receipts to income, with, perhaps, a 
mechanism to apply a tax rate averaged over a number of 
years, would seem fair. 
That stance does then imply that wealth is, in itself, tax-
able, and I would argue that it is. If, after all, one of the main 
objectives of tax is to redistribute income and wealth it makes 
no sense to ignore wealth as a tax base, either in its own 
right, or as a source of income that does, in turn, require 
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redistribution. A wealth tax is, then, an essential part of a tax 
system even if capital gains and gifts made out of wealth are 
already taxed elsewhere. The rate at which wealth tax might 
be charged may well be modest, and it is clear that exemp-
tions would be necessary for the necessary cost of providing 
a home (but not of landed estates) and for reasonable sums 
put aside to provide for old age, but above and beyond that 
the arguments against a wealth tax have always been prag-
matic and not theoretical. When, as until very recently, it was 
so easy to relocate wealth out of the country and into a tax 
haven and so avoid any liability, wealth taxes looked some-
thing like honesty box arrangements, which cannot be 
thought an equitable outcome. In the new era now being cre-
ated, of automatic information exchange of data on people 
who hold accounts and own companies and trusts in tax 
havens, this pragmatic objection can be consigned to history. 
The tireless campaigning of the tax justice movement to 
achieve this goal has made wealth taxation possible. 
The argument that wealth taxes should not be imposed 
upon business assets can be dismissed. Pragmatically, 95 per 
cent of all businesses are likely to fall below any threshold at 
which a wealth tax will be charged: the small enterprise 
economy will never be impacted by a wealth tax. Once a 
business is on a scale that passes that threshold there are good 
reasons for charging tax on the owners of the wealth implicit 
in them. Such businesses will, almost invariably, make use of 
limited liability, and since this is a privilege granted by society 
it should be paid for. If the wealth of those who own busi-
nesses is protected from unforeseen loss, which is the case 
when a limited liability company is used, then a premium is 
due for that benefit. Next, although many business owners 
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like to claim to the contrary, no business is built solely on 
personal endeavour; it is always the case that the state con-
tributes substantially to its success, either by simply providing 
the legal framework in which it can operate, or by protecting 
its asset from claim from third parties, or by providing the 
legal infrastructure in which it can trade, or by training its 
key personnel during their school and university education as 
well as ensuring that they come to work by and large fit and 
well each day. A return is due for these benefits. 
A wealth tax on business assets would be consistent with 
the objective of redistribution (and concentration of wealth is 
rarely beneficial to society), but at the same time it might 
actually bring benefit to the business. If settlement of the tax 
is made in kind, through the annual transfer of ownership 
of small parts of the business to a trust arranged in such a 
way as to ensure that employees in the business can be repre-
sented upon its board, have access to information that they 
need and ultimately have a say in its long-term future then, 
by providing talented employees with the right to partici- 
pate in its conduct, that tax can diversify the pool of talent 
available to a business upon which to depend for its future 
success.
Another type of wealth I think it essential to tax is that 
implicit in the ownership of land. For too long land owner-
ship in the UK has been too concentrated. Too much of its 
ownership is unrecorded; or, when such records are kept, the 
beneficial ownership may be disguised through the use of off-
shore limited companies. As a result land speculation has 
sometimes been hard to identify, and therefore to tax. 
Meanwhile preferential tax regimes for personal homes have 
resulted in house price increases out of all proportion to 
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income inflation, so that very many people in the UK, the 
young in particular, are now excluded from the housing 
market. At the same time, local authority taxation, which is 
largely based upon the outdated valuation of properties (a 
crude tax, created in a hurry to replace the hated poll tax), 
has become deeply dysfunctional for that reason. As a conse-
quence land value taxation has now become essential.
Land value taxation should apply to all land value, without 
exception, where the land value is the amount for which the 
land could be let without having been developed. The land 
value tax due on an empty plot would therefore be the same 
as that due on the house next door. As already noted, this is 
an ideal tax to be managed by a devolved authority or regional 
government. The charge would be made on the owner, and 
not on the occupier of the land. In other words, this is a tax 
paid by landlords and the owner-occupiers of land. This 
means it is quite clear what it is: it is a tax on wealth. 
There are five advantages to land value taxation. First, it 
cannot really be avoided: if the tax is not paid the land is 
forfeited. Second, it encourages the productive use of land 
because the charge is made whether or not the land is in use. 
Third, it allows the taxing authority to achieve environmental 
policy goals through active engagement with that land use, 
for example by using allowances and exemptions. Fourth, 
this tax shifts the burden from those who are less able to pay 
it – that is tenants – to those who always can, who are land-
lords. As a result this tax tends to be progressive in its nature, 
which most other land-based taxes ever charged in countries 
like the UK have never been, and which the UK council tax is 
very definitely not. Finally, because land use tends to improve 
when land value tax is in use yields rise, there are economic 
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gains as a result and reduced social cost from vacant land and 
so the system provides net economic gains beyond revenue 
raised. 
This consideration of direct charges on wealth does not, 
however, bring to a close the consideration of wealth taxa-
tion. Transfers of wealth provide another basis for tax. The 
sale of goods is one such transfer: when a sale takes place 
wealth is transferred between the participants. Sales taxes 
and value-added taxes can very clearly be applied to these 
transfers. The UK has had a VAT since 1973. 
Trading in other assets can also be taxed in this way. So, 
for example, stamp duty has been charged upon the sale of 
shares and land in the UK for a long time. 
It does not take much extension of that logic to come to a 
financial transaction tax chargeable upon the purchase and 
sale of a wide range of financial instruments and upon specu-
lation in money itself, including foreign exchange. Such a tax 
has been widely resisted by the City of London – and by the 
UK government as a consequence – but in practice the present 
situation, where some financial transactions are taxed at a 
relatively high rate (as happens in the case of share dealings) 
while others fall outside the scope of that tax (as do many 
forms of financial derivative trading, even if the derivative 
relates to shares), creates tax loopholes, and a horizontal 
inequality in the financial services market. 
The case for a financial transactions tax is overwhelmingly 
strong. For a start, it is a tax that can be applied to banks, 
unlike a VAT (which for technical reasons is almost impos-
sible to apply in their case). And since it is deliberately 
designed to discourage trading activity it could also be a 
useful tool for intervention in the market. Very few people 
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outside the financial services sector now doubt that the high 
volume of financial transactions being undertaken is, in itself, 
a destabilizing factor in the world economy; by reducing that 
volume a financial transactions tax can correct a market 
failure. Moreover, if the rate of this tax is variable, increasing 
in line with the number of transactions being undertaken 
(and this is technically possible), it will make trading increas-
ingly unattractive at times when markets are panicking, 
which is precisely when they need to be slowed down. Such a 
tax could, in that case, be an essential protection against 
market failure caused by panic.
Taking the idea of a financial transactions tax just a little 
further there is, in fact, no reason at all why money transfers 
should not be taxable. It is entirely possible to tax all trans-
actions through bank accounts that a person or company 
operates (transfers between accounts under common control, 
which banks could easily identify, could be excluded). This 
charge could be applied to the aggregate of all deposits or 
withdrawals from accounts, or both (which may be neces-
sary, else the incentive to relocate accounts outside the UK for 
trading purposes might be very high: taxing both sides of the 
transaction ensures that at least part of any arrangement 
impacting the UK will always be collected). 
As with a financial transactions tax on share and deriva-
tive trading such a tax would be challenged by the powerful 
forces of the banking sector, and yet it has been proved to 
work: from 1993 to 2007 Brazil had such a tax charge on all 
bank accounts at the rate of 0.38 per cent on almost all trans-
actions, during which period this tax provided much of the 
funding for its healthcare system. It was disputes on whether 
there should be such funding rather than whether the tax 
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worked that resulted in its demise.1 Australia has also used 
such a tax, but no longer does so. 
To have such a tax in the UK would be pioneering, but 
there is good reason for considering it, in particular as a 
replacement for national insurance. National insurance has 
always been a UK tax that has fallen outside the logic of 
having a relationship to wealth. Instead it is a tax where the 
payment supposedly represents a charge, with the clue being 
in the name: there was meant to be an insurance element in 
this contribution when it was first created. This insurance 
component has long gone: the contributory principle has dis-
appeared from many benefits that are now paid; national 
insurance contributions do not now pay for the NHS; and 
pensions are not paid on an insurance basis but are instead 
paid on a current-year basis, i.e. current contributions pay for 
current pensions and there is, as a result, no guarantee of a 
state pension upon retirement even if a person has paid 
national insurance throughout their working career. This is, 
then, a dishonest tax that is no longer fit for purpose: no one 
should be taxed on the basis of a charge for a service that it 
cannot be guaranteed will be supplied. What is more, since it 
falls solely on labour and not on capital this tax creates mas-
sive distortions in our tax system, suppresses real wages and 
encourages large amounts of tax abuse.
National insurance also raises well over £100 billion a year 
for the UK Exchequer. Replacing such a tax will take time, 
and care, and merging it into income tax is not realistic, even 
if it sounds superficially appealing: the resulting required tax 
rates will be too high. In addition, we need a tax where the 
tax base is primarily on consumption, but where the likely 
outcome is progressive, and not regressive as VAT is. This is 
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for social reasons, but also to discourage excessive consump-
tion in a world where carbon usage has to be reduced. This is 
why I think that a progressive tax on the total sum paid into 
and out of people’s and companies’ bank accounts is now 
essential. This simply requires that the rate charged increases 
as the total payments into and out of bank accounts con-
nected to a person increase. What that rate might be would 
be open to debate and the transition from national insurance 
could be gradual: we are talking about a major new tax here, 
after all. That said, the reality is that this charge on bank 
transactions could be the best approximation to a progressive 
carbon usage tax (CUT) that is likely to be available. And 
because this charge can be applied to businesses and individ-
uals alike, this is the tax that can, in the twenty-first century, 
end the absurd need to tax labour and its wealth creation and 
instead shift that tax to excessive consumption, a shift we 
know is now needed. 
Business would not be excluded from this charge’s progres-
sive nature. Whilst I would suggest that this tax should be 
imposed at flat rates on business, this rate could vary for each 
business activity whilst smaller business could be exempt. 
There would, of course, have to be quite powerful penalties 
for those seeking to avoid this charge by moving offshore – 
with the penalty being levied through income and corporation 
taxes. And, if all that could be achieved, I suggest we might 
have the tax Thomas Piketty was seeking when he said he 
was looking for a global wealth tax.
All of which does not mean that we have finished with the 
taxation of wealth as yet. Abusing the collective wealth of 
others is another basis for charging tax. This is, of course, the 
reason why some taxes on what economists call externalities 
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are levied. So, for example, taxes on carbon and other forms 
of pollution are charged because the emission of noxious sub-
stances imposes costs, both now and, through climate change, 
in the future. 
A similar externality that has potential impact upon the 
collective wealth of others is created when trading takes place 
through limited liability companies. If these fail the cost of 
their doing so falls in part on their creditors and sometimes 
more widely onto society at large, as the banking crisis of 
2008 proved. Income recorded in a limited liability company 
should, as a result, be subject to higher rates of tax than are 
charged on income recorded in other ways.
This logic of taxing generic externalities to correct market 
failures is not, however, the rationale for all charges of this 
type: taxes on tobacco, alcohol and road use do not fit within 
this framework. In these cases the taxes are meant to be a 
contribution towards the cost that the user imposes upon 
society by their behaviour. This is a blatant charging exercise. 
National insurance is another tax supposedly of this type but 
its relationship with the benefits system is now so eroded that 
its demise is now required, as already noted.
Mention of benefits does however link to another aspect of 
wealth taxation. This arises because a social security system 
is, in effect, a form of negative wealth taxation. When it is 
determined that a person’s likely level of essential spending 
will, in all probability, be more than the wealth accumulation 
that they can enjoy in a given period, for whatever reason and 
from whatever source, then an effective social security system 
must step in to make sure that the person does not slip into 
poverty, which in this context is not just an absence of wealth, 
but a need to have access to it. 
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Any system of social security (or benefits, or welfare) will 
always interact with the tax system, and for decades it has 
been acknowledged that countries that run the two mainly or 
entirely independently of each other can create significant 
and perverse consequences. This is especially true of the way 
benefits are withdrawn as a person’s earnings rise. The com-
bined effect of the two processes has created marginal tax 
rates in excess of 80 per cent of income in the UK for those 
on well below average incomes.2 In an ideal system this issue 
would be resolved by integrating the tax and social security 
systems. The best way to achieve this is firstly by paying a 
citizen’s income to everyone in the country, irrespective of 
whether they work or not, and secondly by changing the 
income tax system to reflect that fact (having assumed the tax 
on bank account usage, noted above, could already accom-
modate the national insurance changes). 
If there were a citizen’s income the right would be uni-
versal. It would, for example, go to children as well as adults, 
even if at reduced rate. Economist Howard Reed and I mod-
elled such a system in 2013.3 The required minimum income 
payments we assumed necessary to ensure that all children 
were out of relative poverty (60 per cent of median income) 
at the time we did the work were as shown in Figure 10. I 
stress, these sums would, in the system we modelled, be paid 
without question: they represent an entitlement. As a result 
they would, however, replace almost all benefits barring some 
housing benefit where rents are particularly high, and some 
disability benefits. They would also replace the old age pen-
sion, and, it should be noted, were higher than those pensions 
paid at that time (and at the time of writing).
As is clear from this table a couple with, for example, four 
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children would get an allowance of £31,500 a year, tax free, 
under this system. The other side of the coin would, however, 
be higher taxes. To ensure that this was both possible and 
suitably progressive we envisaged a small tax-free personal 
allowance of maybe £2,000 or so (but remember everyone 
gets the tax-free payment noted above as a massive compen-
sation for this change) followed by a 25 per cent tax band 
and then a main 50 per cent band. At the other end of the 
income scale, incomes above £100,000 would pay tax at 
higher rates ranging from 60 per cent to a maximum of 70 
per cent for incomes above £150,000. This might sound high 
Figure 10: Required minimum income payments for 
proposed citizen’s income
Family type Minimum Income  
Standard – (£/week)
Single, no children 192.59
Couple, no children 301.74
Lone parent, 1 child 275.59
Lone parent, 2 children 361.99
Lone parent, 3 children 457.66
Couple, 1 child 374.17
Couple, 2 children 454.52
Couple, 3 children 554.55
Couple, 4 children 605.80
Single pensioner 158.74
Couple pensioner 231.48
Source: www.minimumincomestandard.org/2012_update.htm
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but the figures were influenced by the need to include national 
insurance in the charge. If a charge on bank transactions was 
instead put in place, as I now suggest is desirable, then they 
could be reduced somewhat. We called this arrangement a 
Unified Income Tax system and it was our belief that it could 
quite cost-effectively replace the existing UK national insur-
ance, income tax and benefits systems and balance out in its 
costings. 
These reforms have five key advantages. First, the basic or 
citizen’s income to be paid would mean the effective eradica-
tion of poverty (on the ‘below 60 per cent of median income’ 
definition). Second, marginal tax rates for families on low 
incomes are much lower under this system than any conceiv-
able where separate tax and benefits systems are operated, 
with a maximum of about 60 per cent for those in receipt of 
housing support and 45 per cent for those not on housing 
support. The disincentive to work that is such a strong fea-
ture of the existing benefits system would, therefore, 
disappear. Third, the whole tax and benefits system would be 
hugely simplified, with only one direct tax and three benefits 
– the universal citizen’s income and a means-tested benefit to 
assist with housing costs plus another to address significant 
disability. This would, for example, mean the end of the 
whole national insurance system. Fourth, everyone would get 
the benefits to which they were entitled under this system – a 
major issue in the present system where it is believed that 
more than £15 billion a year of benefits are unclaimed.4 And 
finally, by paying benefits to everyone without exception the 
stigma of the benefits system is removed. 
The question many would ask of this proposal is whether 
people would still choose to work if they had a basic income. 
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Some may not, of course, but the truth is that work is much 
more than an economic activity. Work is a social activity. It 
does, for many people, provide purpose. And for many people 
it is also about fulfilling their potential. There is also the fact 
that under this system work always pays, whilst the freedom 
to choose that this system would create would mean that the 
pressure on employers to provide high quality work, with 
training and flexibility, would be enormous, which is exactly 
what the UK economy needs if it is to create the productivity 
that is so lacking. We believed, and I still believe, that the risk 
of many falling out of work as a result of this payment would 
be small. 
Wealth, its accumulation, ownership, transfer and absence, 
as well as the external threats that some behaviour might 
pose to it, can explain the vast majority of the taxes, and ben-
efits, that any society needs (excluding those taxes that are, in 
effect, insurance-based charges). This does not, however, sug-
gest how these tax bases are to then be identified, estimated 
as to value and charged to tax. This is not the place for a 
detailed explanation of how this needs to be done in the case 
of each tax: the reality is that much of this is already known. 
Some general rules and explanation as to how some major 
exceptions might be dealt with – which is where many of the 
problems have arisen – will have to suffice. 
Starting with the basis on which the charge to tax is to be 
defined, what is vital is that this be as broadly specified as 
possible. As already explained in this book, the UK approach 
to charging tax has been to define what is subject to tax and 
whatever is not mentioned is then assumed to be not taxable. 
This has been the foundation of most tax abuse in the UK: 
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trying to find the loopholes that have kept a transaction out 
of tax has become the tax avoider’s art. The solution is 
obvious: all of the potential tax base must, in an ideal tax 
system, be considered taxable unless it is specifically excepted 
from charge. The importance of doing this can hardly be 
stressed enough: as experience has shown, there are enor-
mous limitations to language when it comes to defining tax 
bases. An approach in which ‘all is in the tax base unless 
specifically ruled out’ is essential in that case. 
This approach must also be mirrored when defining what 
may be permitted to reduce a tax bill. In essence the answer 
is in this case as simple: nothing should be allowed as an 
offset against income unless it is specifically permitted in law. 
So, for example, the fact that an expense is in a set of business 
accounts should not mean that tax relief is available upon it: 
only those expenses definitely prescribed as permissible must 
be subject to that relief. Generally speaking tax systems have 
been better in defining this side of the equation to date even 
if some permitted expenses are open to debate as to the use-
fulness of the relief given. Many tax reliefs given for interest 
paid, for example, are subject to this doubt. 
All this legislation then needs to be backed up by a purpo-
sive approach to new tax laws, in turn supported by a general 
anti-avoidance principle in UK tax law. The reasons for both 
of these have already been explained in this book: the effect 
is to say that if anyone tries to artificially get round the law 
to secure a tax saving then the steps they have taken to achieve 
this goal will be ignored when it comes to assessing them to 
tax. Nothing could be fairer, more straightforward or certain 
than that. Everyone knows exactly where they stand. 
This approach should also apply to those issues that arise 
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when trying to find the tax base. The powers needed to secure 
information on who has what taxable transactions within the 
UK will be discussed later in this chapter: the challenge 
needing to be addressed first is to what extent transactions 
located outside the UK need to be brought within the scope 
of UK taxation. The answer to this question is, thankfully, 
straightforward. The most massive loopholes would be 
opened up in UK tax law if a person could avoid their respon-
sibility to pay tax in this country simply by moving a source 
of income, or an asset, or bank account (or whatever else they 
might seek to move) outside the UK. In that case a UK-resident 
person has to be taxable in full on their worldwide income 
(including gains and receipt of gifts) as well as on their world-
wide wealth and bank accounts. Unless this is done, horizontal 
equity is impossible, as it would also be if some people were 
outside the scope of this rule for any reason. Whilst it is fair 
that those seeking temporary residence in the UK (four years, 
or less) might, for reasons of administrative ease and inter-
national equity, be taxable only on their UK income and 
whatever of their worldwide income is brought to the UK 
during that period, after that time has elapsed it is vital that 
they must be taxed on their total worldwide income. The 
UK’s domicile rule has to be consigned to the bin of history. 
The same rule must also be applied to UK companies. The 
possibility that a UK company might seek to avoid tax by 
artificially relocating activity into a company taxed in another 
country is unacceptable. This is, admittedly, a complex issue 
that is also related to how to tax people equitably on the 
income they record in limited liability companies, but a solu-
tion has to be found or tax abuse is inevitable. Thankfully an 
answer is available. In principle all income from which a UK 
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person might benefit that is earned abroad, whether in a com-
pany or not, must first be subject to the tax laws of the state 
where it is earned. After that, and if there is additional tax to 
pay, it must be subject to UK tax with credit given for taxes 
already paid. If earned in a person’s own name this should 
happen in the year in which the income arises. If it is in a 
company there may be technical reasons why that is not pos-
sible until the time it is brought into the UK (although note 
the suggestion I make below on small company tax, which 
could overcome this problem in their case). And to make sure 
that income is properly allocated to each country in which a 
group of companies operated its total group tax profits 
should be allocated to states using a formula that seeks to 
establish just where its real economic activities are located. 
Significant factors are likely to be where its staff are, where 
its sales are from and to, where it extracts minerals (if that is 
part of its business) and, maybe, where its assets are located. 
This system of apportionment is not perfect but right now 
there are few people with any knowledge of tax, bar the tax 
avoidance industry and its clients, who think that the taxa-
tion of international companies works at present. In that case 
reform is well overdue, and the arrangement I propose is 
vastly better and would be subject to significantly less abuse 
than the existing one where all companies are treated as if 
they are independent of each other. That assumption is, of 
course, factually incorrect and the result is that the current 
system of international tax of companies is based on what 
might, politely, be called ‘make believe’. I am suggesting it be 
based on economic facts.
Reform is also needed when it comes to calculating busi-
ness profits. Accounts are largely unsuitable for this purpose. 
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The International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, 
that sets the rules for most large company accounts, actually 
makes this clear: it has admitted that the data reported using 
its standards are not suited to this purpose. However, since it 
is impossible to expect companies and businesses to keep two 
sets of books – one for the members and another for the tax 
authorities, it is now clear that active cooperation between 
governments is needed to ensure that the correct data required 
to assess business income for tax are available in future. This 
might well involve agreeing what information they should 
require be added to the standards set by the International 
Financial Reporting Standards Foundation to achieve this 
goal. They might also explore whether simplifications are 
possible for tax: one simplification that would suit those 
businesses that have to invest heavily to undertake their 
trades would be to permit the offset of all expenditure on new 
equipment in the year it was incurred. This would counter a 
bias in existing tax rules that tends to favour speculators and 
banks over companies engaged in more useful economic 
activity.
There are further problems to be resolved in taxing compa-
nies. If the income of some people who invest in companies is 
not to be over-taxed in a way that can also discourage over-
seas investors into the UK then the tax rate paid by UK 
companies (taking all comments already made into account) 
should always be above the standard rate of income tax that 
most people will pay on their wealth accumulations but 
below the higher rates that will be needed if vertical tax equity 
is to be established. The problem that this creates is immedi-
ately obvious: there is an incentive in this case for any person 
who pays higher rate tax who can arrange to reallocate their 
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own income into a company to do so if they do not need 
immediate access to their wealth accumulation to meet living 
costs. People who do not need their income immediately are, 
of course, almost invariably amongst the wealthier members 
of any society; the simple existence of relatively low-taxed 
companies can increase income and wealth inequality unless 
action is taken to address the issue.
That problem can be solved by requiring that all the profits 
of a company with real, live, warm-blooded shareholders 
who have significant control of it, whether singly or as a 
group, should be apportioned to those members and be taxed 
as their own income in their own hands, with full credit for 
any tax paid anywhere in the world within the company 
being given for offset against any resulting UK tax bill (and 
with substantial penalties being payable for trying to circum-
vent this process). This process was familiar in UK company 
taxation from the 1960s to 1980s. Reinstating it, especially 
as company tax rates are falling around the world, is a pre-
condition of tax justice.
Unfortunately that solution is impossible to apply in the 
case of larger companies where no such shareholders can be 
identified. In that case an excess profits tax should be charged 
when cash is retained in a company beyond the level that the 
logic of the existing group business requires. This, I accept, 
will not be an easy process but reflects the fact that there is no 
economic logic, barring tax saving, for companies to with-
hold profits from their members if they have no apparent use 
for them. Efficient markets do in fact require this distribution 
so that investors and not unknown managers can make the 
best choice of where their funds should be put to best use. 
Using this logic, business expansion has then to be subject to 
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explicit shareholder approval, either for retaining funds or 
for raising new funding, as should always be true in any 
proper capital market. This excess profits tax is simply a rein-
forcement of desirable best business practice.
Doing these things solves many of the problems companies 
pose: what about tax havens? This has been a perennial issue 
on which the tax justice movement has worked for more than 
a decade and I am not suggesting that the problem has gone 
away yet, but there has been progress. Multinational corpo-
rations are to now be required to submit country-by-country 
reporting accounts to HM Revenue & Customs that will 
show if they make use of such places: the chance of getting 
away with doing so reduces as a result. Similarly, as a result 
of civil society campaigning, the point has been reached 
where, very soon, tax havens will, in the vast majority of 
cases, be providing information on those people from the UK 
(and other similar countries) who maintain accounts in their 
jurisdictions. The simple fact is, the secrecy within them is 
being shattered. The chance to find a tax base has been 
created.
Bizarrely, some of the procedures that will now be required 
of tax havens are not as yet required within the UK economy. 
So, for example, whilst we will be expecting tax haven banks 
to provide information on the companies that are owned by 
UK-resident people to HM Revenue & Customs, we do not 
expect UK high-street banks to do the same thing, and this is 
absurd. They have these data: the time has come when it must 
be made available to our tax authority so that companies in 
the UK, which have for too long been, in effect, a cheap 
licensed form of identity theft when it comes to tax abuse – as 
a result of the exceptionally lax regulatory regime that the 
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UK operates – are brought under control. The reality is that 
if we are willing to demand changes from tax havens so that 
they are transparent we must do the same within our own 
domestic economy to ensure that our tax authority has the 
best chance of catching tax cheats.
That, however, would be a complete waste of time if piles 
of information were sent to HM Revenue & Customs and 
they had no staff to use the data. There is widespread opinion, 
whether from the public, taxpayers, tax advisers or business, 
that HMRC is already understaffed and has not got the 
resources to undertake the tasks expected of it. The recom-
mendations I have already made will only add to the workload 
of HMRC. In particular, there is no point having better tax 
legislation and data to tackle tax avoidance if specialists are 
not available to use it, and likewise there is no point having 
additional information to tackle tax evasion unless staff 
resources, with relevant systems backup, are provided to 
make sure that the data can be used to trace those who are 
not paying their taxes. When HMRC has seen its staff num-
bers fall from more than 90,000 in 2005 to well below 60,000 
in 2015, with the downward trend expected to continue,5 
those resources do not exist. 
There are other issues to address as well. In particular, the 
wholesale withdrawal of HMRC from many communities in 
the UK represents a significant failure of the democratic pro-
cess because taxpayers are now isolated from the body that 
asks them to pay tax when in practice HMRC should be seen 
to be operating in the communities that it serves, and that it 
expects to comply with its requirements.
For these reasons a radical review of the staffing of HMRC 
is now required. It is very likely that as a result HMRC would 
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be asked to reopen many of its offices in towns and cities up 
and down the UK, including those that provide the opportu-
nity for taxpayers to have face-to-face meetings with tax 
officials to make sure that their affairs are properly managed. 
It is also the opinion of many tax professionals that HMRC 
should be provided with a substantial increase in the number 
of staff it has available to it to tackle tax avoidance, beat tax 
evasion, provide the level of service that UK taxpayers rea-
sonably expect, recover tax debts and close the UK tax gap.
Estimates of the yield from employing those additional 
staff at HMRC vary but ARC, the union for its top-level staff, 
estimated6 that at least £25 could be recovered for every 
additional £1 spent on one of their members in 2013. The 
yield might be lower overall if spending were to be on staff on 
other grades, as is also essential,7 but no one seriously doubts 
that it would still be substantial.
This would, however, require a considerable change in the 
management culture in the upper echelons of HM Revenue & 
Customs. For archaic constitutional reasons, some of which 
were explored in Chapter 1, the UK is in the absurd position 
of having a tax authority that has no minister directly respon-
sible for it and that has no Select Committee in Parliament to 
which it is directly accountable. The consequence, as has 
become all too apparent in recent years, is that the Board of 
HMRC has been unaccountable for its actions, and has been 
reluctant to explain itself to Parliament, or anyone else.
This lack of accountability has been compounded by the 
requirement that HMRC adopt a corporate-style structure 
since the time of its creation in 2005. This has encouraged the 
appointment of directors with little or no knowledge of tax, 
and the appointment of non-executive directors to its board 
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all of whom8 are drawn from the large-business community 
even though there are only 700 such companies in the UK 
and 31 million taxpayers in all.
This corporate structure has very clearly failed. HMRC 
has failed to act in the public interest, as many hearings before 
the Public Accounts Committee have shown,9 and has, too 
often, appeared to enter into cosy relationships with large 
companies10 and high net worth individuals11 that have 
resulted in them either enjoying what seem generous tax set-
tlements or not being brought to account for the tax crimes 
that they may have committed. If there is to be confidence in 
the tax system in the United Kingdom then it is essential that 
this cosy relationship is ended between big business, its direc-
tors and tax advisers, and HMRC. It is also vital that HMRC 
is subject to proper scrutiny by Parliament in future. 
Three steps are needed to achieve this goal. First, the Board 
of HMRC should be reconstituted so that it is representative 
of a broad range of taxpayers including large business, small 
business, employees, pensioners, civil society, charities, trade 
unions, the investment community and, of course, HMRC’s 
staff. Only then can it really be considered suitable to direct 
the work of the department in the interests of the community 
as a whole.
Second, managing the government’s revenue is too 
important a task for there to be no minister responsible for 
this activity in future. It is no longer acceptable that a junior 
Treasury minister be nominated to answer questions on the 
issue when they have no direct line of responsibility for 
HMRC. In that case HMRC must now become the responsi-
bility of a full government department in its own right, 
independent of the Treasury. The resulting Department for 
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Taxation should have a Cabinet minister responsible for 
answering for its actions. The minister in question must not 
be a member of the Treasury team, but must instead be 
accountable independently of that department for the success 
or failure of HMRC in achieving its forecasts and objectives.
Third, to ensure that HMRC is fully accountable to 
Parliament in future, there must be a Tax Select Committee of 
the House of Commons whose sole task should be to monitor 
tax policy and HMRC’s success in collecting the tax revenues 
that are due in the UK, including an on-going assessment of 
the UK tax gap. To achieve that goal the committee in ques-
tion must overcome one of the anachronisms of the UK 
parliamentary system, which is that House of Commons 
Select Committees have almost no resources made available 
to them to research the work of the department whose activ-
ities they are meant to monitor.
If HMRC is to be held to account in future, both by a min-
ister and by Parliament, then it is vital that an independent 
body, accountable to the minister, but jointly answerable to 
the Tax Select Committee of the House of Commons, should 
be created. The obvious name for such a body would be the 
Office for Tax Responsibility.
This Office for Tax Responsibility would have three main 
tasks. The first would be to monitor the likely effectiveness of 
proposed tax changes in more technical depth than the Office 
for Budget Responsibility does at present. The second would 
be to monitor the effectiveness of a tax law after implementa-
tion, to determine whether its objectives been achieved and to 
make recommendation for further change if necessary. The 
third would be to independently appraise the tax gap and 
to monitor HMRC’s effectiveness in allocating resources to 
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close it, in ways that the National Audit Office never does at 
present. By undertaking these tasks this Office could finally 
make the UK tax system accountable, and not before time. 
These changes are not enough in themselves to bring about 
all the reforms needed to deliver a fully working tax system. 
What I have outlined are the changes that are the prerequisite 
of that system working, without which the management of 
our economy will be harder, the achievement of any govern-
ment’s social and economic policies will be hindered and the 
chances that tax will deliver all the benefits that it can pro-
vide for society will be impaired. To put it another way, we 
would not see the Joy of Tax in reality. So, reform is needed. 
But is that really possible? As I argue in my last chapter, I 
think it is. 
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As the Chancellor might put it
The preceding chapters have described an ideal tax system, 
and that, of course, is what everyone should aspire to. But, as 
the saying goes, if you really wanted an ideal tax system no 
one would choose to start from where we are now, despite 
which there is no alternative but to do just that. It follows that 
a massive programme of change in our tax system is needed. 
Such a programme of change, as everything in this book 
might predict, would have to be big, and bold. It would 
require a courageous Chancellor, made in the mould I 
described in a previous book,1 to deliver it. I don’t know who 
that might be. All I can do is offer them, in this the final 
chapter of this book, the budget speech that they would need 
to make so that we might all share in The Joy of Tax. I just 
hope that whoever the Chancellor who takes up that chal-
lenge might be they will forgive me for ghost writing on their 
behalf. There is good reason for doing so: what I want to 
demonstrate is that what I have written so far is not abstract 
theory, but is the stuff of which politics is really made. So this 
is what I’d have that Chancellor say:
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In the recent election the people of this country sent this 
House a clear and unambiguous message. They said that our 
tax system is a mess. They made clear that our benefits system 
is unfair. And they were unambiguous in demanding change 
to the way in which our economy works if it is to deliver the 
prosperity everyone in this country has a right to enjoy.
This budget is my response to those messages. It opens a 
new era in taxation in this country. For too long tax has been 
the subject of wrong-headed thinking, bad economics and 
poor design. From now on that will not be the case. This 
budget brings tax into the twenty-first century.
The Treasury will be publishing a full explanation of the 
economic foundations for this new tax system this afternoon, 
but let me tell the House what the principles are that underpin 
the changes in economic management that this government 
will begin to deliver today, and that will impact on the lives 
of every person in this country.
I must start with a little history. In 2014 the Bank of 
England had to admit that decades, and maybe centuries, of 
supposed understanding of how the banking system worked 
was plain straightforwardly wrong. They did in April that 
year recognize the essential truth that it is banks that create 
the money in our economy and that they do this by lending. 
What they realized was that money – every single penny of it 
– is created out of thin air by the simple process of debiting a 
loan account and crediting a current account whenever a loan 
is made by a bank.
This realization was in itself revolutionary. It says that if 
banks have such power then they very definitely need special 
attention from regulators, and tax authorities.
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But more importantly, what it said is that there need never 
be a shortage of money in any economy. All the money we 
ever need to make things happen can be created out of thin 
air at the time it is required to make our economy work.
And it says governments can partake in this process as 
well, because we own the most important bank of all in the 
UK – the Bank of England. 
In an instant the pretence that investment is only possible 
when there are sufficient savings in the economy to pay for 
them was shattered. We now know savings and investment 
are completely unrelated, except insofar as the Bank of 
England admitted that all bank deposits are made as a result 
of lending made, and not the other way round.
If you think about it that too is a revolutionary thought: 
what it says is that if banks fail through a lack of deposited 
funds to provide liquidity that’s because of a lack of lending, 
and not a lack of saving.
Everything about banking was now admitted to be the 
opposite of everything that most people – including bankers, 
politicians and economists – had been saying to that date. 
And this was not because of a new development: what the 
Bank of England said was that people had always had this 
wrong. 
And this has, let me assure you, a great deal to do with tax. 
That’s because, I should remind you, government has always 
had the ability to create its own money, just as commercial 
banks do. Indeed, our right to create money pre-dated that of 
banks, and their right to create money only exists because we 
license them to do so.
But just saying that does, I hope, make three more eco-
nomic truths very clear.
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The first is that whilst commercial banks make money by 
lending, governments create cash by spending. That’s the way 
the system works.
The second truth is this, that just as commercial banks 
limit the amount of money in the economy and so prevent it 
from spiralling out of control by requiring that their loans be 
repaid, so do governments do the same thing – but in their 
case they reclaim the money they have spent into the economy 
by claiming it back as taxation.
And thirdly, what this means is that government spending 
always comes before taxation, and is not dependent upon the 
amount of money that can be raised in tax.
In fact, it is always the case that, just as commercial banks 
can in theory always create the money that the economy 
needs if there is sufficient demand for borrowing, so too can 
the government always create the money it needs to fund any-
thing it wants to do by spending the money that’s required 
into existence.
But, and I can hear the House waiting for me to deliver a 
‘but’, there is in all this a vital need to make sure that the 
economy does not run out of control. No one wants to live in 
an era of high inflation. No one wants the state to run out of 
control. No one wants boom and bust.
So there is a need for economic management in our national 
economy. That is what government is for. In fact, and let’s be 
candid about this, there is no one else who can take on that 
role. 
In that case this government does not believe it is our task 
to sit back and watch what the private sector might or might 
not do in this country and accept the consequences. Much as 
we believe in the private sector and a great deal of what it 
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does, we do not think it can deliver what it is government’s 
job to do.
Nor does this government think it is our job to only pro-
vide whatever services might be possible out of the taxes that 
the private sector might pay us after it has chosen to avoid 
and evade its responsibilities, as some amongst its member-
ship have shown that they will.
Instead this government believes that it is our job to make 
sure that in partnership with the private sector – and I cannot 
stress that word partnership enough – we must create the 
conditions in which everyone, whether they be individuals, 
families, companies, young, old, able, disabled, men or women, 
and whatever their origin, belief or sexual orientation, can 
prosper in this country. We have a commitment to equality at 
the very heart of all that we do. That equality extends in our 
case to our belief in the role that the public and private sec-
tors have to play in this country: we think their tasks are 
equal, and each is no more or less important than the other. 
And that is why I am today presenting the radical pro-
posals that I will describe before I sit down.
What we are saying is that, just as a private sector bank 
has to make a profit, but cannot do so without taking the risk 
of lending funds that may or may not be repaid in the future, 
so must we take the risk of spending in the expectation that 
tax will be paid in the future. But whereas the process of 
a bank reclaiming its loan is relatively simple because it is a 
business with no responsibility beyond those to its staff, cus-
tomers, depositors and shareholders, we as a government 
have a much broader responsibility to everyone when we tax, 
which is how we reclaim our money.
As a result the tax that we reclaim from the economy has 
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to achieve more than the simple task of recovering the money 
that we have spent, although economically that is what the 
process is all about. In taxing we think that it is our duty to 
make sure that we create the conditions for prosperity. And 
that we create the conditions for equality. And that we make 
sure we encourage the operation of free and effective markets 
whilst correcting for those issues, like pollution, that they can 
never control by themselves. And that we have to do all this 
accountably, because the overall decisions on what part of 
the economy should be taken up by government activity, and 
what proportion of our spending should be reclaimed by tax, 
will be decided at the end of the day by the people of this 
country at the ballot box, which is in our opinion the best 
place to decide what the right balance between the economic 
activity in the state and private sectors should be.
What all this means is that tax is not neutral. I welcome 
that fact. That means tax can, when required, raise more or 
less than government spending. What it need never be, and I 
cannot emphasize this strongly enough, is equal to spending 
simply for the sake of it. 
If tax is less than government spending then that boosts the 
amount of activity in an economy. If that economy is not 
achieving to its potential and is not using, in particular, the 
skills and resources of all those who live within the state to 
best effect, then this has to be the most responsible act that a 
government can undertake. I stress the point: I believe we 
should tax less than we spend when otherwise the resources, 
talents and abilities of the people of this country would go to 
waste simply so that the books of the government can be bal-
anced. To balance the books when that outcome would be 
the result would be a true national scandal.
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And there is good reason for this. The simple fact is that 
government debt is something else that has been misunder-
stood by conventional economics. That’s because government 
debt is not something we have to repay. That’s the popular 
myth, but like the popular myths on money and tax it is not 
true. The national debt is, in fact, just money. All money is 
debt. Nothing more. And nothing less. It’s debt that makes 
money. And as we now know, repaying debt destroys money, 
literally. So let’s be clear: government debt is just that part of 
the money supply that central government has created, just as 
commercial bank lending is the part of the money supply that 
the private sector has created.
Both matter and both have to be kept in check, but I stress 
the two are inextricably linked. Depending on the measure 
used, and I am not taking argument on that issue today, UK 
government debt may be 80 per cent of our national income 
at present,2 up from 53 per cent in 2009. In contrast private 
debt was approximately 160 per cent of GDP in 2014,3 which 
was, incidentally, a fall from 191 per cent in 2009. If you 
want the evidence that the growth in government money cre-
ation (more commonly called the national debt) is in large 
part substitution for private money destruction over that 
period, this is it. When the private sector was busy destroying 
our money stocks over this period, due to loan repayment, 
the government had no choice but to make good the shortfall 
if the economy was going to have the cash it needed. 
But in that case what does that say about the argument for 
a balanced budget? It says that the balanced budget propo-
nents are demanding that we should rely solely on banks to 
create money and that government should take no part in the 
process.
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Think too about the argument for refusing to create new 
government debt (and so money) in that light. That’s an argu-
ment that we should not only hand over ever-increasing 
responsibility for money creation to our banks but that we 
should accept whatever the outcome might be of that process 
– even if it were disastrous for our economy because there 
would simply not be enough money to keep it going.
Is that what we want? This government has a very clear 
response. It is a resounding no. As important as our banks are 
we know they have massive weaknesses. And we know that 
they do not, because they cannot, act in the national interest. 
So why on earth would anyone argue, as some do, that they 
should have sole responsibility for money creation? Not only 
is that politicians running away from their responsibility to 
act when it is necessary, this is a recipe for economic disaster. 
This government will not run away from its duties and will 
not deliberately create economic disaster. The economy is 
safe in our hands. 
In which case, for the sake of doubt, please also under-
stand that this means that, on occasion, it will be right that 
taxation is higher than government spending. That has to 
happen when the private sector has become too exuberant for 
our national good and is over-exciting the economy with new 
money resulting from record levels of commercial bank 
lending. I will welcome the day when the private sector does 
that because there are so many new products and services, as 
well as jobs, that it wants to create. But we have not seen it 
do that for a long time: at best it has only ever over-lent in 
recent times to fuel property speculation. I am asking the 
Governor of the Bank of England to put in place appropriate 
controls to address that issue, and when he has done this, I 
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make this plea to business: ‘I beg you: make us run a surplus 
because you’re proving yourselves so able to deliver pros-
perity for this country.’ But until the private sector does that 
I’ll make things good for everyone in this country when the 
private sector will not. 
So, when I run a government deficit it will be with pride, 
because I know that all I am doing is creating the cash, the 
jobs, the economic activity and the well-being that this 
country needs, when the private sector banks are not deliv-
ering because private business is not using the talents of the 
people of this country to best effect. That deficit spending 
will in that case be, I suggest, at the heart of responsible gov-
ernment. And it will never create debt that will burden future 
generations. It will just create money that the economy needs, 
in exactly the same way that private sector banks can do the 
same thing.
So, saying all that, we will tax as much as is necessary and 
no more. And in raising that tax we will not just look to raise 
money, because that would be to presume that none of the 
other goals that this government has are of importance. 
Instead our tax policies will deliberately reflect our other pol-
icies, in all their diversity.
We will tax to increase equality, and in the process we will 
reduce inequality of income and wealth.
We will tax to encourage market activity, and to correct 
their failures.
We will tax to encourage full employment and opportunity 
for those who work.
We will tax to deliver sustainability because we and our 
children and their children require that.
We will tax to build sustainable growth.
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We will tax openly and transparently.
We will tax for the common good, because that is what we 
believe tax can deliver.
So, what then do I propose to do to fulfil this vision? In 
essence what I am setting out today is a fundamental reform 
of taxation in this country because I believe that tax is funda-
mental to the prosperity of everyone, including everyone who 
trades, in the UK. This will be a new tax compact for the UK 
and the first of those reforms makes clear something about 
which it seems too many have been in denial in this country 
for too long. This reform makes clear that the money paid in 
tax in the UK is money that the government owns: it is not 
taxpayers’ money. 
In case there is doubt after what I have just said, let me 
spell this out: the government spends its own money. That is 
made up of money it can create, money it can borrow and 
money it collects in tax. But in each and every case what it 
spends is money belonging to the government. It is not the 
taxpayers’. The myth that somehow it is the taxpayers’ money 
that the government uses has been very convenient for those 
who argue that they could make better use of the cash in 
question, an argument they then take as justification for 
avoidance or evasion of their obligation to pay. I have to tell 
all who think that: from today think again. Taxes that are 
owed from now on are due because the tax in question 
belongs to the government and not you, and I am here to 
remind everyone that we were given the right to collect that 
tax by the people of this country in free and democratic elec-
tions and you’re cheating on your neighbours if you like to 
pretend otherwise. Your neighbours don’t like cheats and nor 
do we. That’s why we’re changing the rules of tax. 
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Like many Chancellors before me I am not amused by the 
work of a vast army of highly paid lawyers, bankers and 
accountants who think it their job to undermine my right to 
tax, even though that right has been granted by the people of 
this country. Time and again my predecessors have tried to 
tackle this problem, but all have failed. Our tax law is as a 
result incredibly long, and deeply complex. The reason for 
that is that no one has, until today, had the courage to chal-
lenge the cause of this problem at its root. That root is that 
UK tax law is written so that nothing is taxable unless the law 
says it is. 
This is what I am going to change. I now advise the House 
that we are going to introduce a new law. It will be called the 
Tax Base Act. And it will say that all income, profits, gains, 
gifts, wealth, land, sales and other such tax bases are in the 
scope to tax unless specifically exempted. The result is that, 
for the very first time, if a taxpayer argues that something 
they have done is not taxable it will be for them to prove that 
is the case: the onus will now be on them whereas in the past 
it has always been the government’s duty to prove that tax 
was due. The same law will also say that nothing can be offset 
against a tax bill unless specifically allowed by law. Again, if 
there is doubt it will be for the taxpayer to prove their case. 
The whole balance of power in UK taxation will change for 
ever as a result, but the vast majority of us will not notice 
because we have always lived very comfortably within the 
law as it is. For tax cheats I am, however, creating the prover-
bial nightmare scenario, and I am sure that most people in 
this country will be delighted as a result. 
To back this up I will ensure that in future all UK tax law 
will be purposive. That means every bit of new law will 
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say why it is being introduced, what it is meant to achieve, 
and why that is necessary. 
And to back all this up I will introduce a second Act. This 
will be called the Interpretation of Tax Law Act, and will 
make clear that, when dispute arises, all tax cases will be 
decided on whether or not the intention of the law has been 
complied with. HM Revenue & Customs will not be able to 
demand a payment by claiming that a law has a meaning no 
one in this House ever intended it should have. And a tax-
payer will not be able to claim exemption from tax or a right 
to offset an expense unless they can show that this was 
intended.
At a stroke I will add to the certainty of tax law. It will be 
simpler. It will be shorter. It will be clearer. It will make its 
case in plain English so it can be understood. And it will be 
guided by principles that anyone will be capable of making 
sense of. 
Of course this is a big change. It will require consultation. 
And we will go out of our way to hear the opinion of all who 
need to be consulted on this issue, and not just the views of 
the tax profession and big business who are usually the only 
people who can afford the time and effort to take part in 
these processes. To achieve this we will be awarding grants to 
make sure that those who think they need to be heard when 
we ask for opinion will have the chance to get their say, not 
just on this issue but others of similar significance over time.
That open-mindedness to all who have interest in tax is 
something that I believe must extend throughout the tax 
system. For that reason I am also announcing a major change 
to the way in which HMRC is managed today. It is absurd 
that this department – one of the biggest in Whitehall – has 
Joy of Tax.indd   217 04/09/2015   12:30
RICHARD MURPHY
218
no minister to whom it is responsible. Chancellors, and their 
teams, have answered for it over the years, but there is no 
minister for taxation. Nor is there a Department of Taxation. 
Instead we have our tax authority run by a Board. To whom 
that Board is responsible is not clear. And how Parliament 
gets to hold them to account is even more ambiguous: it has 
not even been possible to decide which committee can ask 
them questions. There may have been historical reasons for 
this – just as there are for the fact that HMRC is still named 
as if the personal property of our sovereign – but such anach-
ronisms belong to another age and will not do in the 
twenty-first century.
So today I am announcing that we are creating a new 
Secretary of State for Taxation. My Right Honourable friend 
the Prime Minister will be announcing who will hold the 
appointment in due course. That minister will be supported 
by the usual range of ministerial colleagues and together they 
will be responsible for running the new Department of 
Taxation, whose job it will be to collect the taxes for which 
HMRC have been responsible since 2005.
Such a Department could not function without a proper 
statement of purpose. That I will clearly state. The new 
Department of Taxation will be tasked with collecting all 
those taxes rightly due from those who owe them under UK 
law wherever they might reside, whatever nationality they 
might have, and whatever legal status they might claim. In 
doing so it shall be expected to apply the law equitably and 
with due sensitivity to the taxpayer’s position. It will be 
obliged to provide help to those who make reasonable request 
for support in paying their tax. It will be allowed to charge 
for doing so when it is reasonable that it might do so. And it 
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will, of course, be held to account by an independent appeals 
and judicial system, with whose rulings it will be obliged to 
comply. Tax justice will be at the heart of UK taxation from 
now on. 
To ensure that the new Secretary of State and ministerial 
colleagues are appropriately advised we will establish a new 
advisory board to replace that which previously oversaw 
HMRC, but we will not replicate that Board’s membership, 
which was exclusively reserved for tax advisers and represen-
tatives of big business. This new board will seek to recruit 
membership reflecting the interests of all taxpayers. The days 
when our tax authority appeared to be run by big business 
and the wealthy for the benefit of the best-off in society have 
to be consigned to history. 
The new Department will have some very clear budget 
responsibilities placed upon it. It will be expected to estimate 
what the total sum owing in tax in any year might be and set 
out clearly how best it might manage its resources to collect 
that sum. When, as will inevitably happen on occasion, it 
falls short of that total sum it will be expected to explain why 
this tax gap has arisen and what it intends to do to remedy 
the deficit, if that is possible. This will include recommending 
new law and the repeal of old law that has outlived its 
purpose. 
To make sure that these complex issues are fully under-
stood by my new ministerial colleagues, and, as importantly, 
the Members of this House, we will create a new Office for 
Tax Responsibility. This will report jointly to the Secretary of 
State and a new Select Committee of this House. This Office 
will audit HMRC, the tax gap and the new Department’s 
effectiveness in using resources. It will also vet and comment 
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upon that Department’s proposals for change in tax law. It 
will be entitled in its own right to suggest those laws that now 
need reform or repeal. And to make sure this House has 
the say that it deserves on this most vital of issues the new 
Select Committee will be allowed to ask this Office for Tax 
Responsibility to undertake reviews on its behalf. 
The Chancellor will retain overall responsibility for estab-
lishing economic policy for the UK: tax is just a part of that 
process but it is an important one. The new minister and I 
will work very closely together.
In doing so I make clear that I will reverse another of my 
predecessor’s policies in place over many years. We will treat 
the Department of Taxation as a revenue department and not 
as one that incurs expense. As such, it will be granted the 
resources it needs to undertake its job, so long as it can show 
that these resources will be used cost-effectively. The days 
when we have run a deficit because we have not allocated 
enough money to collecting the taxes due in this country are 
over.
Changing the administration of tax will not, however, be 
enough to fulfil our plans to collect the tax owing in this 
country. Some serious and systemic defects in the tax system 
will also need to be addressed. So, for example, every com-
pany and trust in the UK will be required to submit a tax 
return in future. And every bank in the UK shall be obliged to 
tell the new Department for Taxation who they have identi-
fied as the directors and owners of those companies. Those 
people will then be liable for all the tax owing by their com-
panies if it is not paid and they cannot prove this was not 
through their own neglect. The process by which UK compa-
nies could be used to help anyone who wanted to evade tax 
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from behind a veil of anonymity must be brought to an end.
For the same reason all companies will be required to put 
their full accounts, including expanded information on their 
tax due and paid, on public record in future. In the case of 
multinational corporations this will mean that they will have 
to file accounts including country-by-country reporting data.
And, because the accountancy profession has failed to 
deliver these reforms, we will no longer trust them to deliver 
the accounting standards to ensure tax is properly paid in 
this country in due course. They may, of course, continue 
to set International Financial Reporting Standards and UK 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles but we are today 
setting up a Tax Reporting Standards Board to make sure 
that we get the accounting data we need to ensure that tax 
due is both paid and properly explained in the accounts of all 
who trade in the UK.
Let me move on to discuss just who we think those taxable 
in the UK might be. I can announce that from today we are 
abolishing the domicile rule that has allowed some people to 
claim a special and restricted basis for taxation in this country 
on the grounds of the accident of their situation at birth. That 
type of discrimination has no place in the UK in the twenty- 
first century. A new temporary residence rule will, however, 
be available to those here for less than five complete tax 
years. 
Deciding which companies are resident in the UK has 
always been a sensitive issue and international law has not 
kept pace with it. I therefore announce today that we will 
now consider all companies and trusts that own land and 
buildings in the UK or which employ people in the UK to be 
resident in the UK and that, without exception, all such 
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companies will be required to file their accounts on public 
record in this country, making clear what part of their income 
and profit arises in the UK, and all will be required to file UK 
tax returns, irrespective of which other countries they might 
have tax obligations to. We will be proposing multilateral 
reform to our double tax treaties with all other countries 
impacted by this change, offering them reciprocal rights. We 
stress, we are only seeking to tax that part of their income 
that arises in the UK to UK tax, but the time when trading in 
the UK could be used as a mechanism to avoid tax that might 
otherwise be due in this country has to be brought to an end.
So too do many of the opportunities to shift profits out of 
the UK need to be brought to an end. Most of these arise 
when expenses are claimed for tax purposes that have been 
charged to a company trading in the UK from companies to 
which they are related that are located elsewhere. To tackle 
this issue I can confirm that we are also seeking multilateral 
change to our double tax treaties to ensure that tax may be 
deducted at source from payments of interest, dividends, roy-
alties, management charges, insurance premiums and hedging 
expenses when paid from the UK to companies related to that 
making the payment located in a wide range of countries 
that we have identified as having insufficiently stringent tax 
regimes to ensure that those sums are appropriately taxed on 
receipt. We will willingly offer reciprocal rights to the coun-
tries affected. The curse of profit-shifting has to be brought to 
an end: the UK must have the right to tax profit arising in this 
country. For the time being the European Union is outside the 
scope of this change, but we will be raising this issue with our 
partners there.
To ensure that this right to tax is upheld I also announce 
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that the UK’s General Anti-Abuse Rule will be replaced 
with a General Anti-Avoidance Principle. This might sound 
semantic, but it is not: the abuse rule puts the onus of proof 
of abuse on our tax authority. The general anti-avoidance 
principle will require a taxpayer to show that each step in a 
transaction has not been included for tax reasons and does 
instead have a substantial alternative purpose or it will be 
ignored when tax is due. The age of tax avoidance has to 
be brought to an end. This is an important step in achieving 
that goal.
Let me finally turn then to the taxes we will charge in this 
country and state the principles on which we will charge 
them. That’s necessary because many of our taxes make little 
or no sense now, having been designed in other eras for eco-
nomic circumstances long forgotten. Too often they are 
discriminatory: tax on those working for a living has long 
been much higher in this country than that due on similar 
sums enjoyed by people living off investment income, gains 
or speculation. That makes no sense at all. If we are to have 
a fair and progressive tax system in the UK then a pound that 
a person receives should not be taxed more or less favourably 
dependent upon the place from which it comes or the way in 
which it is recorded unless there is very sound public benefit 
for that difference. 
In that case some UK taxes need abolition now. One of 
those is capital gains tax. Capital gains will in future be taxed 
as income. A small annual allowance of tax-free gains will be 
permitted in future, purely to save the cost of having to report 
all gains, however small they might be, for tax purposes, but 
the idea that the conversion of income into gains should 
reduce tax rates will come to an end. 
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This change will, I stress, apply to the sale of private busi-
nesses: as the likes of Warren Buffet have pointed out, no true 
entrepreneur was ever put off their goal by the fact that they 
might have to pay fair tax at some point on the money 
they made. 
Anti-avoidance measures to prevent the shifting of gains in 
marriages and civil partnerships and the shifting of gains out-
side the UK on the sale of UK assets will be introduced, with 
those responsible for aiding and abetting the latter being 
made liable for all the tax owing on any arrangement they 
have helped create. 
Back in 1965 when capital gains tax was created it made 
sense to exempt a person’s home from charge to this tax. This 
country was not then the home-owning nation the govern-
ment of the day wished it to be, and there was a need to build 
new houses. We wanted to provide that opportunity and an 
incentive to take it. Property wealth was surprisingly limited. 
There was a desire to spread it more widely. Times have 
changed. This country has become one where property rep-
resents a significant part of private wealth, but precisely 
because of the tax relief provided in 1965 that wealth is now 
hugely concentrated in an ageing minority who can still 
afford to own their own home. Many of the young now have 
no chance of owning a house precisely because, after fifty 
years of tax-free gains having accumulated in the property 
market, house prices have moved way beyond their reach. 
What was once a good idea is now a bad idea that is creating 
social and inter-generational stress in the UK. As a result 
gains arising from today on UK housing will be taxable. But, 
because I know that people need to move for many reasons 
during their lives, we will only collect the tax due when a 
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person dies or when they do not reinvest the proceeds of the 
sale of their house in another home. No one will be denied 
the chance to live in a house to the value they have been 
accustomed to owning because of this tax charge.
Capital gains will also apply to the sale of all agricultural 
land and businesses in future, and upon the gift of all assets 
whether during life or on death. In the case of owner- 
managed businesses and family-run farms we recognize that 
continuity of management is important, and that businesses 
should not be denuded of capital as a result of tax owing. 
Consequently we will make special arrangements in these 
cases to accept part-ownership of the assets sold or gifted in 
lieu of taxes, but do make clear that such ownership will be 
actively managed to ensure that the state receives its share of 
future profits, and special rights shall be attached to any 
shares accepted as part of such an arrangement to ensure that 
these rights can be enforced.
With these changes to capital gains tax there will be little 
reason for inheritance tax in the future and as a result I con-
firm that this tax, which has been the cause of much vexation, 
will be abolished. 
In place of this tax I am instead proposing a wealth tax. 
This is now possible for the first time because of the information- 
sharing agreements that we now have with so many of the 
world’s tax havens. We will pursue such deals with those that 
have still not signed them. In the meantime any professional 
adviser who in any way assists a person to avoid tax by 
exploiting the remaining states who have not cooperated 
with us will under new arrangements become personally 
liable for all tax not paid as a consequence, without limit. 
The wealth tax will not be charged on main residences, 
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family farms and private businesses that will now be subject 
to capital gains tax in life, whether gifted or sold, and on 
death. Nor will it be charged on pension wealth. This charge 
will then be on let property portfolios, financial investment 
portfolios, personal property and other assets of similar type 
primarily used to generate unearned income, unless they are 
otherwise exempted by law using the new principles for 
writing tax law that I have already outlined. The charge will 
be introduced on all such portfolios worth more than £1 mil-
lion at the rate of 1 per cent per annum, although the rate will 
increase with the scale of declared wealth. All wealth will be 
subject to self-declaration. Any assets not declared will 
become the property of the state. Any asset undervalued 
will be subject to sale to the state at the under-declared price 
if the Department of Taxation decides to exercise that option. 
Wealth will be calculated on a worldwide basis.
I have three further measures relating to land to announce 
before moving on. The first relates to council tax. This is a 
tax produced in a hurry by a government in a panic that 
nobody has dared revise since the day that it was introduced 
in 1992 and which is unfit for purpose today, and as unfair 
now as on the day it was created. It makes no sense at all that 
this tax, which is charged on the occupiers and not the owners 
of land, and which encourages second-property ownership 
and properties being left vacant, whilst the fact that charges 
are capped at what are now ludicrously low valuations ren-
ders it regressive, should continue in existence. I can therefore 
confirm that arrangements are to be made to introduce a land 
value tax in England and that devolved governments will be 
encouraged to consider similar taxes in the parts of the 
country for which they are responsible. Such a change will 
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take time, and care will be needed with the design of this tax. 
This means that its introduction will be delayed for at least 
three years, but I can set out its design principles now. All 
land will, without exception, be liable to this tax, although 
exemptions for some land and uses will be made, using our 
new tax design principles. Any land where the beneficial 
owner (including the owners of offshore companies) cannot 
be identified will be held by the Crown in trust until owner-
ship can be established. If that has not happened within ten 
years the state will become the legal owner of the land in 
question. The tax will be charged on the rental value of the 
undeveloped land: this is a tax on land and not on buildings. 
The tax will be progressive: the higher the value of the land 
the higher the rate will be. Land will not be aggregated for 
assessment: the wealth tax addresses that issue, in our 
opinion. The rates of tax will be deliberately set to ensure 
that many living in lower-banded council tax property will 
pay less in future and all tenants will, by definition, be 
exempted from this tax. Arrangements will be made to pre-
vent landlords passing on their liabilities to their tenants.
The next change with regard to land relates to stamp duty. 
Because all housing will now be subject to capital gains tax, 
keeping the stamp duty charge on the purchase and sale of 
private houses makes no sense at all, so it will be abolished. 
In combination these two changes considerably reduce the 
cost of moving house in the UK if a person needs to relocate 
for the purposes of their employment, and will as a result 
help people find work to suit their needs and to relocate when 
family or other needs demand it.
I have two final changes to make with regard to housing. 
The first tackles the illogical fact that interest relief on 
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mortgage borrowings has been provided to landlords for the 
last twenty-five years when it has been denied to owner- 
occupiers. This makes no sense at all. It divides the market, 
has fuelled house price increases by subsidizing the cost of 
buy-to-let arrangements and has driven a massive increase in 
housing benefit costs as a result. Previous governments have 
restricted this relief to basic rate tax, but I now intend to 
abolish it for everyone bar not-for-profit landlords. I am 
aware, of course, that this will cause stress to some landlords. 
For those affected we will offer a guarantee: we will buy 
properties from distressed landlords where there are tenants 
in place for the value of the mortgage outstanding as at 
today’s date or 80 per cent of market value, whichever is the 
higher. No one need face financial crisis as a result of this 
change.
The move will, however, create a potential shortage of new 
housing for let. This will be addressed by the launch of a 
house-building programme to be funded by infrastructure 
quantitative easing. The debt that not-for-profit social land-
lords (including local authorities and housing associations) 
issue to fund their programmes will be made available for 
sale on financial markets in future, but with a guarantee that 
so long as the properties meet minimum requirements, 
including high environmental standards, a new Investment 
Bank to be established today will fund those loans using new 
money especially created for the purpose by the Bank of 
England. Every government has the power to create money 
for social purposes. We will use it when it provides a proper 
and better alternative than taxation provides.
Let me turn then to other taxes. I have made clear our pol-
icies. We are not seeking to balance our budget, although the 
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quantitative easing programme I have just announced will, by 
taking a burden off taxation, make it more likely that we will 
achieve that goal. I stress: our tax policy will always be 
designed to ensure that we can deliver high quality jobs in 
every constituency in the UK while also ensuring that those 
with need that the government can help with have access to 
the resources they require, whatever they might be. This is 
our priority: people working matters more than balancing a 
budget. 
This, though, means I have major changes to make in the 
structure of the UK’s tax system. First let me deal with income 
tax, which many think to be at the heart of that system. 
Income tax is one of our few progressive taxes at present, and 
as such plays a vital role in delivering the essential redistribu-
tion of income in this country that is a foundation of our 
common wealth. I wish to reinforce that process. Firstly, the 
anomaly where some on higher income in the UK are denied 
a personal allowance for the purposes of this tax must go. 
Everyone will now enjoy that allowance.
Equally, it is absurd that some get more value from this 
allowance than others because they are higher rate taxpayers. 
That denies the fact that we should all be treated as equals by 
the tax system: this allowance will now only be available at 
the basic rate of tax.
That precedent is one I want to build on: in future no 
allowance or relief, excepting those given as a deduction from 
trading income, will be provided at anything but the basic 
rate of tax. This will provide an enormous simplification to 
our current tax regime as well as delivering social justice. 
On the subject of such allowances and reliefs, now that we 
know, as the Bank of England has admitted, that savings are 
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not the precondition of investment in the UK economy, but 
that credit is, the economic justification for many of the sav-
ings arrangements that receive favourable treatment in the 
UK tax system has disappeared. Moreover, since, by defini-
tion, most of those using these schemes can already afford to 
save, the tax relief provided tends simply to increase wealth 
inequality in the UK. That’s the exact opposite of the policy 
we intend to pursue. As such all such reliefs, including those 
for pension saving, will be phased out over the next five years. 
I have been persuaded to retain the ISA scheme that can be 
used by many as an alternative mechanism for saving for 
retirement, although I would stress my own belief that much 
of the money in ISAs would be saved anyway, meaning that 
the tax relief provided is simply a state subsidy to no good 
effect for those not in need of it. I will establish several par-
allel studies on this issue in the near future to determine 
whether or not my hypothesis is correct, to ensure that money 
is not being wasted unnecessarily in keeping this scheme.
Investment income has, in any case, been incredibly favour-
ably treated in the last thirty years in the UK because unlike 
earnings from work it has not been subject to national insur-
ance. I can see no economic justification for this, or the 
half-hearted attempt to address this issue that the dividend 
tax introduced by a predecessor represented. I announce the 
abolition of that tax today. I also announce that there will 
now be, so long as we have a national insurance charge in this 
country, an investment income surcharge on all types of 
unearned income, including interest, dividends, rents, trust 
distributions and taxable proceeds from insurance policies. 
This will be set at a rate broadly equivalent to 60 per cent of 
the combined employee’s and employer’s national insurance 
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contribution. The first £3,000 of investment income will be 
exempt from the charge for those below retirement age. That 
will increase to an exemption equivalent to median annual 
income for pensioners. 
The relationship between the tax and national insurance 
systems has always been difficult, and national insurance is 
now a tax without economic justification. It no longer funds 
pensions or the NHS, and the mechanisms for its payment 
reflect a world of work long gone. It’s especially worrying 
that it discourages employment when high quality work for 
all has to be our national goal. I want therefore to announce 
that it is my plan to abolish national insurance charges. This 
goal will not, however, be achieved overnight. This change is 
too big for that to be the case and we cannot do without a 
means to collect the revenue national insurance currently 
contributes. 
I have considered merging income tax and national insur-
ance, but that will not do. Firstly, national insurance is a 
regressive tax and any merger would to some degree repro-
duce that in income tax. Second, the resulting rates would be 
unattractively high. 
I am instead introducing a new tax. This is a progressive 
charge on financial flows through bank accounts and related 
payment systems. The charge will apply to individuals and 
businesses. Initially the rate charged will be flat above a fixed 
sum flowing through all an individual’s linked accounts – the 
link ensuring that account transfers can go on unimpeded. 
The fixed sum will be designed to ensure that for many on 
lower incomes this charge will not apply. Over time the rate 
will become progressive: the goal will be to entirely replace 
the regressive national insurance charge that at present 
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discourages employment with a new progressive charge that 
will discourage excessive consumption in a way that no tax in 
the UK does at present. We know that this is necessary: we 
cannot afford the excess consumption that is fuelling global 
warming. This is a tax whose time has come. That is why I 
am going to call it a Carbon Usage Tax, or CUT for short. 
Measures to beat avoidance of this tax, including avoidance 
by the transfer of banking arrangements outside the UK, will 
be put in place.
Anti-avoidance arrangements are also needed when it 
comes to company taxation. Another anomaly of UK taxa-
tion has been that anyone can transfer their income from 
their own name into that of a company they own and reduce 
their tax rate as a result. This makes no sense: a pound under 
a person’s control is always worth the same amount to them, 
whether in a company or not, and that pound should be sub-
ject to the same tax wherever it is recorded. Our economy is 
being distorted by this situation, and almost certainly to our 
disadvantage.
When corporation tax was first introduced so too was the 
concept of the close company. This was any company con-
trolled by five or fewer people – with all close relatives 
counting as one person. I intend to revive the idea: all close 
companies will from now on have their income apportioned 
to their members, who will have to pay tax on their share 
whether or not they are paid it. I am aware this could create 
injustice: as a result all companies that distribute less than 50 
per cent of their taxable income to their shareholders will 
instead see their corporation tax rate double in future and the 
shareholders will be discharged from their responsibility in 
that case. To make sure that such companies are not 
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prevented from investing I will ensure that all companies 
impacted have 100 per cent allowances on their capital 
spending and that it is only taxable income that they need 
distribute, not their accounting profits. Nothing in this 
arrangement will harm the entrepreneurial economy.
For larger companies there are obvious problems in 
applying this rule. Their tax needs to be dealt with in a dif-
ferent fashion entirely, and in due course I intend that large 
and small company tax regimes should be separate for that 
reason. For now I make clear that the first steps in addressing 
this problem will be an increase in the corporation tax rate 
for such companies. These companies impose a cost on 
society because they can reduce the effectiveness of taxation 
systems. They also impose a cost because of the risks limited 
liability creates. And their members secure a benefit from 
both situations: this benefit needs to be paid for. Consequently 
a 5 per cent excess tax will be due by these companies on all 
their profits chargeable in the UK. Coupled with the mea-
sures already noted to secure the UK tax base, I expect this to 
increase significantly their contribution to the UK economy.
That is important: we have people in need in the UK and I 
intend to help them. For too long our UK social security 
system has been characterized as being inhabited by those 
who are work shy or scroungers. I know that is simply not 
true. Of course there are a few to whom such terms might 
apply, but it’s insulting to the vast majority on low income 
and who need support in this country to even suggest that 
such terms have general application. Instead of permitting 
such allegations by seeking to separate the benefits system 
from the majority in society I wish to make clear that the 
benefits and tax systems should instead be seen as a 
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continuum by integrating them. The goal is to guarantee a 
minimum income to everyone in the UK, whoever they are, 
and whatever age they are, so long as they have a minimum 
residence qualification. Such a move will have enormous 
advantages: in particular the penal tax rates suffered by those 
moving from benefits into work will largely disappear whilst 
the stigma of old age and pensions will eventually be replaced 
by a national income all will share.
I will say now that this will, of course, increase income tax 
rates: I accept that as the price for social justice for each and 
every person in this country. But every single person will also 
be in receipt in due course of a minimum guaranteed income 
that will protect everyone from the curse of poverty. I can 
think of nothing more important that a government can do 
for the young, the old, the vulnerable, the unfortunate, the 
disabled and those whom the market has failed than this. 
That is why we will set out to achieve this goal.
I recognize I cannot do it overnight, but we will do three 
things today. First we will restore universal child credits. 
Second we will eliminate many of the penal elements that 
have crept into the benefits system such as the much hated 
bedroom tax that has victimized so many, and third I will 
ensure that everyone of adult age will now enjoy the value of 
the personal allowance that I have also granted to those on 
highest pay today. So, if a person in receipt of benefits will 
from today have insufficient taxable income to receive the 
cash value of the personal allowance given to all with income 
at the basic rate in tax then their income will be topped up by 
this amount, in cash. The income tax system in this country 
is not just for those in work: it is for everyone, and so too is 
the benefits system. We have begun today the march to make 
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them one system that ensures everyone in this country can 
live in dignity.
Finally, let me turn to those taxes that impact on spending. 
I have already mentioned a new tax on bank deposits. It 
would be inappropriate to create such a tax without recog-
nizing the special status of the financial services industry 
when it comes to such a tax. The sums contracted in this 
sector are out of all proportion to those in the rest of the 
economy, or world come to that. It has long been suggested 
that this country needs a financial transactions tax. Today it 
gets one, with differential rates for trading in shares and other 
securities, foreign exchange, derivatives and other futures, to 
allow flexibility in the response that this tax can provide to 
each of these markets. I am also commissioning research on 
how such rates may be varied in times of high-volume trading 
to slow down markets when they are tending to panic. This 
tax is as much about preventing the excesses that these mar-
kets cause as it is about revenues raised, although I expect the 
sums in question to be significant. As a state with its own 
currency we will put in place necessary anti-avoidance mea-
sures to ensure that this tax will be hard to avoid or evade.
Our biggest tax on consumption is VAT. This is a tax that 
has raised significant sums and which many economists have 
said should be reformed to remove the exemptions and allow-
ances within it which they say create economic inefficiencies. 
I have to disagree. If economic efficiency means lots of money 
irrespective of ability to pay and simplicity means taxing 
come what may then I might agree with the economists who 
say this, but I do not, of course, think those terms mean any-
thing like that. So we will, of course, retain VAT but I intend 
to reduce the rate to the lowest levels allowed by the European 
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Union and will compensate by increasing the bank transac-
tions tax on consumption. VAT has contributed to the quite 
absurd situation where the UK has what looks like a flat tax 
system overall, except at the bottom end where it is obviously 
regressive. I intend to change that and this is a first step in this 
direction.
There are specific measures I will take to increase specific 
expenditure taxes but at this moment, given the scale of other 
tax reforms already announced, these must be relatively 
minor and can only be justified by policy need. One such 
need is to reform our basis of air transport taxation. This is a 
flat tax and makes a relatively high charge on families going 
on their annual holiday and a low one in proportion to 
income on those who travel frequently. So I am pleased to 
announce a new progressive air usage tax. Anyone flying 
once a year will now pay no airport taxes; those who travel 
frequently will pay progressive rates of tax based on their 
passport data which will be collected at the time of booking 
for that purpose. 
I will also tackle one other pressing issue and that is tax on 
renewable energy. The climate change levy is charged on this 
at present. That is absurd: the levy will be removed 
immediately.
I am open to suggestions on other such changes. Please 
send them my way. Our tax system will from now on be 
open, accountable and up for discussion, just as all today’s 
announcements will be subject to appropriate consultation. 
In saying that I do, however, return to my opening themes. 
This is a budget that sets out to change our understanding 
of tax and its role in our society for good. It is a budget that 
says that a government has a duty to manage the economy of 
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the nation it has been elected to govern, and it confirms that 
this government will do that. It’s a budget that rejects the 
false logic of balancing the books, and says that there are 
more ways than just taxing to do that in any case: our use of 
quantitative easing to fund social housing announced today is 
evidence of that. In due course we expect to use the same 
mechanism for other purposes.
But most of all this is a budget about fairness. It will redis-
tribute income and wealth, but in ways that are appropriate. 
It will encourage work, but provide for those who cannot 
work or for whom work is not paying appropriately in ways 
that respect them as the fully valued members of society that 
they are. It creates a level playing field between business and 
the rest of the community, and between the UK and its part-
ners. And by taking taxes off work and putting them onto 
excess consumption this is a budget about achieving the 
potential of all people in this country, and not about deliv-
ering the chance for a few to spend a lot.
As such this budget is about our common future and 
building it together. That’s what I call the Joy of Tax.
I commend The Joy of Tax to the House. 
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